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  1. Imagining Moral Bioenhancement Practices: Drawing Inspiration from Moral Education, Public Health Ethics, and Forensic Psychiatry.Jona Specker & Maartje H. N. Schermer - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (3):415-426.
    :In this article, we consider contexts or domains in which moral bioenhancement interventions possibly or most likely will be implemented. By looking closely at similar or related existing practices and their relevant ethical frameworks, we hope to identify ethical considerations that are relevant for evaluating potential moral bioenhancement interventions. We examine, first, debates on the proper scope of moral education; second, proposals for identifying early risk factors for antisocial behaviour; and third, the difficult balancing of individual freedom and third party (...)
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  • Forensic Practitioners’ Views on Stimulating Moral Development and Moral Growth in Forensic Psychiatric Care.Jona Specker, Farah Focquaert, Sigrid Sterckx & Maartje H. N. Schermer - 2018 - Neuroethics 13 (1):73-85.
    In the context of debates on psychiatry issues pertaining to moral dimensions of psychiatric health care are frequently discussed. These debates invite reflection on the question whether forensic practitioners have a role in stimulating patients’ moral development and moral growth in the context of forensic psychiatric and psychological treatment and care. We conducted a qualitative study to examine to what extent forensic practitioners consider moral development and moral growth to be a part of their current professional practices and to what (...)
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  • Collectively ill: a preliminary case that groups can have psychiatric disorders.Ginger A. Hoffman - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2217-2241.
    In the 2000s, several psychiatrists cited the lack of relational disorders (what I call “collective disorders”—disorders of groups rather than individuals) in the DSM-IV as one of the two most glaring gaps in psychiatric nosology, and campaigned for their inclusion in the DSM-5. This campaign failed, however, presumably in part due to serious “ontological concerns” haunting such disorders. Here, I offer a path to quell such ontological concerns, adding to previous conceptual work by Jerome Wakefield and Christian Perring. Specifically, I (...)
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