If ecological systems are functionally organised, they can possess functions or malfunctions. Natural function would provide justification for conservationists to act for the protection of current ecological arrangements and control the presence of populations that create ecosystem malfunctions. Invasive species are often thought to be malfunctional for ecosystems, so functional arrangement would provide an objective reason for their control. Unfortunately for this prospect, I argue no theory of function, which can support such normative conclusions, can be applied to large scale (...) ecosystems. Instead ecological systems have causal structure, with small clusters of populations achieving functional arrangement. This, however, does not leave us without reason to control invasive species. We can look at the causal arrangement of ecological systems for populations that support ecological features that we should preserve. Populations that play a causal role in reducing biodiversity should be controlled, because biodiversity is a good all prudent agents should want to preserve. (shrink)

If ecological systems are functionally organised, they can possess functions or malfunctions. Natural function would provide justification for conservationists to act for the protection of current ecological arrangements and control the presence of populations that create ecosystem malfunctions. Invasive species are often thought to be malfunctional for ecosystems, so functional arrangement would provide an objective reason for their control. Unfortunately for this prospect, I argue no theory of function, which can support such normative conclusions, can be applied to large scale (...) ecosystems. Instead ecological systems have causal structure, with small clusters of populations achieving functional arrangement. This, however, does not leave us without reason to control invasive species. We can look at the causal arrangement of ecological systems for populations that support ecological features that we should preserve. Populations that play a causal role in reducing biodiversity should be controlled, because biodiversity is a good all prudent agents should want to preserve. (shrink)

This paper illuminates a variety of issues that speak to the question of whether ‘captivity for conservation’ can be an ethically acceptable goal of the modern zoo. Reflecting on both theoretical disagreements and practical challenges , the paper explains why the ‘Noah’s Ark’ paradigm is being replaced by an alternative ‘integrated approach.’ It explores the changes in the zoo’s core tasks that the new paradigm implies. And it pays special attention to the changes that would have to be made in (...) zoos’ collection policies: connection with in situ projects, emphasizing local species and the local biogeographical region, exchange of animals among zoos and between zoos and wildlife, and a shift towards smaller species. Finally the question will be addressed whether the new paradigm will achieve a morally acceptable balance between animal welfare costs and species conservation benefits. (shrink)

The article seeks to highlight the relation between ontology and communication while considering the role of AI in society and environment. Bioinformationalism is the technical term that foregrounds this relationality. The study reveals instructive consequences for philosophy of technology in general and AI in particular. The first section introduces the bioinformational approach to AI, focusing on three critical features of the current AI debate: ontology of information, property-based vs. relational AI, and ontology vs. constitution of AI. When applied to the (...) themes of relationality and non-anthropocentric communications, bioinformational insights highlight an inclusive and meaningful groundwork for understanding AI by ‘relating’ it with society and the environment through an engagement with the ongoing critique of human supremacy. In the second section, we move from ‘relating’ AI to ‘rewilding’ AI by proposing taxonomical classification for certain technological entities. We situate our proposal in the broader personhood debate with the proposal of taxonomical ranking. In the last section, we show an instance of a relational approach steeped in substantialist ontology by introducing the fourth feature of the AI debate. A broad critique of Floridi’s philosophy of information introduces this fourth feature from the domain of philosophy and sociology to address various theoretical and ecological problems with current relational accounts. In doing so, we argue for ‘communication’ to be the replacement of ‘information’ as the moral unit. A bioinformational understanding of AI advocates taking ontological commitments seriously at all levels of informational and technological processes and products. (shrink)

We analyze the role of ethical values in the determination of the social cost of carbon, arguing that the familiar debate about discounting is too narrow. Other ethical issues are equally important to computing the social cost of carbon, and we highlight inequality, risk, and population ethics. Although the usual approach, in the economics of cost-benefit analysis for climate policy, is confined to a utilitarian axiology, the methodology of the social cost of carbon is rather flexible and can be expanded (...) to a broader set of social-welfare approaches. [Open access]. (shrink)

