For the last three decades, physicists have been moving beyond the boundaries of their discipline, using their methods to study various problems usually instigated by economists. This trend labeled ‘econophysics’ can be seen as a hybrid area of knowledge that exists between economics and physics. Econophysics did not spring from nowhere—the existing literature agrees that econophysics emerged in the 1990s and historical studies on the field mainly deal with what happened during that decade. This article aims at investigating what happened (...) before the 1990s by clarifying the epistemic background that might have paved the way to the emergence of econophysics. This historical exploration led me to highlight the active role played by the Santa Fe Institute by promoting interdisciplinary research on complexity in 1980s. Precisely, by defining three research themes on economic complexity, the SFI defined a research agenda and a way of extending physics\biology to economics. This article offers a possible archeology of econophysics to clarify what could have contributed to the development of a particular episteme in the 1980s easing the advent of econophysics in the 1990s. (shrink)

In this paper, the Author reviewed the typical objections against the claim that brains are computers, or, to be more precise, information-processing mechanisms. By showing that practically all the popular objections are based on uncharitable interpretations of the claim, he argues that the claim is likely to be true, relevant to contemporary cognitive science, and non-trivial.

This paper proposes a metaphysical framework for distinguishing between human and machine intelligence. Specifically, it posits two identical deterministic worlds -- one comprising a human agent and the other comprising a machine agent. These agents exhibit different types of information processing mechanisms despite their apparent sameness in a causal sense. By postulating the distinctiveness of human over machine intelligence, this paper resolves what it refers to as “the vantage point problem” – namely, how to legitimize a determinist’s assertion of determinism (...) by placing the determinist within the universe. (shrink)

This paper proposes a metaphysical framework for distinguishing between human and machine intelligence. By drawing an analogy from Kant’s incongruent counterparts, it posits two identical deterministic worlds -- one comprising a human agent and the other comprising a machine agent. These agents exhibit different types of information processing mechanisms despite their apparent sameness in a causal sense. By postulating the distinctiveness of human over machine intelligence, this paper resolves what it refers to as “the vantage point problem” – namely, how (...) to legitimize a determinist’s assertion of determinism by placing the determinist within the universe. (shrink)

The contribution of the body to cognition and control in natural and artificial agents is increasingly described as “off-loading computation from the brain to the body”, where the body is said to perform “morphological computation”. Our investigation of four characteristic cases of morphological computation in animals and robots shows that the ‘off-loading’ perspective is misleading. Actually, the contribution of body morphology to cognition and control is rarely computational, in any useful sense of the word. We thus distinguish (1) morphology that (...) facilitates control, (2) morphology that facilitates perception and the rare cases of (3) morphological computation proper, such as ‘reservoir computing.’ where the body is actually used for computation. This result contributes to the understanding of the relation between embodiment and computation: The question for robot design and cognitive science is not whether computation is offloaded to the body, but to what extent the body facilitates cognition and control – how it contributes to the overall ‘orchestration’ of intelligent behaviour. (shrink)

The dialogue develops arguments for and against a broad new world system - info-computationalist naturalism - that is supposed to overcome the traditional mechanistic view. It would make the older mechanistic view into a special case of the new general info-computationalist framework (rather like Euclidian geometry remains valid inside a broader notion of geometry). We primarily discuss what the info-computational paradigm would mean, especially its pancomputationalist component. This includes the requirements for a the new generalized notion of computing that would (...) include sub-symbolic information processing. We investigate whether pancomputationalism can provide the basic causal structure to the world and whether the overall research program of info-computationalist naturalism appears productive, especially when it comes to new approaches to the living world, including computationalism in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This paper presents Minimal Information Structural Realism. MISR claims that information is an ontologically and epistemologically objective physical entity1 and is perceived as, but not identical to, organization, form, or structure of nature. There is a relatively significant body of literature claiming that the essential, if not fundamental, element of nature is information. Authors differ on the precise description of information conceived this way. However, they do agree that it would be a forming element in nature, a factor responsible for (...) patterns observed in reality, apprehended through order, organization or structures. To express the fundamental ontological role of information in nature, a new kind of structural realism, or rather information structural realism, is needed. This paper is proposing exactly this in the form of minimal information structural realism. The basic claim of MISR is that information is a foundation of reality and it is perceived or apprehended through patterns or structures. This claim embodies basic intuitions regarding the role of information in nature. MISR is not associated with the structural realism SR of the ontic or epistemic kinds, and is only remotely related to the concept of information structural realism defined by Floridi. (shrink)