Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Intrinsic Properties of Properties.Sam Cowling - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly:pqw052.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Intrinsic Properties and Relations.Jan Plate - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (8):783-853.
    This paper provides an analysis of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, as applied both to properties and to relations. In contrast to other accounts, the approach taken here locates the source of a property’s intrinsicality or extrinsicality in the manner in which that property is ‘logically constituted’, and thus – plausibly – in its nature or essence, rather than in e.g. its modal profile. Another respect in which the present proposal differs from many extant analyses lies in the fact that it does (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Untyped Pluralism.Salvatore Florio - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):317-337.
    In the semantic debate about plurals, pluralism is the view that a plural term denotes some things in the domain of quantification and a plural predicate denotes a plural property, i.e. a property that can be instantiated by many things jointly. According to a particular version of this view, untyped pluralism, there is no type distinction between objects and properties. In this article, I argue against untyped pluralism by showing that it is subject to a variant of a Russell-style argument (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Universals.Chad Carmichael - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):373-389.
    In this paper, I argue that there are universals. I begin (Sect. 1) by proposing a sufficient condition for a thing’s being a universal. I then argue (Sect. 2) that some truths exist necessarily. Finally, I argue (Sects. 3 and 4) that these truths are structured entities having constituents that meet the proposed sufficient condition for being universals.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Nominalist Constituent Ontologies: A Development and Critique.Robert K. Garcia - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    In this dissertation I consider the merits of certain nominalist accounts of phenomena related to the character of ordinary objects. What these accounts have in common is the fact that none of them is an error theory about standard cases of predication and none of them deploys God or uniquely theistic resources in its explanatory framework. -/- The aim of the dissertation is to answer the following questions: -/- • What is the best nominalist account on offer? • How might (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Odpowiedź Lowe’a na argument Ramseya przeciwko rozróżnieniu uniwersalia–indywidua.L. U. C. Joanna - 2016 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 6 (1):223-238.
    The answer of Lowe to Ramsey’s argument against the distinction universal vs. indivi- dual: At the beginning of this article Ramsey’s argumentation against universal‐particular distinction is presented. It is based on the assumption that this division requires another one: namely, subject‐predicate distinction. This argumentation was a starting point for Lowe, who does not respect the aforementioned assumption. In his theory, there are not two but four categories, namely: substantial universals, non‐substantial universals, substantial particulars, and non‐substantial particulars. Two of these categories (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Quantitative Properties.M. Eddon - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):633-645.
    Two grams mass, three coulombs charge, five inches long – these are examples of quantitative properties. Quantitative properties have certain structural features that other sorts of properties lack. What are the metaphysical underpinnings of quantitative structure? This paper considers several accounts of quantity and assesses the merits of each.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • From Plurals to Superplurals: In Defence of Higher-Level Plural Logic.Berta Grimau Roca - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Glasgow
    Plural Logic is an extension of First-Order Logic with plural terms and quantifiers. When its plural terms are interpreted as denoting more than one object at once, Plural Logic is usually taken to be ontologically innocent: plural quantifiers do not require a domain of their own, but range plurally over the first-order domain of quantification. Given that Plural Logic is equi-interpretable with Monadic Second-Order Logic, it gives us its expressive power at the low ontological cost of a first-order language. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Intrinsic Properties of Properties.Cowling Sam - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):241-262.
    Do properties have intrinsic properties of their own? If so, which second-order properties are intrinsic? This paper introduces two competing views about second-order intrinsicality: generalism, according to which the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction cuts across all orders of properties and applies to the properties of properties as well as the properties of objects, and objectualism, according to which intrinsicality is a feature exclusive to the properties of objects. The case for generalism is then surveyed along with some proposals for distinguishing intrinsic second-order (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Regress, Unity, Facts, and Propositions.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1225-1247.
    The problem, or cluster of problems, of the unity of the proposition, along with the cluster of problems that tend to go under the name of Bradley’s regress, has recently again become a going concern for philosophers, after having for some time been regarded as primarily of historical interest. In this paper, I distinguish between the different problems that tend to be brought up under the heading of the unity of the proposition, and between different related regress arguments. I present (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Genealogy of Universals: The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy.Katarina Perovic - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):359-363.
    Not long ago I found myself at a metaphysics conference in which one of the speakers right at the outset declared dismissively that he would be doing metaphysics ‘of the last five minutes’. Everybody laughed. I was horrified. A traditional metaphysical problem was presented and discussed as it had been set out by a contemporary philosopher, and we were all expected to take for granted the parameters of the debate as they were being presented, without further questioning and examining of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Against the Compositional View of Facts.William Bynoe - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):91-100.
    It is commonly assumed that facts would be complex entities made out of particulars and universals. This thesis, which I call Compositionalism, holds that parthood may be construed broadly enough so that the relation that holds between a fact and the entities it ‘ties’ together counts as a kind of parthood. I argue firstly that Compositionalism is incompatible with the possibility of certain kinds of fact and universal, and, secondly, that such facts and universals are possible. I conclude that Compositionalism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Bradley’s Regress and Visual Content.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (2):155-172.
