The aim of this paper is to better qualify the problem of online trust. The problem of online trust is that of evaluating whether online environments have the proper design to enable trust. This paper tries to better qualify this problem by showing that there is no unique answer, but only conditional considerations that depend on the conception of trust assumed and the features that are included in the environments themselves. In fact, the major issue concerning traditional debates surrounding online (...) trust is that those debates focus on specific definitions of trust and specific online environments. Ordinarily, a definition of trust is assumed and then environmental conditions necessary for trust are evaluated with respect to such specific definition. However, this _modus operandi_ fails to appreciate that trust is a rich concept, with a multitude of meanings and that there is still no strict consensus on which meaning shall be taken as the proper one. Moreover, the fact that online environments are constantly evolving and that new design features might be implemented in them is completely ignored. In this paper, the richness of the philosophical discussions about trust is brought into the analysis of online trust. I first provide a set of conditions that depend on the definition of trust that can be assumed and then discuss those conditions with respect to the design of online environments in order to determine whether they can enable (and under which circumstances) trust. (shrink)

Ad hoc concepts are highly-context dependent representations humans construct to deal with novel or uncommon situations and to interpret linguistic stimuli in communication. In the last decades, such concepts have been investigated both in experimental cognitive psychology and within pragmatics by proponents of so-called relevance theory. These two research lines have however proceeded in parallel, proposing two unconnected strategies to account for the construction and use of ad hoc concepts. The present work explores the relations between these two approaches and (...) the possibility of merging them into a unique account of the internal structure of ad hoc representations and of the key processes involved in their constructions. To this purpose, we first present an integrated two-level account of the construction of ad hoc representations from lexical concepts; then, we show how our account can be embedded in a conceptual space framework that allows for a natural, geometrical interpretation of the main steps in such a construction process. After discussing in detail two main examples of the construction of ad hoc concepts within conceptual spaces, we conclude with some remarks on possible extensions of our approach. (shrink)

In this article, I deal with a conceptual issue concerning the framework of two special sciences: artificial intelligence and synthetic biology, i.e. the distinction between the natural and the artificial (a long-lasting topic of history of scientific though since the ancient philosophy). My claim is that the standard definition of the “artificial” is no longer useful to describe some present-day artificial sciences, as the boundary between the natural and the artificial is not so sharp and clear-cut as it was in (...) the past. Artificial intelligence and synthetic biology, two disciplines with new technologies, new experimental methods, and new theoretical frameworks, all need a new, more specific, and refined definition of (the) “artificial”, which is also related to the use of the synthetic method to build real world entities and in open-ended (real or virtual) environments. The necessity of a new definition of the artificial is due to the close relationship of AI and synthetic biology with biology itself. They both are engineering sciences that are moving closer and closer, at least apparently, towards (natural) biology, although from different and opposite directions. I show how the new concept of the artificial is, therefore, the result of a new view on biology from an engineering and synthetic point of view, where the boundary between the natural and the artificial is far more blurred. From this, I try to formulate a brand-new, more useful definition for future understanding, practical, and epistemological purposes of these two artificial sciences. (shrink)

This dissertation summarises a research path aimed at fostering the use of Cognitive Architectures in Serious Games research field. Cognitive Architectures are an embodiment of scientific hypotheses and theories aimed at capturing the mechanisms of cognition that are considered consistent over time and independent of specific tasks or domains. The theoretical approaches provided by the research in computational cognitive modelling have been used to formalise a methodological framework to guide researchers and experts in the game-based education sector in designing, implementing, (...) and evaluating Serious Games. The investigation of cognitive processes involved during the game experience represents the fundamental step of the pro- posed approach. Two different case studies are described to discuss the possible use of the suggested framework. In the first case study, the aim was to design a modified version of the Tetris game with the intention of making the game more effective in training the visual-spatial skill called mental rotation. In the second scenario, the frame- work was used as a basis for creating an innovative persuasive game. This case study provides an example of adopting cognitive architectures for implementing a non-player character with human-like behaviour developed using targeted cognitive theories. (shrink)

