Work in feminist and critical race aesthetics brings out a complex interaction between aesthetic, ethical, and political value. The interest in ethico-political considerations is also found in recent literature around art and ethics, such as debates about the work of immoral artists, cultural appropriation and heritage, and art in public spaces. These discussions are characterized by a social structural approach to the ethico-political value of art that focuses on relations between artworks, other artefacts, and individuals in specific sociohistorical contexts and (...) as they emerge from specific social organizations. In this paper I present the main features and assumptions behind these social structural approaches to the values of art. I examine accounts that take ethico-political value to depend on artworks’ contributions to public discourse and on their role in constituting social structures. (shrink)

Liberalism is often claimed to be at odds with feminism and critical race theory (CRT). This article argues, to the contrary, that Rawlsian liberalism supports the central commitments of both. Section 1 argues that Rawlsian liberalism supports intersectional feminism. Section 2 argues that the same is true of CRT. Section 3 then uses Young’s ‘Five Faces of Oppression’—a classic work widely utilized in feminism and CRT to understand and contest many varieties of oppression—to illustrate how Rawlsian liberalism supports diverse feminist (...) and CRT projects, and why it may be critical to achieve solidarity between feminism, CRT, and Rawlsian liberalism. Finally, Section 4 responds to five objections. (shrink)

Understanding and empathy on the part of those in privileged positions are often cited as powerful tools in the fight against oppression. Too often, however, those in positions of power assume they know what it is like to be less well off when, in actuality, they do not. This kind of assumption represents a thinking vice we dub synecdoche epistemic arrogance. In instances of synecdoche epistemic arrogance, a person who has privilege wrongly assumes, based on limited experiences, that she can (...) know what it is like to experience a particular form of oppression. We argue two main points. First, synecdoche epistemic arrogance can lead to a variety of moral harms. Second, synecdoche epistemic arrogance is often tied to other troubling epistemic patterns, which we discuss in the context of disability and race simulations. Overall, the essay helps demonstrate how synecdoche epistemic arrogance can contribute to injustice. (shrink)

Current debates in food aesthetics are moving away from a focus on whether food is art, and worries about the subjectivity and objectivity of taste, and towards questions about food's aesthetic properties, the cultural and social significance of food, our modes of aesthetic engagement with food, and issues involving cultural appropriation and the authenticity of dishes.

Blake Hereth has recently argued for zootheism, the view that God has incarnated as a non-human animal. I argue that zootheism is compatible with orthodox Christianity, and that at least one argument for it has some force. But I also argue that Hereth’s version of zootheism conflicts with orthodox Christianity, as do some of the arguments Hereth uses to motivate it. And then I argue that the elements of Hereth’s view which conflict with orthodox Christianity are independently implausible anyway: the (...) conflicting details are better filled in in other ways, and the conflicting arguments fail. Recognizing this yields a version of zootheism which is in harmony with orthodox Christianity while still having a philosophical motivation. (shrink)

In countries like the United States, White people benefit from appropriating Black hair culture, even while Black men and women experience race-based hair discrimination and oppression. One goal of this paper is to raise awareness of hair discrimination and oppression within the philosophical community. Another is to consider whether current theories of appropriation can account for the wrongness of this widespread phenomenon and, if so, how. We are particularly interested in the special case where one minority group appropriates from another (...) minority group—viz. the appropriation of Black hairstyles by Non-Black Persons of Colour. Our paper highlights the complexity of appropriation claims between competing minority groups—both of which have been oppressed, albeit differently, by White people— due to their multi-ethnic, multicultural and, therefore, intersectional, status. (shrink)

Is it ever aesthetically permissible to engage in acts of cultural appropriation? This paper shows how recent work on aesthetic normativity can help answer this question. Drawing on the work of Lopes and McGonigal, I argue that in many cases those who engage in cultural appropriation act against their aesthetic reasons. Lopes and McGonigal advocate for externalist accounts of aesthetic reasons according to which whether or not an agent has an aesthetic reason to act depends on whether or not their (...) action will be an aesthetic achievement. Employing this framework, I argue that insofar as acts of cultural appropriation are seldom aesthetic achievements, many agents who engage in culturally appropriative aesthetic activities act against their aesthetic reasons. (shrink)

What could ground normative restrictions concerning cultural appropriation which are not grounded by independent considerations such as property rights or harm? We propose that such restrictions can be grounded by considerations of intimacy. Consider the familiar phenomenon of interpersonal intimacy. Certain aspects of personal life and interpersonal relationships are afforded various protections in virtue of being intimate. We argue that an analogous phenomenon exists at the level of large groups. In many cases, members of a group engage in shared practices (...) that contribute to a sense of common identity, such as wearing certain hair or clothing styles or performing a certain style of music. Participation in such practices can generate relations of group intimacy, which can ground certain prerogatives in much the same way that interpersonal intimacy can. One such prerogative is making what we call an appropriation claim. An appropriation claim is a request from a group member that non-members refrain from appropriating a given element of the group’s culture. Ignoring appropriation claims can constitute a breach of intimacy. But, we argue, just as for the prerogatives of interpersonal intimacy, in many cases there is no prior fact of the matter about whether the appropriation of a given cultural practice constitutes a breach of intimacy. It depends on what the group decides together. (shrink)

Cultural appropriation occurs when an individual from one culture uses another culture's ideas. Often the ideas relate to artifacts, clothes, food, and symbols. Frequently, critics of cultural appropriation claim that it is a type of theft. The critics also claim that it disrespects minorities and also is similar to or involves colonialism. In this paper, we argue that it is neither wrong nor bad to culturally appropriate. It is not wrong because no one owns cultural symbols, not all cultural appropriation (...) involves insult or ridicule, and it is unclear what makes something an instance of cultural appropriation. It is often not bad because a free market in cultural goods frequently maximizes the good. (shrink)

