- Evidence of evidence in higher-order evidence: Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Eds.: Higher-order evidence: new essays. Oxford University Press, 322pp, £60 HB.Jonathan Matheson - 2020 - Metascience 29 (2):205-208.details
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Defeaters and the generality problem.Tim Loughrist - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5):13845-13860.details
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A note concerning justification and access.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):369-386.details
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No-Platforming and Higher-Order Evidence, or Anti-Anti-No-Platforming.Neil Levy - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (4):487-502.details
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Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):573-596.details
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Belief and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13523-13542.details
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Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement.Adam Leite - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):150-171.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):767-794.details
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Evidentialism and the Problem of Basic Competence.Timothy Kearl - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Klemens Kappel & Frederik J. Andersen - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1103-1120.details
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Bottom up justification, asymmetric epistemic push, and the fragility of higher order justification.Klemens Kappel - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):119-138.details
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Obsessive–compulsive akrasia.Samuel Kampa - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (4):475-492.details
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Reasonable Doubt, Robust Evidential Probability and the Unknown.Hylke Jellema - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-20.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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Prefaces, Knowledge, and Questions.Frank Hong - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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A Virtue Reliabilist Error-Theory of Defeat.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2449-2466.details
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Indicative Conditionals and Epistemic Luminosity.Matt Hewson & James Ravi Kirkpatrick - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):231–258.details
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Higher‐order evidence and losing one's conviction.Leah Henderson - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):513-529.details
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Rationality is Not Coherence.Nora Heinzelmann - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):312-332.details
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Extremists are more confident.Nora Heinzelmann & Viet Tran - 2022 - Erkenntnis.details
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The Problem with Trusting Unfamiliar Faculties: Accessibilism Defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):447-471.details
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Knowledge-how is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.details
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Moderate Epistemic Akrasia.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):69-97.details
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Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (2).details
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Dubious pleasures.Javier González de Prado - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):217-234.details
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Dispossessing Defeat.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):323-340.details
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Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2221-2242.details
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Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.details
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A subjectivist’s guide to deterministic chance.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4339-4372.details
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Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment.James Fritz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):573-587.details
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Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism.James Fritz - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):98-116.details
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Refuting two dilemmas for infallibilism.Giada Fratantonio & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2643-2654.details
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How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
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Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, by Julia Staffel. Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. ix + 217. [REVIEW]Claire Field - 2021 - Mind 130.details
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Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, by Julia Staffel.Claire Field - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):724-733.details
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It's OK to Make Mistakes: Against the Fixed Point Thesis.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):175-185.details
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Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.details
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Conservative Treatment of Evidence.Alireza Fatollahi - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):568-583.details
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Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1753-1766.details
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Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities.Lee Elkin & Gregory Wheeler - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):260-278.details
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The Suspension Problem for Epistemic Democracy.Miguel Egler - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Does my total evidence support that I’m a Boltzmann Brain?Sinan Dogramaci - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3717-3723.details
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Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.details
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Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):248-269.details
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Evidence and fallibility.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):39-55.details
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Thinking about Progress: From Science to Philosophy.Finnur Dellsén, Insa Lawler & James Norton - 2022 - Noûs 56 (4):814-840.details
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A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):493-503.details
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