Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. A Puzzle About Seeing for Representationalism.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    When characterizing the content of a subject’s perceptual experience, does their seeing an object entail that their visual experience represents it as being a certain way? If it does, are they thereby in a position to have perceptually-based thoughts about it? On one hand, representationalists are under pressure to answer these questions in the affirmative. On the other hand, it seems they cannot. This paper presents a puzzle to illustrate this tension within orthodox representationalism. We identify several interesting morals which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of perception is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may be that all perceptual representations are in some way proprietarily perceptual and differ from the representational format of thought (Dretske 1981; Carey 2009; Burge 2010; Block ms.). Or it may instead be that perception and cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This paper rejects (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Two Kinds of Cognitive Expertise.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Expertise is traditionally classified into perceptual, cognitive, and motor forms. I argue that the empirical research literature on expertise gives us compelling reasons to reject this traditional classification and accept an alternative. According to the alternative I support there is expertise in forming impressions, which further divides into expertise in forming sensory and intellectual impressions, and there is expertise in performing actions, which further divides into expertise in performing mental and bodily actions. The traditional category of cognitive expertise splits into (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Categorising Without Concepts.Ophelia Deroy - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):465-478.
    A strong claim, often found in the literature, is that it is impossible to categorize perceptual properties unless one possesses the related concepts. The evidence from visual perception reviewed in this paper however questions this claim: Concepts, at least canonically defined, are ill-suited to explain perceptual categorisation, which is a fast, and crucially a largely involuntary and unconscious process, which rests on quickly updated probabilistic calculations. I suggest here that perceptual categorisation rests on non-conceptual sorting principles. This changes the claim (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Seeing Seeing.Ben Phillips - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I argue that we can visually perceive others as seeing agents. I start by characterizing perceptual processes as those that are causally controlled by proximal stimuli. I then distinguish between various forms of visual perspective-taking, before presenting evidence that most of them come in perceptual varieties. In doing so, I clarify and defend the view that some forms of visual perspective-taking are “automatic”—a view that has been marshalled in support of dual-process accounts of mindreading.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is Iconic Memory Iconic?Jake Quilty‐Dunn - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Short‐term memory in vision is typically thought to divide into at least two memory stores: a short, fragile, high‐capacity store known as iconic memory, and a longer, durable, capacity‐limited store known as visual working memory (VWM). This paper argues that iconic memory stores icons, i.e., image‐like perceptual representations. The iconicity of iconic memory has significant consequences for understanding consciousness, nonconceptual content, and the perception–cognition border. Steven Gross and Jonathan Flombaum have recently challenged the division between iconic memory and VWM by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Attention and Encapsulation.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    The question of whether perception is encapsulated from cognition has been a major topic in the study of perception in the past decade. One locus of debate concerns the role of attention. Some theorists argue that attention is a vehicle for widespread violations of encapsulation; others argue that certain forms of cognitively driven attention are compatible with encapsulation, especially if attention only modulates inputs. This paper argues for an extreme thesis: no effect of attention, whether on the inputs to perception (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Troubles with Bayesianism: An Introduction to the Psychological Immune System.Eric Mandelbaum - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (2):141-157.
    A Bayesian mind is, at its core, a rational mind. Bayesianism is thus well-suited to predict and explain mental processes that best exemplify our ability to be rational. However, evidence from belief acquisition and change appears to show that we do not acquire and update information in a Bayesian way. Instead, the principles of belief acquisition and updating seem grounded in maintaining a psychological immune system rather than in approximating a Bayesian processor.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Shifting Border Between Perception and Cognition.Ben Phillips - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):316-346.
    The distinction between perception and cognition has always had a firm footing in both cognitive science and folk psychology. However, there is little agreement as to how the distinction should be drawn. In fact, a number of theorists have recently argued that, given the ubiquity of top-down influences, we should jettison the distinction altogether. I reject this approach, and defend a pluralist account of the distinction. At the heart of my account is the claim that each legitimate way of marking (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • A Neo-Kantian Account of Perception.Leslie Stevenson - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (3):411-431.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Psychosemantics and the Rich/Thin Debate1.E. J. Green - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):153-186.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sellarsian Buddhism Comments on Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy.Evan Thompson - 2018 - Sophia 57 (4):565-579.
    This paper critically examines Jay Garfield’s accounts of the self, consciousness, and phenomenology in his book, Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy. I argue that Garfield’s views on these topics are shaped, in problematic ways, by views he takes over from Wilfrid Sellars and applies to Buddhist philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation