T. Kuhn opposes in his articles on history of science the union of the philosophy and history of science. He is defending an interdisciplinary dialog between both sciences. A given problem would be explained there from the point of view od the philosophy of science and of the history of science but not by a unified point of view. However, Kuhn gave with his theory of scientific revolutions the basis for a new science: the theory of the development of science. (...) This science unifies even the analysis of the historical development of science with the rational reconstruction of the development of science. (shrink)

In order to perceive the world, we need more than just raw sensory input: a subliminal paradigm of thought is required to interpret raw sensory data and, thereby, create the objects and events we perceive around ourselves. As such, the world we see reflects our own unexamined, culture-bound assumptions and expectations, which explains why every generation in history has believed that it more or less understood the world. Today, we perceive a world of objects and events outside and independent of (...) mind, which merely reflects our current paradigm of thought. Anomalies that contradict this paradigm have been accumulated by physicists over the past couple of decades, which will eventually force our culture to move to a new paradigm. Under this new paradigm, a form of universal mind will be viewed as nature’s sole fundamental entity. In this paper, I offer a sketch of what the new paradigm may look like. (shrink)

In debates about animal sentience, the precautionary principle is often invoked. The idea is that when the evidence of sentience is inconclusive, we should “give the animal the benefit of the doubt” or “err on the side of caution” in formulating animal protection legislation. Yet there remains confusion as to whether it is appropriate to apply the precautionary principle in this context, and, if so, what “applying the precautionary principle” means in practice regarding the burden of proof for animal sentience. (...) Here I construct a version of the precautionary principle tailored to the question of animal sentience together with a practical framework for implementing it. I explain and defend the key features of this framework, argue that it is well-aligned with current practice in animal welfare science, and consider and reject a number of influential counterarguments to the use of precautionary reasoning in this area. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es explorar las diferencias subyacentes a las visiones que Michel Foucault y Hannah Arendt sostuvieron respectivamente sobre la esfera pública en general y sobre su relación con procesos biológicos, sociales y económicos en particular. De esta manera las presuposiciones teóricas presentes en el escrito foucaultiano La volonté de savoir serán contrastadas con aquellas analizadas por Arendt en su trabajo The Human Condition. En las conclusiones será indagado el deseo de reunión de parte de las weltanschauungen (...) que los autores previamente referidos poseían sobre este tópico, formulado por Giorgio Agamben. (shrink)

Scientific antirealism, the view that successful theories are empirically adequate, is untenable in light of the problem of unobserved anomalies that since past scientists could not observe the anomalies that caused the replacement of past theories with present theories, present scientists also cannot observe the anomalies that will cause the replacement of present theories with future theories. There are several moves that antirealists would be tempted to make to get around the problem of unobserved anomalies. All of them, however, are (...) problematic. (shrink)

Resumen: Usualmente se ha asumido que una única distinción puede dar cuenta del rol que cumplen los conceptos en una teoría respecto de la contrastación y respecto de la explicación. Intentaremos mostrar que esta asunción es incorrecta. Por una parte, no hay razones para considerar que esta coincidencia deba darse, y por otra, como se intentará mostrar a partir de varios ejemplos, de hecho, no se da. La base de contrastación de una teoría no tiene por qué coincidir con el (...) explanandum de la teoría. Para defender este punto se asumirá el estructuralismo metateórico. Se extraerán consecuencias para la concepción metateórica presupuesta. Palabras claves: Explicación; contrastación; T-teoricidad; Estructuralismo metateórico; Distinción teórico observacional -/- Title: Explain and test Abstract: It is usually held that one distinction can account for the role that concepts play in a theory regarding both test and explanation. We will demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect. On the one hand, there is no reason to think that this coincidence should exist. On the other, this is not the case, as we will show analysing several examples. The testing basis of a theory does not have to coincide with the explanandum of the theory. To defend this point we will endorse de metatheoretical structuralism. In addition, we will consider some repercussions that this discussion has for the assumed metatheoretical framework. Key-words: Explanation; Test; T-theoreticity; Metatheoretical Structuralism; Theoretical observational distinction . (shrink)

The use of MABS (Multi-Agent Based Simulations) is analysed as the modelling of distributed (usually social) systems using MAS as the model structure. It is argued that rarely is direct modelling of target systems attempted but rather an abstraction of the target systems is modelled and insights gained about the abstraction then applied back to the target systems. The MABS modelling process is divided into six steps: abstraction, design, inference, analysis, interpretation and application. Some types of MABS papers are characterised (...) in terms of the steps they focus on and some criteria for good MABS formulated in terms of the soundness with which the steps are established. Finally some practical proposals that might improve the informativeness of the field are suggested. (shrink)