A 3rd person Knowledge Level analysis of cognitive architectures -/- Abstract I provide a knowledge level analysis of the main representational and reasoning problems affecting the cognitive architectures for what concerns this issue. In providing this analysis I will show, by considering some of the main cognitive architectures currently available (e.g. SOAR, ACT-R, CLARION), how one of the main problems of such architectures is represented by the fact that their knowledge representation and processing mechanisms are not sufficiently constrained with “structural (...) insights” (Lieto 2021) coming from cognitive science for dealing with commonsense knowledge and reasoning (Lebiere, Oltramari, 2018). As a possible way out to such knowledge processing issues, I present the main assumptions that have led to the development of the Dual PECCS categorization system (Lieto, Radicioni, Rho 2017) and discuss some of the lessons learned and their possible implications in the design of the knowledge modules and knowledge-processing mechanisms of integrated cognitive architectures. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the artificial components of hybrid bionic systems do not play a direct explanatory role, i.e., in simulative terms, in the overall context of the systems in which they are embedded in. More precisely, I claim that the internal procedures determining the output of such artificial devices, replacing biological tissues and connected to other biological tissues, cannot be used to directly explain the corresponding mechanisms of the biological component(s) they substitute (and therefore cannot be used (...) to explain the local mechanisms determining an overall biological or cognitive function replicated by such bionic models). I ground this analysis on the use of the Minimal Cognitive Grid (MCG), a novel framework proposed in Lieto (Cognitive design for artificial minds, 2021) to rank the epistemological and explanatory status of biologically and cognitively inspired artificial systems. Despite the lack of such a direct mechanistic explanation from the artificial component, however, I also argue that the hybrid bionic systems can have an indirect explanatory role similar to the one played by some AI systems built by using an overall structural design approach (but including the partial adoption of functional components). In particular, the artificial replacement of part(s) of a biological system can provide i) a local functional account of that part(s) in the context of the overall functioning of the hybrid biological–artificial system and ii) global insights about the structural mechanisms of the biological elements connected to such artificial devices. (shrink)

This paper presents a practical case study showing how, despite the nowadays limited collaboration between AI and Cognitive Science (CogSci), cognitive research can still have an important role in the development of novel AI technologies. After a brief historical introduction about the reasons of the divorce between AI and CogSci research agendas (happened in the mid’80s of the last century), we try to provide evidence of a renewed collaboration by showing a recent case study on a commonsense reasoning system, built (...) by using insights from cognitive semantics. (shrink)

The mental rotation ability is an essential spatial reasoning skill in human cognition and has proven to be an essential predictor of mathematical and STEM skills, critical and computational thinking. Despite its importance, little is known about when and how mental rotation processes are activated in games explicitly targeting spatial reasoning tasks. In particular, the relationship between spatial abilities and TetrisTM has been analysed several times in the literature. However, these analyses have shown contrasting results between the effectiveness of Tetris-based (...) training activities to improve mental rotation skills. In this work, we studied whether, and under what conditions, such ability is used in the TetrisTM game by explicitly modelling mental rotation via an ACT-R based cognitive model controlling a virtual agent. The obtained results show meaningful insights into the activation of mental rotation during game dynamics. The study suggests the necessity to adapt game dynamics in order to force the activation of this process and, therefore, can be of inspiration to design learning activities based on TetrisTM or re-design the game itself to improve its educational effectiveness. (shrink)

This work describes an explainable system for emotion attribution and recommendation (called DEGARI (Dynamic Emotion Generator And ReclassIfier) relying on a recently introduced probabilistic commonsense reasoning framework.

The paper presents the heterogeneous proxytypes hypothesis as a cognitively-inspired computational framework able to reconcile, in both natural and artificial systems, different theories of typicality about conceptual representation and reasoning that have been traditionally seen as incompatible. In particular, through the Dual PECCS system and its evolution, it shows how prototypes, exemplars and theory-theory like conceptual representations can be integrated in a cognitive artificial agent (thus extending its categorization capabilities) and, in addition, can provide useful insights in the context of (...) a computationally grounded science of the mind. (shrink)

Inventing novel knowledge to solve problems is a crucial, creative, mechanism employed by humans, to extend their range of action. In this talk, I will show how commonsense reasoning plays a crucial role in this respect. In particular, I will present a cognitively inspired reasoning framework for knowledge invention and creative problem solving exploiting TCL: a non-monotonic extension of a Description Logic (DL) of typicality able to combine prototypical (commonsense) descriptions of concepts in a human-like fashion. The proposed approach has (...) been tested both in the task of goal-driven concept invention and has additionally applied within the context of serendipity-based recommendation systems. I will present the obtained results, the lessons learned, and the road ahead of this research path. (shrink)

Commonsense reasoning is a crucial human ability employed in everyday tasks. In this talk I provide a knowledge level analysis of the main representational and reasoning problems affecting the cognitive architectures for what concerns this issue. In providing this analysis I will show, by considering some of the main cognitive architectures currently available (e.g. SOAR, ACT-R, CLARION), how one of the main problems of such architectures is represented by the fact that their knowledge representation and processing mechanisms are not sufficiently (...) constrained with insights coming from cognitive science (Lieto 2021; Lieto, Lebiere, Oltramari, 2018). As a possible way out to such knowledge processing issues, I present the main assumptions that have led to the development of the Dual PECCS categorization system (Lieto, Radicioni, Rho 2017) and discuss some of the lessons learned and their possible implications in the design of the knowledge modules and knowledge-processing mechanisms of integrated cognitive architectures. (shrink)