    According to the well-known Bradley’s Regress argument, one cannot explain the unity of states of affairs by referring to relations combining objects with properties. This argument has been widely discussed within analytic metaphysics, but has not been recognized as relevant for the philosophy of perception. I argue that the mainstream characterization of visual content is threatened by the Bradley’s Regress, and the most influential metaphysical solutions to the regress argument cannot be applied in the context of visual content. However, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • In Defense of Quine’s Ostrich Nominalism.Guido Imaguire - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1):185-203.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Politeness: Towards an Evaluative and Embodied Approach.Chaoqun Xie - 2008 - Radical Philosophy Review of Books 16 (1):151-175.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How Does an Aristotelian Substance Have its Platonic Properties? Issues and Options.Paul Gould - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (2):343-364.
    Attempts to explicate the substance-property nexus are legion in the philosophical literature both historical and contemporary. In this paper, I shall attempt to impose some structure into the discussion by exploring ways to combine two unlikely bedfellows—Platonic properties and Aristotelian substances. Special attention is paid to the logical structure of substances and the metaphysics of property exemplification. I shall argue that an Aristotelian-Platonic account of the substance-property nexus is possible and has been ably defended by contemporary philosophers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Nominalist Realism.Nicholas K. Jones - 2018 - Noûs:0-1.
    This paper explores the impact of quantification into predicate position on the metaphysics of properties, arguing that two familiar debates about properties are fundamentally altered by recasting them in a second-order setting. Two theories of properties are outlined, differing over whether the existence of properties is expressed using first-order or second-order quantifiers. It is argued that the second-order theory: provides good reason to regard debate about the locations of properties as contentless; resolves debate about whether properties are particulars or universals (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Is There a Problem About Propositional Unity?Howard Peacock - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):393-418.
    The problem of the ‘Unity of the Proposition’ is the problem of explaining the difference between a content-expressing declarative sentence and a ‘mere list’ of referents. The prevailing view is that such a problem is to be solved metaphysically, either by reducing our ontology to exclude propositions or universals, or by explaining how it is possible for a certain kind of complex entity – the ‘proposition’– to ‘unify’ its constituents. I argue that these metaphysical approaches cannot succeed; instead the only (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Theory of Form Logic.Wolfgang Freitag & Alexandra Zinke - 2012 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (4):363-389.
    We investigate a construction schema for first-order logical systems, called “form logic”. Form logic allows us to overcome the dualistic commitment of predicate logic to individual constants and predicates. Dualism is replaced by a pluralism of terms of different “logical forms”. Individual form-logical systems are generated by the determination of a range of logical forms and of the formbased syntax rules for combining terms into formulas. We develop a generic syntax and semantics for such systems and provide a completeness proof (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Unsaturatedness: Wittgenstein's challenge, Frege's answer.Mark Textor - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):61-82.
    Frege holds the distinction between complete (saturated) and incomplete (unsaturated) things to be a basic distinction of logic. Many disagree. In this paper I will argue that one can defend Frege's distinction against criticism if one takes, inspired by Frege, a wh -question to be the paradigm incomplete expression.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Relational Complexes.Joop Leo - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):357-390.
    A theory of relations is presented that provides a detailed account of the logical structure of relational complexes. The theory draws a sharp distinction between relational complexes and relational states. A salient difference is that relational complexes belong to exactly one relation, whereas relational states may be shared by different relations. Relational complexes are conceived as structured perspectives on states ‘out there’ in reality. It is argued that only relational complexes have occurrences of objects, and that different complexes of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Relation as the Unifier of States of Affairs.Bo Meinertsen - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):1–19.
    This paper is concerned with what I call the ‘problem of unity’ . This is the puzzle of how Armstrong‐like states of affairs are unified. The general approach is ‘relational internalism’: the unifier of such a state of affairs is a relation of some sort in it. A view commonly associated with relational internalism is that if such a relation satisfies a certain ‘naive’ expectation to a relation – that it is related to its relata – then Bradley's regress results. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Hylomorphism Reconditioned.Michael C. Rea - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):341-358.
    My goal in this paper is to provide characterizations of matter, form and constituency in a way that avoids what I take to be the three main drawbacks of other hylomorphic theories: (i) commitment to the universal-particular distinction; (ii) commitment to a primitive or problematic notion of inherence or constituency; (iii) inability to identify viable candidates for matter and form in nature, or to characterize them in terms of primitives widely regarded to be intelligible.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • In the Eye of Another: Comments on Christopher Peacocke’s ‘Interpersonal Self-Consciousness’.M. G. F. Martin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):25-38.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Neutral Relations Revisited.Fraser MacBride - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (1):25–56.
    Do non‐symmetric relations apply to the objects they relate in an order? According to the standard view of relations, the difference between aRb and bRa obtaining, where R is non‐symmetric, corresponds to a difference in the order in which the non‐symmetric relation R applies to a and b. Recently Kit Fine has challenged the standard view in his important paper ‘Neutral Relations’ arguing that non‐symmetric relations are neutral, lacking direction or order. In this paper I argue that Fine cannot account (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Tropes, Particularity, and Space-Time.Vassilios Livanios - 2007 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):357-368.
    Several difficulties, concerning the individuation and the variation of tropes, beset the initial classic version of trope theory. K. Campbell (Abstract particulars, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990) presented a modified version that aims to avoid those difficulties. Unfortunately, the revised theory cannot make the case that one of the fundamental tropes, space-time, is a genuine particular.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark