This book aims to show that recent developments in neuroscience permit a defense of free will. Through language, human beings can escape strict biological determinism.

As scientists advance knowledge of the brain and develop technologies to measure, evaluate, and manipulate brain function, numerous questions arise for religious adherents. If neuroscientists can conclusively establish that there is a functional network between neural impulses and an individual’s capacity for moral evaluation of situations, this will naturally lead to questions about the relationship between such a network and constructions of moral value and ethical human behavior. For example, if cognitive neuroscience can show that there is a neurophysiological basis (...) for the moral appraisal of situations, it may be argued that the world’s religions, which have traditionally been the keepers and purveyors of ethical values, are rendered either spurious or irrelevant. The questions point up broader dilemmas in the interface between science and religion, and raise concerns about the ethics of neurological research and experimentation. Since human beings will still arbitrate what is “moral” or “ethical,” how can religious perspectives enrich the dialogue on neuroethical issues and how can neuroscience enrich dialogue on religion? Buddhist views on the nature of consciousness and methods of practice, especially meditation practice, may contribute to discussions on neuroscience and theories about the interrelationship between consciousness and ethical awareness by exploring the role that karma, intentionality, and compassion play in Buddhist understandings of the interrelationship between consciousness and ethics. (shrink)

The increasing popularity of artificial cognitive enhancements raises the issue of their impact on the agent’s personal autonomy, and issues pertaining to how the latter is to be secured. The extended mind thesis implies that mental states responsible for autonomous action can be partly constituted by the workings of cognitive artifacts themselves, and the question then arises of whether this commits one to embracing an extended agent thesis. My answer is negative. After briefly presenting the main accounts on the conditions (...) for autonomous agency, and analyzing how the latter can be protected from threats posed by the use of cognitive artifacts, I argue that autonomous agency is essentially tied to conscious experience and intentionality, which in turn can only be attributed to the human part of any extended cognitive system. I present both theoretical (conceptual) and practical arguments against recognizing the entire extended system, composed of one human and an artifact, as an autonomous agent. (shrink)

There is a close conceptual relation between the notions of religious disenchantment and scientific naturalism. One way of resisting philosophical and cultural implications of the scientific image and the subsequent process of disenchantment can be found in attempts at sketching a reenchanted worldview. The main issue of accounts of reenchantment can be a rejection of scientific results in a way that flies in the face of good reason. Opposed to such reenchantment is scientific naturalism which implies an entirely disenchanted worldview. (...) However, one of the main problems of scientific naturalism are placement problems. A reenchanted worldview does have the conceptual resources to avoid placement problems, yet seems to throw out the baby with the bathwater. A dilemma results: the Scylla of an undesirable scientific naturalism and the Charybdis of a rampant, seemingly prescientific reenchanted worldview. In this article I argue that there is a safe middle passage between these two options, i.e. the recently proposed liberal naturalism which allows for a moderate normative reenchantment. Liberal naturalism lets us have it both ways: avoiding the placement problems while retaining a necessary and reasonable adherence to science, thereby avoiding both an all-too restrictive scientific naturalism. (shrink)

Naturalism is the current orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Naturalism is the conjunction of the (ontological) claim that all that truly exists are the entities countenanced by the natural sciences and the (epistemological) claim that the only true knowledge is natural-scientific knowledge. Drawing on some recent work in Critical Theory, this article argues that naturalism qualifies as an ideology. This is the case because naturalism meets three key aspects shared by paradigmatic cases of ideology: (i) naturalism has practical consequences and implications (...) of a specific kind, (ii) those endorsing naturalism fall prey to a dual deception: having false meta-level beliefs about naturalism as being without alternative, and (iii) naturalism has a tendency towards self-immunisation. The article ends by suggesting we pull naturalism out of our collective cognitive backgrounds onto the main stage of critical discourse, making it a proper topic for philosophical critique again. (shrink)

Techniques for achieving moral enhancement will modify brain processes to produce what is alleged to be more moral conduct. Neurophilosophy and neuroethics must ponder what “moral enhancement” could possibly be, if possible at all. Objections to the very possibility of moral enhancement, raised from various philosophical and neuroscientific standpoints, fail to justify skepticism, but they do place serious constraints on the kinds of efficacious moral enhancers. While there won't be a “morality pill,” and hopes for global moral enlightenment will remain (...) hopes, there will be a large variety of behavioral modifiers described as enhancers of some aspect of morality or another according to prevailing social norms. The most likely moral enhancers that will be designed, tested, and marketed in the near future will attempt to alleviate seriously immoral and illegal behavior. Some enhancers diminishing antisocial conduct and a few designed to elevate moral conduct above normal levels will also become available, although their widespread use is doubtful. There will also be specialized modifications for enhancing whatever an individual personally regards as moral, and for enabling better performance by a person in an operational role. A measure of skepticism toward all the proposed kinds of moral enhancement is advised, and where political implementation of moral enhancers is concerned, a healthy amount of cynicism as well. (shrink)

Neuroscientific studies have shown that brain activity correlated with a decision to move can be observed before a person reports being consciously aware of having made that decision . Given that a later event cannot cause an earlier one , such results have been interpreted as evidence that decisions are made unconsciously . We argue that this interpretation depends upon an all-or-none view of consciousness, and we offer an alternative interpretation of the early decision-related brain activity based on models in (...) which conscious awareness of the decision to move develops gradually up to the level of a reporting criterion. Under this interpretation, the early brain activity reflects sub-criterion levels of awareness rather than complete absence of awareness and thus does not suggest that decisions are made unconsciously. (shrink)

:The microbiome is proving to be increasingly important for human brain functioning. A series of recent studies have shown that the microbiome influences the central nervous system in various ways, and consequently acts on the psychological well-being of the individual by mediating, among others, the reactions of stress and anxiety. From a specifically neuroethical point of view, according to some scholars, the particular composition of the microbiome—qua microbial community—can have consequences on the traditional idea of human individuality. Another neuroethical aspect (...) concerns the reception of this new knowledge in relation to clinical applications. In fact, attention to the balance of the microbiome—which includes eating behavior, the use of psychobiotics and, in the treatment of certain diseases, the use of fecal microbiota transplantation—may be limited or even prevented by a biased negative attitude. This attitude derives from a prejudice related to everything that has to do with the organic processing of food and, in general, with the human stomach and intestine: the latter have traditionally been regarded as low, dirty, contaminated and opposed to what belongs to the mind and the brain. This biased attitude can lead one to fail to adequately consider the new anthropological conceptions related to the microbiome, resulting in a state of health, both physical and psychological, inferior to what one might have by paying the right attention to the knowledge available today. Shifting from the ubiquitous high-low metaphor to an inside-outside metaphor can thus be a neuroethical strategy to achieve a new and unbiased reception of the discoveries related to the microbiome. (shrink)

In follow-up to a large-scale ethics survey of neuroscientists whose research involves neuroimaging, brain stimulation and imaging genetics, we conducted focus groups and interviews to explore their sense of responsibility about integrating ethics into neuroimaging and readiness to adopt new ethics strategies as part of their research. Safety, trust and virtue were key motivators for incorporating ethics into neuroimaging research. Managing incidental findings emerged as a predominant daily challenge for faculty, while student reports focused on the malleability of neuroimaging data (...) and scientific integrity. The most frequently cited barrier was time and administrative burden associated with the ethics review process. Lack of scholarly training in ethics also emerged as a major barrier. Participants constructively offered remedies to these challenges: development and dissemination of best practices and standardized ethics review for minimally invasive neuroimaging protocols. Students in particular, urged changes to curricula to include early, focused training in ethics. (shrink)

La autonomía constituye uno de los pilares básicos de un sistema político como el democrático que se asocia a la capacidad de toma de decisiones de la ciudadanía como su núcleo moral principal. Los descubrimientos en el ámbito de las neurociencias y su aplicación al campo del marketing y a la comunicación política despiertan hoy en día las sospechas por la posible capacidad de activar el "botón del voto" de los electores. Este artículo tiene como objetivo adentrarse en el estudio (...) de los principales trabajos desarrollados sobre el neuromarketing político y la neuropolítica. La finalidad de esta propuesta consiste en presentar los debates éticos que irrumpen con el neuromarketing político. Autonomy is one of the basic pillars of a political system like democracy, which is associated with citizens’ decision-making capacity as its main moral core. Discoveries in the neurosciences domain and their application to the marketing and political communication field now arouse suspicions about the possible capacity of activating voter’s "voting button". The objective of this article is to examine the main works on political neuromarketing and neuropolitics. The purpose of this proposal consists in presenting the specific ethical debates that emerge around political neuromarketing. (shrink)

We begin by introducing our readers to the Extended Mind Thesis and briefly discuss a series of arguments in its favour. We continue by showing of such a theory can be resisted and go on to demonstrate that a more conservative account of cognition can be developed. We acknowledge a stalemate between these two different accounts of cognition and notice a couple of issues that we argue have prevented further progress in the field. To overcome the stalemate, we propose to (...) focus on the ethical implications of these theories. We link work conducted on the Extended Mind Thesis with contemporary transhumanist research and claim that extended may be ethically preferred over embedded because it is a more progressive and inclusive theory. (shrink)

La Neuroética necesita un marco de ética filosófica desde el que interpretar, integrar y criticar el progreso neurocientífico en el ámbito moral. Este artículo intenta: 1) Mostrar en qué medida este marco es necesario. 2) Abordar la cuestión del método adecuado para construirlo. 3) Compilar los principales tópoi de las neurociencias que el marco debería interpretar e integrar. 4) Mostrar cómo la ética del discurso puede ser un marco adecuado para la neuroética. 5) Señalar algunas insuficiencias de ese marco y (...) sugerir para superarlas una ética de la razón cordial. (shrink)

La neuroética nace oficialmente a comienzos del siglo XXI, gracias al avance de las neurociencias, como ética aplicada vinculada a la bioética, pero también como neuroética autónoma. Como ética aplicada, aborda cuestiones cercanas a la bioética. Como neuroética autónoma, se enfrenta a problemas clásicos de la filosofía desde una perspectiva neurocientífica en sentido amplio. Dos cuestiones serán centrales en ella: diseñar un marco para seleccionar, interpretar e integrar los datos de las neurociencias acerca de la moralidad, y trazar el método (...) -o métodos- adecuados para el nuevo saber. Curiosamente, en ambos casos la mayor parte de los neuroéticos dice inscribirse en posiciones naturalistas, pero realmente procede de forma no-naturalista. El artículo se propone analizar los distintos lados de la neuroética y sacar a la luz el método que realmente siguen los neuroéticos, que desmiente al naturalismo. (shrink)

There are few concepts as relevant as that of intentional action in shaping our sense of self and the interaction with the environment. At the same time, few concepts are so elusive. Indeed, both conceptual and neuroscientific accounts of intentional agency have proven to be problematic. On the one hand, most conceptual views struggle in defining how agents can adequately exert control over their actions. On the other hand, neuroscience settles for definitions by exclusion whereby key features of human intentional (...) actions, including goal-directness, remain underspecified. This paper reviews the existing literature and sketches how this gap might be filled. In particular, we defend a gradualist notion of intentional behaviour, which revolves around the following key features: autonomy, flexibility in the integration of causal vectors, and control. (shrink)