All too often, social kinds function as sites of oppression. To be a woman, to be Black, to be trans – each, in its own way, situates someone at the lower end of a social hierarchy. Membership in such groups thus constitutes a liability: notwithstanding the goods people draw from sharing in these identities, they also stand at perpetual risk of those same identities exposing them to significant harm. What, if anything, can members of oppressed groups do to counter that (...) oppression? In this article I explore one possible strategy: people can – and do – strategically invoke their membership in what I call ‘anti-oppressive kinds’, in order to contest the oppression they face qua members of oppressed groups. Focusing on one particularly salient anti-oppressive kind, the human, I first offer an explanation as to how and why its invocation might be politically effective, before considering some hazards with its use. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. What is cultural ‘appropriation’? What is cultural ‘appreciation’? Whatever the complex answer to this question, cultural appropriation is commonly defined as ‘the taking of something produced by members of one culture by members of another’, whilst appreciation is typically understood as mere ‘exploration’: ‘Appreciation explores whatever is there’. These provisional definitions suggest that there is an in-principle distinction between the two concepts that presupposes the following: what is appreciated is already available; what is (...) appropriated was, prior to its being taken, not already there or available. Moreover, perhaps appreciation, when contrasted to appropriation, is unproblematic precisely due to this basic difference. In this paper, we argue that the exclusive disjunction – appropriation or appreciation – rests on a false distinction between the two. We also show that this distinction presupposes a false normative principle that to the extent that x is appreciation rather than appropriation, then x is not – relevant to this issue – a wrong. Against these presuppositions, we defend the view that appropriation is already built into appreciation. This does not mean that we cannot ask questions of appreciation, but that questions of appreciation do not preclude the problematics of appropriation. (shrink)

This paper is about style appropriation: the use by someone of stylistic cultural innovations distinctive of a cultural group that is not her own. While I agree with the key insight of C. Thi Nguyen and Matthew Strohl : 981-1002) – namely, that style appropriation is sometimes found objectionable because group intimacy is believed to have been breached – I disagree with their core claim that the settled beliefs of the group cannot be wrong about whether its group intimacy has, (...) in fact, been compromised in this way. I accept that facts about group intimacy can generate normative reasons concerning style appropriation, but develop a distinctive account of how this comes to be so: one which holds that such facts are independently grounded, rather than being decided by group opinion. This alternative picture of how group intimacy grounds normative reasons does better justice to the intuitive thought that reality, including its normative regions, is belief-independent. The paper ends with some replies to potential objections. (shrink)

This paper seeks to clear up the confusion surrounding debates over cultural appropriation. To do so, I argue for an agent-centred approach—a focus on appropriators more than appropriation. In my view, cultural misappropriation involves agents who exhibit disregard toward a relevant culture and its members. I argue further that this approach improves upon recent alternative philosophical approaches to cultural appropriation, which I divide into two camps: toleration-based and power-based.

Some writers have objected to cultural appropriation in the arts on the grounds that it violates cultures’ property rights. Recently a paper by Erich Matthes and another by C. Thi Nguyen and Matthew Strohl have argued that cultural appropriation does not violate property rights but that it is nevertheless often objectionable. Matthes argues that cultural appropriation contributes to the oppression of disadvantaged cultures. Nguyen and Strohl argue that it violated the intimacy of cultures. This paper argues that neither Matthes nor (...) Nguyen and Strohl succeed in showing that cultural appropriation is often objectionable. (shrink)

In this essay, we address an important problem in the ethics of cultural engagement: the problem of giving a systematic account of when and why outsider use of insider cultural material is permissible or impermissible. We argue that many scholars rely on a problematic notion of collective ownership even when they claim to be disavowing it. After making this case, we motivate an alternative framework for thinking about cultural exchange, which we call the core interests framework. We conclude with some (...) reflections on how this framework helps to raise interesting questions about the most promising accounts of wrongful cultural appropriation. (shrink)

This study addresses the issue of how religious authority is negotiated and redefined in the age of digital media, focusing on the case of Raja Zia ul Haq, a Pakistani Muslim cleric. Utilizing Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis, the study posits that Zia ul Haq’s strategic semiotic choices in attire and symbolism serve as calculated maneuvers to navigate complex dialogues of power, identity, and cultural capital. The findings reveal that his appropriation of biker club symbolism disrupts traditional paradigms of Islamic clerical (...) authority in Pakistan. These choices resonate with a younger, digitally savvy audience and function as a form of religious rebranding. The study argues that Zia ul Haq’s semiotic choices challenge monolithic interpretations of Islamic authority, thereby opening new avenues for religious engagement and interpretation. The significance of this work lies in its transnational implications, offering a counter-narrative that challenges prevailing stereotypes about Islamic scholars and suggests new paradigms for understanding religious authority in a globalized world. (shrink)

Recently, there have been cases in which out-group representation in art has faced severe criticism. Out-group representation occurs when an artist in her work engages with people, characters, or subject matters that do not fall within her own identity group. This is exemplified by the case of finding a translator for Amanda Gorman’s The Hill We Climb in the Netherlands, where the original choice was criticized because, unlike Gorman, the translator was not Black, and by the case of Dana Schutz’s (...) painting of Emmett Till in his casket at the Whitney Museum in New York, which was criticized for being painted by a White person who could not understand the suffering Emmett Till and his mother had gone through. A number of objections to out-group representation are identified in the debate, namely, an objection from authenticity, an objection from equality of opportunity, and the suggestion that out-group representation is disrespectful and/or harmful. It is argued that none of these objections establishes that it is morally problematic to engage in out-group representation in art per se, although, importantly, there are a number of moral concerns that those who thus engage should be sensitive to. (shrink)