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Skeptical Conclusions.Linton Wang & Oliver Tai - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):177-204.details
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Comparative syllogism and counterfactual knowledge.Linton Wang & Wei-Fen Ma - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1327-1348.details
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Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will.Sven Walter - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.details
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Philosophical basis of relatedness logic.Douglas N. Walton - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 36 (2):115 - 136.details
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Morgenbesser's Coin and Counterfactuals with True Components.Lee Walters - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):365-379.details
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Against Hypothetical Syllogism.Lee Walters - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (5):979-997.details
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Some consequences of possibilism.Russell Wahl - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):427 – 433.details
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Teleosemantics and the troubles of naturalism.Steven J. Wagner - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (1):81-110.details
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What time travelers may be able to do.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):115 - 121.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.details
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Causation.Franz Von Kutschera - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):563 - 588.details
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The Singularity of Experiences and Thoughts.Alberto Voltolini - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):459-473.details
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Subjective Reasons.Eric Vogelstein - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.details
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An Interpretation of McCall’s “Real Possible Worlds” and His Semantics for Counterfactuals.Alexandru Dragomir - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (1):65-78.details
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Mood and gradability: An investigation of the subjunctive mood in spanish.Elisabeth Villalta - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (4):467-522.details
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Independent forebrain and brainstem controls for arousal and sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.details
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The Sense of Time.Gerardo Viera - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):443-469.details
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Speed Up the Conception of Logical Systems with Test-Driven Development.Mathieu Vidal - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (1):83-103.details
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The Probabilistic Nature of Objective Consequentialism.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2007 - Theoria 73 (1):46 - 67.details
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Defending a possibilist insight in consequentialist thought.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):183 - 195.details
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Counterfactuals for consequentialists.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (2):103 - 125.details
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Ockham’s Razors: A User’s Manual, by Elliott Sober. [REVIEW]Joel Velasco - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):891-902.details
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Making Counterfactual Assumptions.Frank Veltman - 2005 - Journal of Semantics 22 (2):159-180.details
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Counterpart theories for everyone.Achille C. Varzi - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4691-4715.details
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Towards a uniform analysis of any.Robert van Rooij - 2008 - Natural Language Semantics 16 (4):297-315.details
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Preferential Semantics using Non-smooth Preference Relations.Frederik Van De Putte & Christian Straßer - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (5):903-942.details
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Prolegomena to dynamic logic for belief revision.Hans P. Van Ditmarsch - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):229-275.details
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Models of intentional explanation.Robrecht Vanderbeeken - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):233 – 246.details
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My beliefs about your beliefs: A case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic.Hans van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):191-209.details
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Lewis and Taylor as Partners in Sin.James Van Cleve - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):165-175.details
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Dynamic logic for belief revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.details
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Conditional Learning Through Causal Models.Jonathan Vandenburgh - 2020 - Synthese (1-2):2415-2437.details
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Time-Symmetrized Counterfactuals in Quantum Theory.Lev Vaidman - 1999 - Foundations of Physics 29 (5):755-765.details
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Challenging Lewis’s challenge to the best system account of lawhood.Rafal Urbaniak & Bert Leuridan - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1649-1666.details
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Do Ceteris Paribus Laws Exist? A Regularity-Based Best System Analysis.Matthias Unterhuber - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S10):1833-1847.details
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Epistemic self-esteem of philosophers in the face of philosophical disagreement.János Tőzsér & László Bernáth - 2020 - Human Affairs 30 (3):328-342.details
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L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.details
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Counterfactuals without possible worlds.Raymond Turner - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (4):453 - 493.details
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Morgan on deductive explanation: A rejoinder. [REVIEW]Raimo Tuomela - 1976 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (4):527 - 543.details
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Dispositions, realism, and explanation.Raimo Tuomela - 1977 - Synthese 34 (4):457 - 478.details
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Universals, laws, and governance.Matthew Tugby - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1147-1163.details
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The problem of retention.Matthew Tugby - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity.Matthew Tugby - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):465-476.details
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Nomic Necessity for Platonists.Matthew Tugby - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):324-331.details
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Categoricalism, dispositionalism, and the epistemology of properties.Matthew Tugby - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1-16.details
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Quantum metametaphysics.Alessandro Torza - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):1-25.details
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Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge.Brett Topey - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4415-4436.details
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Obligation, conditionals, and the logic of conditional obligation.James E. Tomberlin - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):81 - 92.details
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Actualism or possibilism?James E. Tomberlin - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):263 - 281.details
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