- Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism.Mark Satta - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):625-640.details
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Epistemic Infrastructure for a Scientific Metaphysics.Amanda Bryant - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):27-49.details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Externalism About Knowledge: A Brief Introduction.Luis Oliveira - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.details
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Epistemic Dilemmas Defended.Nick Hughes - 2021 - In Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and normativity.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing.details
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Evidence and Bias.Nick Hughes - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
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A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
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Twisted ways to speak our minds, or ways to speak our twisted minds?Luis Rosa - forthcoming - In Waldomiro Silva Filho (ed.), Epistemology of Conversation. Springer.details
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Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.details
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Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle.Simon Wimmer - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (8):777-788.details
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Mechanistic reasoning and the problem of masking.Michael Wilde - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):1-16.details
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Précis of The Range of Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-7.details
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The Radicalism of Truth‐insensitive Epistemology: Truth's Profound Effect on the Evaluation of Belief.John Turri - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):348-367.details
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Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4009-4030.details
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The Knowledge Norm of Belief.Zachary Mitchell Swindlehurst - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):43-50.details
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Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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Where Reasons and Reasoning Come Apart.Eva Schmidt - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):762-781.details
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Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-22.details
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Aiming at the truth and aiming at success.Lubomira Radoilska - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):111-126.details
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Epistemic deontology and the Revelatory View of responsibility.Timothy Perrine - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 54 (1):119-133.details
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The Paradox of Graded Justification.Artūrs Logins - forthcoming - Episteme:1-29.details
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Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K.Artūrs Logins - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):120-137.details
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Pritchard’s Reasons in advance.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.details
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Pritchard’s Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:201-219.details
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Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1355-1365.details
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Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.details
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Do Reasons and Evidence Share the Same Residence.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):720-727.details
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Do you see what I know? On reasons, perceptual evidence, and epistemic status.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):205-220.details
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A justification for excuses: Brown’s discussion of the knowledge view of justification and the excuse manoeuvre.Clayton Littlejohn - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2683-2696.details
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A note concerning justification and access.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):369-386.details
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The knowledge norm of blaming.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):256-261.details
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Lotteries and justification.Christoph Kelp - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1233-1244.details
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Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):57-75.details
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No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):157-166.details
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Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance and the Principle ‘Ought-Implies-Can’.Nick Hughes - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):439-457.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence).Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):368-393.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Is it Safe to Disagree?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):305-321.details
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Does the unity of reason imply that epistemic justification is factive?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Analysis 83 (4):691-700.details
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Finding Excuses for J=K.Roman Matthaeus Heil - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):32-40.details
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Should I believe all the truths?Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3279-3303.details
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Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.details
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