The primary explanatory items of Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology are the drives. Such drives, he holds, are arranged hierarchically in virtue of their entering dominance-obedience relations analogous to those obtaining in human societies. This view is puzzling for two reasons. First, Nietzsche’s idea of a hierarchical order among the drives is far from clear. Second, as it postulates relations among subpersonal items that mimic those among persons, Nietzsche’s view seems to trade on the homunculus fallacy. In this paper, I argue that (...) a Hume-inspired dispositional reading of the drives’ order successfully addresses these two problematic issues. Moreover, I argue that my reading is superior to the two main competing interpretations, which I call the vitalistic reading and the normative reading, for these ascribe to Nietzsche a view committed to the homunculus fallacy. (shrink)

Thomas Hurka has argued that Nietzsche’s positive ethical views can be formulated as a version of perfectionism that posits an objective conception of the good as the maximization of power and assigns to all agents the same goal of maximizing the perfection of the best. I show that Hurka’s case for both parts of this interpretation fails on textual grounds and that the kind of theory he proposes is in conflict with Nietzsche’s general approach to morality. The alternative reading for (...) which I argue defends a form of perfectionism as the value perspective of a ‘noble type’ that may emerge in the wake of a revaluation of all values. The basis of this perfectionism is an individual’s projection of an ideal of life to which she ascribes intrinsic value and in terms of which the value of other things is assessed. Justifying this reading requires drawing a distinction between life-denying ideals – forms of the ‘ascetic ideal’ – and life-affirming ‘counterideals’. It also requires recognizing that the perfection of the noble type is expressed in an individual ideal that cannot be shared with others, as opposed to a common ideal of human perfection. (shrink)

This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have evaluative intentional content without being constituted by cognitive states, as these feelings towards value are neither reducible to, nor to be thought along (...) the lines of, judgements, perceptions, or other mental states. (shrink)

This article argues that Nietzsche’s meta-ethics is basically a form of sentimentalism, but a form of sentimentalism that includes cognitive components in the sentiments that are involved. The article also ascribes to Nietzsche the more original position that the moral sentiments in question vary dramatically between historical periods, cultures, and even individuals, sometimes indeed to the point of becoming inverted between one case and another. Finally, the article also attributes to Nietzsche a hermeneutic insight into certain problems that this situation (...) causes for the accurate interpretation of other people’s viewpoints. Along the way, the article in addition argues that Nietzsche’s positions on all these issues were molded not only by such well-known influences as Paul Rée and Hume, but also, and indeed more strongly, by Herder, and it develops some grounds for thinking that the positions in question are highly plausible ones. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Affective Foundation of Society in Nietzsche's PhilosophyJihun JeongIntroductionNietzsche believes that the different human types should be allowed to thrive and not be reduced into uniformity, as he says "nothing should be banished more than... the approximation and reconciliation" of the different types (KSA 12:10[59]).1 He sees the approximation as a reflection of democratic values and monolithic morality that he opposes. Instead, he believes that humans should be naturalized and (...) allowed to live in accordance with their own nature. To achieve this, Nietzsche proposed "the great politics," which "makes physiology into the ruler over all other questions" to "breed humanity as a whole" so that "one affirms what one is, one denies what one is not" (KSA 13:25[1]). In this way, Nietzsche thinks the different types should live in accordance with their respective nature.In The Antichrist, Nietzsche argues that "every healthy society" consists of different physiological types.2 He repeatedly says that "Nature, not Manu," separates these physiological types of the hierarchical order,3 which is "merely the sanction of a natural order, natural lawfulness of the first rank." While each type has "its own hygiene, its own realm of work, its own feelings of perfection and mastery" (A 57), this rank order is "the sanctioning of a natural distance between several physiological types," which are "determined and best developed for different activity," like "division of labor" (KSA 13:14[221]). Therefore, Nietzsche describes the physiological types divided in a healthy society as "differently gravitating" and "mutually conditioning" types (A 57). In order for a society to be healthy as a whole, individuals should be neither uniform nor scattered, but should be in an organized structure together. This structure is "opposed to an atomistic anarchy." A "human community is a unity [Einheit]," and "all unity is unity only as organization and co-operation." In [End Page 1] this way "a ruling structure," which does not exist as one, "means one [Eins]" (KSA 12:2[87]).However, what is it that produces this unity? Nietzsche's envisioned "naturalization of human beings" (KSA 9:11[211]) involves a society where different types live actively in accordance with their nature or respective physiological constitution. However, the existence of different types does not ensure the formation of society as a whole. Individuals of different types with different power will not automatically gather to form a society if they remain merely as individuals. In other words, if there is no social character in nature itself, a society could be seen to be formed "by accident," as Hobbes understands (42). What then is the basis that allows individuals to be incorporated into the social order? This article explores the social aspect of Nietzsche's understanding of nature, particularly with attention to his idea of affects, which will lead us to the idea of the affective foundation of society in his philosophy.4Nietzsche often describes nature as something chaotic that is elusive, uncertain, indifferent to human affairs, and without purpose and mercy. Thus, he writes, "how could you live according to this indifference? Living—is that not precisely wanting to be different than this nature? Is living not assessing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different?" (BGE 9) In this regard, the first point to note is that the "nature" of which Nietzsche speaks involves human nature strong enough to play with chaos and even to defy nature's indifference and brutality. As Conway points out, "the 'return to nature' that he envisions thus involves a return to human nature as the sole authority or justification for the nomothetic preferences required by the restricted economy of Life" (42–43). It is human nature to impose order on the natural world, transforming its amorphous state into a structured form of life, and to create a hierarchy of values in nature's indifference—this is perfectly natural and is the task of the philosophers. Therefore, rather than settling in "the infinite domain of Chaos" as Seung argues (292), Nietzsche reminds us of human nature: "We speak of nature and, in doing so, forget ourselves: we ourselves are nature" (WS 327). In this respect, the affirmation of nature... (shrink)