After reviewing the status of the concept of the phenomenon in Husserl’s phenomenology and the aim of successive attempts to reform, de-formalize, and to widen it, we show the difficulties of a method that, following the example of Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology, intends to connect the phenomenon directly to the revelation of an exteriority. We argue that, on the contrary, Marc Richir’s phenomenology, which strives to grasp the phenomenon as nothing-but-phenomenon, is more likely to capture the “meaning” of the phenomenological , (...) and hence to help us orient in the field of problems that phenomenology encounters without always knowing how to tackle them. Yet, this extension of the phenomenon’s domain does not thereby encompass everything: there may well be certain issues that require a phenomenology without phenomenon ; but the meaning of this cannot be determined before the complete reenvisioning of transcendental phenomenology. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar quais são os pressupostos teóricos contidos na intuição doadora de sentido husserliana e na ontologia fundamental heideggeriana que possibilitaram a Marion pensar na fenomenologia da doação. Para tanto, retomamos a teoria da intuição de Husserl conforme a sua obra Investigações lógicas ; refletimos a partir dos Prolegômenos de Heidegger sobre uma possível crítica ao projeto de redução do ser à intuição categorial e de sua transposição à esfera da existência; e, em Marion, recorremos às (...) obras Redução e doação e Sendo dado para discorrer criticamente sobre a tese de que Heidegger, ao mesmo tempo que volta ao estudo do ser, indica a possibilidade de pensar a doação como horizonte de pertencimento do próprio ser. Palavras-chave: Intuição doadora. A priori. Doação. Jean-Luc Marion. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: The analytic method by which Descartes established the first principle of his philosophy is a unique cognitive process of direct insight and non-logical inference that differs markedly from the deductive model of noetic apprehension long associated with seventeenth-century rationalism. In this paper, it is shown that the same analytic process is at work in the Third Meditation proof of the innateness of the idea of God, where, however, there are serious doubts about its legitimacy.