- Frankfurt-style counterexamples and begging the question.Stewart Goetz - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):83-105.details
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Reasons explanations (of actions) as structural explanations.Megan Fritts - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12683-12704.details
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Intention at the Interface.Ellen Fridland - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):481-505.details
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Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer Interfaces and Disembodied Agency.Steffen Steinert, Christoph Bublitz, Ralf Jox & Orsolya Friedrich - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (3):457-482.details
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The assimilation argument and the rollback argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):395-416.details
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Self-determination, self-transformation, and the case of Jean Valjean: a problem for Velleman.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2591-2598.details
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If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1101-1131.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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Bratman on identity over time and identification at a time.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):1-14.details
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Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW]Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.details
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Mental Actions and Mental Agency.Anika Fiebich & John Michael - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):683-693.details
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Habitual Actions, Propositional Knowledge, Motor Representations and Intentionality.Gabriele Ferretti & Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2021 - Topoi 40 (3):623-635.details
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Reasons explanations and pure agency.Richard H. Feldman & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.details
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Habit and Intention.Christos Douskos - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1129-1148.details
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Reasons, causes, and contrasts.Jason Dickenson - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):1–23.details
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A Critique of Alfred R Mele’s Work on Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy: Oxford University Press, New York, 1995. [REVIEW]Pujarini Das - 2018 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 35 (3):603-617.details
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The trouble with externalist compatibilist autonomy.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):171-196.details
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On the Nature of Testimony.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):114-127.details
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Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions.E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):220-231.details
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Is Fallible Knowledge Attributable?E. J. Coffman - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):73-83.details
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Involuntarism impugned?E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-11.details
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Do We Decide Intentionally?E. J. Coffman - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):822-827.details
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Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.details
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Free choice, effort, and wanting more.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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Commanding Intentions and Prize-Winning Decisions.Randolph Clarke - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):391-409.details
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Because She Wanted To.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27-35.details
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Autonomous reasons for intending.Randolph Clarke - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212.details
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Unintentional collective action.Sara Rachel Chant - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.details
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Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Collective Responsibility in a Hollywood Standoff.Sara Rachel Chant - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):83-92.details
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Belief, experience and the act of picture-making.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):1-14.details
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New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):193 - 201.details
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Individualism and the metaphysics of actions.Matias Bulnes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):113-132.details
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The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2009 - Disputatio 3 (26):1 - 16.details
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I’m just sitting around doing nothing: on exercising intentional agency in omitting to act.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4617-4635.details
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Intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.details
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Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism.Andrei Buckareff - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 17.details
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How (not) to think about mental action.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):83-89.details
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Doxastic decisions and controlling belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.details
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Causalisms Reconsidered.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):147-.details
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Compatibilism and doxastic control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.details
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An action theoretic problem for intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):89-105.details
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Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):312-332.details
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Motor Intentions: How Intentions and Motor Representations Come Together.Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):231-256.details
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Implicit biases in visually guided action.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):S3943–S3967.details
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A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action.Chiara Brozzo - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):683-697.details
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Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action.Michael Brent & Candace Upton - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):52-71.details
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Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action.Michael Brent - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):656-673.details
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