- The Hardest Paradox for Closure.Martin Smith - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):2003-2028.details
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Perception and the external world.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145.details
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Moral Knowledge By Deduction.Declan Smithies - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):537-563.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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Belief, Rational and Justified.Wes Siscoe - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):59-83.details
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How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist.Daniel J. Singer - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):580-602.details
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The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).details
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Knowing how to put knowledge first in the theory of justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):393-412.details
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Etiological information and diminishing justification.Paul Silva - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):1-25.details
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Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.details
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Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):371-387.details
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First-person representations and responsible agency in AI.Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7061-7079.details
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Is Knowledge Normative?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):379-395.details
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Doxastic justification through dispositions to cause.Julius Schönherr - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-18.details
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Basic factive perceptual reasons.Ian Schnee - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1103-1118.details
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The Doing and the Deed: Action in Normative Ethics.Constantine Sandis - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:105-126.details
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The contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):21-34.details
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Inferentialism, degrees of commitment, and ampliative reasoning.Rodríguez Xavier de Donato, Bonilla Jesús Zamora & Javier González De Prado Salas - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 4):909-927.details
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What’s so bad about echo chambers?Christopher Ranalli & Finlay Malcom - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):70-90.details
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Veritistic Teleological Epistemology, the Bad Lot, and Epistemic Risk Consistency.Raimund Pils - forthcoming - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-21.details
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A Satisficing Theory of Epistemic Justification.Raimund Pils - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):450-467.details
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Radical epistemology, structural explanations, and epistemic weaponry.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):289-304.details
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Good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-18.details
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Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):174-185.details
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How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):251-275.details
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Truthy psychologism about evidence.Veli Mitova - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1105-1126.details
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When Evidence Isn’t Enough: Suspension, Evidentialism, and Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology.Lisa Miracchi - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):413-437.details
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How to be an optimist about aesthetic testimony.Rachel McKinnon - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):177-196.details
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The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.details
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What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.details
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Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought.McHugh Conor - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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‘This Is the Bad Case’: What Brains in Vats Can Know.Aidan McGlynn - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):183-205.details
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Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony Redux.B. J. C. Madison - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):741-755.details
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Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.details
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Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K.Artūrs Logins - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):120-137.details
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Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):77-87.details
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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.details
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Pritchard’s Reasons in advance.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.details
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Pritchard’s Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:201-219.details
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No Evidence is False.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159.details
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Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1381-1398.details
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Justification, knowledge, and normality.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609.details
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Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1355-1365.details
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Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.details
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Do Reasons and Evidence Share the Same Residence.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):720-727.details
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Do you see what I know? On reasons, perceptual evidence, and epistemic status.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):205-220.details
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Eleven angry men.Clayton Littlejohn - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):227-239.details
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