- Objective evidence and rules of strategy: Achinstein on method: Peter Achinstein: Evidence and method: Scientific strategies of Isaac Newton and James Clerk Maxwell. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 177pp, $24.95 HB.William L. Harper, Kent W. Staley, Henk W. de Regt & Peter Achinstein - 2014 - Metascience 23 (3):413-442.details
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Science is judgement, not only calculation: a reply to Aris Spanos’s review of The cult of statistical significance.Stephen T. Ziliak & Deirdre Nansen McCloskey - 2008 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 1 (1):165-170.details
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Prediction in selectionist evolutionary theory.Rasmus Gr⊘Nfeldt Winther - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):889-901.details
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Conceptual challenges for interpretable machine learning.David S. Watson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-33.details
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Evidence in biology and the conditions of success.Jacob Stegenga - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (6):981-1004.details
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Strategies for securing evidence through model criticism.Kent W. Staley - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):21-43.details
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Internalist and externalist aspects of justification in scientific inquiry.Kent Staley & Aaron Cobb - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):475-492.details
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Early stopping of RCTs: two potential issues for error statistics.Roger Stanev - 2015 - Synthese 192 (4):1089-1116.details
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Evidence and Justification in Groups with Conflicting Background Beliefs.Kent W. Staley - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):232-247.details
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The objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):539-558.details
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Evidence and experimental design in sequential trials.Jan Sprenger - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):637-649.details
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Who Should Be Afraid of the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox?Aris Spanos - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (1):73-93.details
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The discovery of argon: A case for learning from data?Aris Spanos - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (3):359-380.details
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Severity and Trustworthy Evidence: Foundational Problems versus Misuses of Frequentist Testing.Aris Spanos - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):378-397.details
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Revisiting Haavelmo's structural econometrics: bridging the gap between theory and data.Aris Spanos - 2015 - Journal of Economic Methodology 22 (2):171-196.details
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Is frequentist testing vulnerable to the base-rate fallacy?Aris Spanos - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):565-583.details
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Error statistical modeling and inference: Where methodology meets ontology.Aris Spanos & Deborah G. Mayo - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3533-3555.details
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Curve Fitting, the Reliability of Inductive Inference, and the Error‐Statistical Approach.Aris Spanos - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):1046-1066.details
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Bernoulli’s golden theorem in retrospect: error probabilities and trustworthy evidence.Aris Spanos - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13949-13976.details
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A frequentist interpretation of probability for model-based inductive inference.Aris Spanos - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1555-1585.details
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What type of Type I error? Contrasting the Neyman–Pearson and Fisherian approaches in the context of exact and direct replications.Mark Rubin - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5809–5834.details
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Inflated effect sizes and underpowered tests: how the severity measure of evidence is affected by the winner’s curse.Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):133-145.details
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What is epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias? The evidential account.Alexander Reutlinger - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-26.details
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Rejoinder: Reviews Symposium.Julian Reiss - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):210-215.details
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Rejoinder error in economics. Towards a more evidence-based methodology , Julian Reiss, Routledge, 2007, XXIV + 246 pages. [REVIEW]Julian Reiss - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):210-215.details
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How Theories of Induction Can Streamline Measurements of Scientific Performance.Slobodan Perović & Vlasta Sikimić - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (2):267-291.details
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Commentary: Psychological Science's Aversion to the Null.Jose D. Perezgonzalez, Dolores Frías-Navarro & Juan Pascual-Llobell - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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Significance Tests: Vitiated or Vindicated by the Replication Crisis in Psychology?Deborah G. Mayo - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (1):101-120.details
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Statistical significance and its critics: practicing damaging science, or damaging scientific practice?Deborah G. Mayo & David Hand - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-33.details
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Some surprising facts about surprising facts.D. Mayo - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:79-86.details
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Philosophical Scrutiny of Evidence of Risks: From Bioethics to Bioevidence.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):803-816.details
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Ockham Efficiency Theorem for Stochastic Empirical Methods.Kevin T. Kelly & Conor Mayo-Wilson - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):679-712.details
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How to discount double-counting when it counts: Some clarifications.Deborah G. Mayo - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):857-879.details
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Eight journals over eight decades: a computational topic-modeling approach to contemporary philosophy of science.Christophe Malaterre, Francis Lareau, Davide Pulizzotto & Jonathan St-Onge - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2883-2923.details
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Model change and reliability in scientific inference.Erich Kummerfeld & David Danks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2673-2693.details
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The epistemic consequences of pragmatic value-laden scientific inference.Adam P. Kubiak & Paweł Kawalec - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-26.details
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Prior Information in Frequentist Research Designs: The Case of Neyman’s Sampling Theory.Adam P. Kubiak & Paweł Kawalec - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):381-402.details
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Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks.Adam P. Kubiak, Paweł Kawalec & Adam Kiersztyn - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (4):585-604.details
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Classical versus Bayesian Statistics.Eric Johannesson - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):302-318.details
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Logical consistency in simultaneous statistical test procedures.Rafael Izbicki & Luís Gustavo Esteves - 2015 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 23 (5):732-758.details
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Prediction in Selectionist Evolutionary Theory.Rasmus Gr⊘Nfeldt Winther - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):889-901.details
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On Falsifiable Statistical Hypotheses.Konstantin Genin - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (2):40.details
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Pursuit and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94 (C):17-30.details
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Error, error-statistics and self-directed anticipative learning.R. P. Farrell & C. A. Hooker - 2008 - Foundations of Science 14 (4):249-271.details
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Higgs Discovery and the Look Elsewhere Effect.Richard Dawid - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (1):76-96.details
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Bayesian Perspectives on the Discovery of the Higgs Particle.Richard Dawid - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):377-394.details
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The Jeffreys–Lindley paradox and discovery criteria in high energy physics.Robert D. Cousins - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):395-432.details
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Statistical Inference and the Replication Crisis.Lincoln J. Colling & Dénes Szűcs - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (1):121-147.details
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Not null enough: pseudo-null hypotheses in community ecology and comparative psychology.William Bausman & Marta Halina - 2018 - Biology and Philosophy 33 (3-4):30.details
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How experimental algorithmics can benefit from Mayo’s extensions to Neyman–Pearson theory of testing.Thomas Bartz-Beielstein - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):385 - 396.details
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