This paper addresses the foundations of Teleological Individualism, the view that organisms, even non-sentient organisms, are goal-oriented systems while biological collectives, such as ecosystems or conspecific groups, are mere assemblages of organisms. Typical defenses of Teleological Individualism ground the teleological organization of organisms in the workings of natural selection. This paper shows that grounding teleological organization in natural selection is antithetical to Teleological Individualism because such views assume a view about the units of selection on which it is only individual (...) organisms that are units of selection. However, none of the Conventionalist, Reductionist, or Multi-Level Realist theories serve to justify such an assumption. Thus, Teleological Individualism cannot be grounded in natural selection. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic once again confirmed that zoonotic diseases are a serious threat to humanity. These infectious diseases, transmitted from animals to humans, have the power to cause a global health crisis. Over time the risk on these outbreaks has increased. Some of the main drivers are global population growth, urbanization, worldwide transport, increased demand for animal protein, unsustainable agriculture, and climate change. This development has fueled a renewed interest in the relation between human, animal and environmental health. This was (...) framed in the concept of One Health: the integrative effort of multiple disciplines working locally, nationally, and globally to attain optimal health for people, animals, and the environment. At present, One Health is the worldwide standard to combat zoonotic diseases. In an ideal world such a strategy should lead to a better health for humans, animals and our environment. However, in practice it is not self-evident that a One Health approach in zoonotic disease control is actually in the interest of animals or the environment. From a holistic One Health perspective it can be difficult to accept the culling of healthy animals to protect public health. The same goes for long term confinement of free-range poultry, whose housing systems are often not suitable for this purpose, to prevent avian influenza outbreaks. Or antimicrobial reduction policies that lead to higher disease incidence and mortality in animals. These ethical considerations formed the start of this thesis. The aim of my research is to clarify the ethical assumptions of a One Health approach in zoonotic disease control, to explore how these can be coherently understood and justified and to indicate what this implies for policymaking. The outcome of my research contributes to the development of an ethic of One Health and will hopefully lead to a more socially acceptable zoonotic disease control. This project is related to the interdisciplinary Wageningen UR strategic research theme ‘Global One Health’. From my conceptual analysis, it follows that there is no universal interpretation of the One Health concept nor of a One Health approach in zoonotic disease control. Nevertheless, One Health has produced several successes in zoonotic disease control, surveillance and research. Due to its ambiguity, the One Health concept functions as a boundary object: by leaving room for interpretation to fit different purposes it facilitates cooperation. In many cases this results in the promotion of health of humans, animals and the environment. However, there are also situations in which this mutual benefit of a One Health approach is not that evident. For instance, when healthy animals are culled to protect public health. To address these moral dilemmas, it is important to develop an ethical framework. Such an ethic of One Health starts with acknowledging the moral status of animals and the indirect moral obligations we have towards ecosystems. Furthermore, it is necessary that we find an appropriate definition of health, which encompasses all three components of One Health. In chapter 3, I present the results of an empirical study on normative presuppositions of health professionals involved in zoonotic disease control policies in the Netherlands. This study reveals that in theory these professionals adhere to a holistic view of the One Health concept. However, in practice an anthropocentric approach was dominant. The study identified public health as a trumping moral value, which reveals an inherent field of tension with the core of One Health thinking. Furthermore, a lack of ethical expertise in control systems for zoonotic diseases can lead to misconception of ethical principles, like the precautionary principle. In chapter 4, I discuss that within a One Health strategy, that requires us to balance public health benefits against the health interests of animals and the environment, unrestricted use of the precautionary principle can lead to moral dilemmas. It must at least be clear that there is a harm and some scientific evidence for a cause and effect relation. Furthermore, precautionary measures should be effective, consistent, proportional and not counterproductive. An assessment of their effect should be integrated in the standard decision-models of public health authorities. Moreover, to ensure societal support these considerations should be transparent and open for dialogue. I present two possible conceptions of the precautionary principle. First, it is noticeable that because of the unpredictable nature of zoonotic diseases, public health authorities focus on the idea of ‘precaution as preparedness’. This reactive response leads to difficult trade-offs between human and animal health. I therefore argue that this policy should always be accompanied by a second policy: ‘precaution as prevention’. Addressing the underlying drivers of zoonotic diseases is a necessary condition to justify disease control measures that harm animals and ecosystems on the basis of the precautionary principle. In chapter 5, I elaborate the responsibilities of veterinarians within the One Health framework. Veterinarians are professionally responsible for the health and welfare of the animals under their care. Moreover, society expects veterinarians to safeguard food safety and public health. These societal expectations are sometimes overdemanding. A holistic perspective on One Health offers veterinarians a way out of the dichotomy between public and animal health, that is at the basis of many moral dilemmas in zoonotic disease control. This is explained with the ‘encapsulated health’ argument: the best way to safeguard human health is to promote the health of animals and the environment. In chapter 6, I conclude that before we decide to implement certain disease control measures, an ethic of One Health requires that we choose those interventions that have the least impact on the health of animals and ecosystems, while still effective enough to stop the disease. My research indicates that the contemporary conception of One Health is necessary but insufficient to address moral dilemmas related to emerging zoonotic diseases. A holistic interpretation of the One Health concept confronts us with underlying value conflicts but will ultimately promote human health more than the current anthropocentric conception. (shrink)