It is no secret that scientists argue. They argue about theories. But even more, they argue about the evidence for theories. Is the evidence itself trustworthy? This is a bit surprising from the perspective of traditional empiricist accounts of scientific methodology according to which the evidence for scientific theories stems from observation, especially observation with the naked eye. These accounts portray the testing of scientific theories as a matter of comparing the predictions of the theory with the data generated by (...) these observations, which are taken to provide an objective link to reality. (shrink)

Hempel, Popper, and Kuhn argue that to be scientific is to be testable, to be falsifiable, and most nearly to do normal science, respectively. I argue that to be scientific is largely to be interactive, offering some examples from science to show that the ideas from different fields of science interact with one another. The results of the interactions are that hypotheses become more plausible, new phenomena are explained and predicted, we understand phenomena from a new perspective, and our worldview (...) becomes simpler. I also argue that given that the interactions are impressive features of science, astrology and religion would be regarded as science, provided that there are similar interactions in those enterprises. (shrink)

The scientific work of Leonardo da Vinci may have served as the main inspiration for the historical research of George Sarton. Although he never produced a work he felt was worthy of its subject, the little that he did write about Leonardo reveals the importance he attributed to him in the history of science. This is especially clear in Sarton´s treatment of Leonardo and a discovery he did not make: William Harvey´s discovery of blood circulation in the 17th Century. In (...) this article, we refer to this particular episode to trace Sarton´s conception of the development of science. It is a conception that illustrates well the traditional historiographic perspective that is the target of Thomas Kuhn´s criticisms. Although Kuhn never wrote about Leonardo or Harvey, we aim to show that he clearly positioned himself contrary to Sarton, albeit indirectly, with respect to this particular historical episode, as well. (shrink)

In our attempts to track changes in geological practice over time and to isolate the source of these changes, we have found that they are largely connected with the germination of new geologic subdisciplines. We use keyword and title data from articles in 68 geology journals to track the changes in influence of each subdiscipline on geology over all. Geological research has shifted emphasis over the study period, moving away from economic geology and petroleum geology, towards physics- and chemistry-based topics. (...) The Apollo lunar landings had as much influence on the topics and practice of geological research as the much-cited plate-tectonics revolution. These results reflect the barely-tangible effects of the changes in vocabulary and habit of thought that have pervaded the substance of geology. Geological literature has increased in volume and specialization, resulting in a highly fragmentary literature. However, we infer that "big science," characterized by large amounts of funding, collaboration, and large logistical investments, makes use of this specialization and turns "twigging" into a phenomenon that enhances, rather than inhibits, the progress of science. (shrink)

Science, like any other cognitive activity, is grounded in the sensorimotor interaction of our bodies with the environment. Human embodiment thus constrains the class of scientific concepts and theories which are accessible to us. The paper explores the possibility of doing science with artificial cognitive agents, in the framework of an interactivist-constructivist cognitive model of science. Intelligent robots, by virtue of having different sensorimotor capabilities, may overcome the fundamental limitations of human science and provide important technological innovations. Mathematics and nanophysics (...) are prime candidates for being studied by artificial scientists. (shrink)

Scientific inquiry is typically focused on particular questions about particular objects and properties. This leads to a multiplicity of models which, even when they draw on a single, consistent body of concepts and principles, often employ different methods and assumptions to model different systems. Pluralists have remarked on how scientists draw on different assumptions to model different systems, different aspects of systems and systems under different conditions and defended the value of distinct, incompatible models within science at any given time. (...) Paraconsistentists have proposed logical strategies to avoid trivialization when inconsistencies arise by a variety of means. Here we examine how chunk and permeate, a simple approach to paraconsistent reasoning which avoids heterodox logic by confining commitments to separate contexts in which reasoning with them is taken to be reliable while allowing ‘permeation’ of some conclusions into other contexts, can help to systematize pluralistic reasoning across the boundaries of plural contexts, using regional climate models as an example. The result is a kind of unity for science—but a unity achieved by the constrained exchange of specified information between different contexts, rather than the closure of all commitments under some paraconsistent consequence relation. (shrink)

