Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason is the claim that everything has a sufficient reason. But is Leibniz committed to the necessity or to the contingency of his great principle? I argue that Leibniz is committed to its contingency, given that he allows for the absolute possibility of entities that he claims violate the PSR. These are all cases of qualitatively indiscernible entities, such as indiscernible atoms, vacua, and bodies. However, Leibniz's commitment to the contingency of the PSR seems to stand (...) in tension with his inference of the PSR from his theory of truth. I argue that this apparent tension can be resolved satisfactorily. When it comes to his modal views on the PSR, Leibniz's position is entirely consistent. (shrink)

V rámci tohoto příspěvku se pokusím zpochybnit dosavadní mainstreamovou interpretaci Leibnizovy metafyziky prostoru, jak ji představil v dopisech anglickému učenci Samuelu Clarkovi. Přestože bývá Leibnizova metafyzika prostoru právě na základě jeho korespondence s Clarkem obvykle považována za ostrý protipól metafyziky Clarkovy, respektive Newtonovy, v rámci tohoto příspěvku poukážu na to, že při zvážení Leibnizovy geometrie zvané „analysis situs“ se taková interpretace stává neudržitelnou. Leibnize nelze považovat za zastánce typicky relačního pojetí prostoru.

In her Discourse on Happiness, Émilie du Châtelet argues susceptibility to illusion is one of the five ‘great machines of happiness,’ and that ‘we owe most of our pleasures to illusions’. However, many who read the Discourse find this aspect of her view puzzling and in tension with her claims that we must always seek truth and obey reason. To understand better her claims in the Discourse on Happiness, this article explores Du Châtelet's discussions of illusions in her Foundations of (...) Physics, On Liberty, and the Dissertation on the Nature and Propagation of Fire. I distinguish four types of illusions that Du Châtelet posits and clarify the ways in which these relate to her views on happiness and love in the Discourse and argue that she avoids deceptive or perpetual illusions of happiness through the use of the principle of sufficient reason. (shrink)