- Simple Probabilistic Promotion.Eden Lin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):360-379.details
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Levels of Description and Levels of Reality: A General Framework.Christian List - manuscriptdetails
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Chance and Necessity.Daniel Nolan - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):294-308.details
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Objective consequentialism and the plurality of chances.Leszek Wroński - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12089-12105.details
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Sources of evolutionary contingency: chance variation and genetic drift.T. Y. William Wong - 2020 - Biology and Philosophy 35 (4):1-33.details
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Evolutionary contingency as non-trivial objective probability: Biological evitability and evolutionary trajectories.T. Y. William Wong - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 81 (C):101246.details
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Degrees of Freedom.Pieter Thyssen & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2021 - Synthese 198 (11):10207-10235.details
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Power Emergentism and the Collapse Problem.Elanor Taylor - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):302-318.details
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Contractualism, Complaints, and Risk.Bastian Steuwer - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (2).details
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Good reasons for losers: lottery justification and social risk.Kai Spiekermann - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):108-131.details
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Theoretical Relicts: Progress, Reduction, and Autonomy.Katie Robertson & Alastair Wilson - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Asymmetry, Abstraction, and Autonomy: Justifying Coarse-Graining in Statistical Mechanics.Katie Robertson - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):547-579.details
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The Principal Principle does not imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx060.details
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The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):605-619.details
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What’s Wrong with the Consequence Argument: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response.Christian List - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):253-274.details
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Special-science counterfactuals.Christian List - 2022 - The Monist 105 (2):194–213.details
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Mechanical Choices: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response.Christian List - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-23.details
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Levels: Descriptive, Explanatory, and Ontological.Christian List - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):852-883.details
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Dynamic and stochastic systems as a framework for metaphysics and the philosophy of science.Christian List & Marcus Pivato - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2551-2612.details
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Do group agents have free will?Christian List - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Blocking an Argument for Emergent Chance.David Kinney - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (5):1057-1077.details
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Two Kinds of High-Level Probability.Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker - 2019 - The Monist 102 (4):458-477.details
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Introduction: Levels of Reality.Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker - 2022 - The Monist 105 (2):147-155.details
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Flat Physicalism.Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker - 2022 - Theoria 88 (4):743-764.details
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Equalized Odds is a Requirement of Algorithmic Fairness.David Gray Grant - 2023 - Synthese 201 (3).details
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Indeterminism in the brain.Bryce Gessell - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (6):1205-1223.details
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On the Foundations of the Problem of Free Will.Paolo Galeazzi & Rasmus K. Rendsvig - forthcoming - Episteme:1-19.details
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A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of the Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’.Luke Fenton-Glynn - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):1061-1124.details
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A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of the Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’.Luke Fenton-Glynn - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):1061-1124.details
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A dynamical systems approach to causation.Peter Fazekas, Balazs Gyenis, Gábor Hofer-Szabó & Gergely Kertesz - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6065-6087.details
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Chance, determinism, and unsettledness.Antony Eagle - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):781-802.details
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Justifying Lewis’s Kinematics of Chance.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):439-463.details
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Causal emergence from effective information: Neither causal nor emergent?Joe Dewhurst - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):158-168.details
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Outlook-based semantics.Elizabeth Coppock - 2018 - Linguistics and Philosophy 41 (2):125-164.details
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Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.details
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Infinite frequency principles of direct inference.Lennart B. Ackermans - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Chancy Covariance and The Mind-Body Problem.Benjamin Eva - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 2:177-216.details
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One-by-one: moral theory for separate persons.Bastian Steuwer - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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A Critique of Compatibilist-Libertarianism.Zachary Peck - unknowndetails
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Imprecise Bayesian Networks as Causal Models.David Kinney - 2018 - Information 9 (9):211.details
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The naturalistic case for free will.Christian List - forthcoming - In Stavros Ioannidis, Gal Vishne, Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker (eds.), Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy. Cham: Springer.details
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Autonomy generalised; or, Why doesn’t physics matter more?Katie Robertson - forthcoming - Ergo.details
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Why Functionalism Is a Form of ‘Token-Dualism’.Meir Hemmo & Orly R. Shenker - unknowndetails
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Bayesian Variations: Essays on the Structure, Object, and Dynamics of Credence.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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Agency as difference-making: causal foundations of moral responsibility.Johannes Himmelreich - 2015 - Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Sciencedetails
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Levels: descriptive, explanatory, and ontological.Christian List - 2017details
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When to defer to supermajority testimony — and when not.Christian List - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 240-249.details
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Free Will and the Cross-Level Consequence Argument.Jonathan Birch - 2020details
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