The paper presents a reflection on the role of technology in the era of knowledge civilization. Diverse perceptions of this era, the concepts of three civilization eras versus three waves, of a conceptual platform versus an episteme of a civilization era, of a big change at the end of industrial civilization era are outlined. The deepening separation of the three spheres of technology, hard science, and social science with humanities is discussed. The contemporary philosophy of technology is shortly reviewed; it (...) is shown that some of its writings represent anti-technological attitudes and disregard the opinions of technologists even in the question of defining technology. An interpretation of technology proposed by M. Heidegger in Die Technik und die Kehre leads to a distinction between technology proper and the system of its socio-economic applications. The relation of technology proper to hard science and to socio-economic applications of technology forms two positive feedback loops. The second feedback loop, the one of socio-economic applications, might be more dangerous in cases of social infatuation with technological possibilities. Limiting such dangers is the responsibility of technology brokers and those who educate them - social, economic, management sciences. It is shown that the technology of knowledge civilization era will differ from that of industrial era in proposing boundless number of diversified technological possibilities. Thus, the Heideggerian warning against social infatuation with technological possibilities must be modified and strengthened. (shrink)

Establishing interdisciplinary academic departments has been a common response to the challenge of addressing complex problems. However, the assumptions that guide the formation of such departments are rarely questioned. Additionally, the designers and managers of interdisciplinary academic departments in any field of endeavour struggle to set an organisational climate appropriate to the diversity of their members. This article presents a preliminary analysis of collaborative dynamics within two interdisciplinary university departments in Australia focused on sustainability. Social network diagrams and metrics of (...) coauthorship and cosupervision are analysed qualitatively. A "vicarious interdisciplinarity" was identified among key academics working narrowly in order to earn the resources that allow them to support others working interdisciplinarily. Those supported in this way appear to benefit from the esteem and nonredundant collaborative connections their mentors provide via this strategy, but they experience uncertainty about their own career opportunities in similar settings. This article thus unearths a conundrum of succession for interdisciplinary academic environments, and suggests that simple colocation of diverse academic stars is an inadequate strategy to achieve effective intradepartmental collaboration. (shrink)

Recent debates between proponents of the modern evolutionary synthesis (the standard model in evolutionary biology) and those of a possible extended synthesis are a good example of the fascinating tangle among empirical, theoretical, and conceptual or philosophical matters that is the practice of evolutionary biology. In this essay, we briefly discuss two case studies from this debate, highlighting the relevance of philosophical thinking to evolutionary biologists in the hope of spurring further constructive cross-pollination between the two fields.

In this paper the life phenomenon is analysed from cybernetic point of view. The Korzeniewski’s approach is discussed and complemented. The analysis is based on autonomous systems theory and information metabolism theory. Philosophical aspects of the problem are taken into consideration as well.

Prior theory – that is theorising on the basis of thought and intuition , as opposed to attempting to explain observed data – inevitably distorts what comes after. It biases us in the selection of our data (the data model) and certainly biases any theorising that follows. It does this because we (as humans) can not help but see the world through our theorising – we are blind without the theoretical “spectacles” described by Kuhn (1962). If a theory has shown (...) to be essentially correct in some domain (i.e. by thorough validation against the target problem or domain) using it as a framework can be helpful, however, if the theory is not mature or even speculative then it can effectively prevent progress . I argue that, although we can not ever completely avoid this sort of bias, we can minimise its effect. Two sources of prior theorising coming from opposite directions are sociology and formal systems – neither of these is inherently biased towards prior theorising, but just happens to be a source for such theorising at the present time. Computer scientists who project the results of interesting models onto society are also guilty of constructing first and fitting later. (shrink)

For an academic, finding an audience is critical. However, finding an audience is not always easy for most marketing academics. This inaugural address explores what the challenges are in finding an audience, among fellow scholars, students, public policy, industry, or society in general. It finds that the academic audience for marketing research is: often small; constrained to the own discipline; and mostly located in the United States. The student audience is also under pressure, due to: the difficult translation of academic (...) marketing research to marketing education; shifting student preferences; and lack of involvement of students. The audience in society is too small due to a lack of relevance of marketing research in three ways: lack of a public policy perspective; too incremental insights to be useful to practice; and too much focus on rigor to be interesting for the press. This address cites three ways to grow towards a larger and more loyal audience by evolving towards: a truly globalized community of marketing academics; living together with our source disciplines; and a stronger focus on the knowledge economy and the life sciences. (shrink)