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Against Multiverse Theodicies

Philo 13 (2):113-135 (2010)

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  1. (1 other version)God Acts in the Quantum World.Bradley Monton - 2014 - In Jonathan Kvanvig & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 5. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Suppose that God exists, and that God does not violate the laws of nature he created for the world. God can nevertheless act in the world, by acting at the indeterministic quantum level. This chapter makes two specific points about God’s quantum action. First, on some ways of understanding quantum mechanics (specifically, the GRW theory, and the associated Continuous Spontaneous Localization theories), God’s actions are almost unlimited, contrary to those who say that God would be quite constrained in his action, (...)
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  • The Multiverse Theodicy Meets Population Ethics.Han Li & Bradford Saad - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.
    The multiverse theodicy proposes to reconcile the existence of God and evil by supposing that God created all and only the creation-worthy universes and that some universes like ours are, despite their evils, creation-worthy. Drawing on work in population ethics, this paper develops a novel challenge to the multiverse theodicy. Roughly, the challenge contends that the axiological underpinnings of the multiverse theodicy harbor a ‘mere addition paradox’: the assumption that creating creation-worthy universes would always make the world better turns out (...)
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  • God’s Prime Directive: Non-Interference and Why There Is No (Viable) Free Will Defense.David Kyle Johnson - 2022 - Religions 13 (9).
    In a recent book and article, James Sterba has argued that there is no free will defense. It is the purpose of this article to show that, in the most technical sense, he is wrong. There is a version of the free will defense that can solve what Sterba (rightly) takes to be the most interesting and severe version of the logical problem of moral evil. However, I will also argue that, in effect (or, we might say, in practice), Sterba (...)
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  • (1 other version)How to Avoid Maximizing Expected Utility.Bradley Monton - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    The lesson to be learned from the paradoxical St. Petersburg game and Pascal’s Mugging is that there are situations where expected utility maximizers will needlessly end up poor and on death’s door, and hence we should not be expected utility maximizers. Instead, when it comes to decision-making, for possibilities that have very small probabilities of occurring, we should discount those probabilities down to zero, regardless of the utilities associated with those possibilities.
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  • The Copernican Principle, Intelligent Extraterrestrials, and Arguments from Evil.Samuel Ruhmkorff - 2019 - Religious Studies 55:297-317.
    The physicist Richard Gott defends the Copernican principle, which claims that when we have no information about our position along a given dimension among a group of observers, we should consider ourselves to be randomly located among those observers in respect to that dimension. First, I apply Copernican reasoning to the distribution of evil in the universe. I then contend that evidence for intelligent extraterrestrial life strengthens four important versions of the argument from evil. I remain neutral regarding whether this (...)
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  • Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):367-392.
    A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value-bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value-bearers he has already created. (...)
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  • Using Wormholes to Solve the Problem of Evil.Nikk Effingham - 2021 - Theologica 5 (1):100-125.
    The Multiverse Response to the problem of evil has it that God made our universe because God makes every universe meeting a certain standard. The main problem for that response is that there’s no explanation for why God didn’t just keeping making duplicates of perfect universes. This paper introduces the ‘Multiactualities Response’, which says that God actualises every possible world that meets a certain standard of value. It avoids the corresponding problem about duplication because different propositions must always be true (...)
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  • The Skeptical Challenge of the Theistic Multiverse.John Pittard - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.
    The multiverse theodicy says that because God can without cost create an infinite number of universes, the standards of acceptability that a conceivable universe must meet to be worthy of divine creation are significantly laxer than is typically supposed in discussions of the problem of evil. While the prospect of a theistic multiverse arguably helps the theist to explain suffering, I argue that it also poses a serious skeptical worry. Given the alleged laxity of the standards that a universe must (...)
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  • Against the Theistic Multiverse.Sara L. Uckelman - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):1-14.
    We argue that Kraay's "theistic multiverse" response to the objections to theism [Kraay 2011] is unsuccessful as it simply shifts the problems leveled against theism from the level of possible worlds to the level of possible universes. Furthermore, when we restate the objections at the level of possible universes, we can show how Kraay's conclusion about the uniqueness of the theistic multiverse is undermined.
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  • The Failure of the Multiverse Hypothesis as a Solution to the Problem of No Best World.David Kyle Johnson - 2014 - Sophia 53 (4):447-465.
    The multiverse hypothesis is growing in popularity among theistic philosophers because some view it as the preferable way to solve certain difficulties presented by theistic belief. In this paper, I am concerned specifically with its application to Rowe’s problem of no best world, which suggests that God’s existence is impossible given the fact that the world God actualizes must be unsurpassable, yet for any given possible world, there is one greater. I will argue that, as a solution to the problem (...)
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  • Megill’s Multiverse Meta-Argument.Klaas J. Kraay - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):235-241.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Jason Megill (2011) offers an innovative meta-argument which deploys considerations about multiple universes in an effort to block all arguments from evil. In what follows, I contend that Megill has failed to establish a key premise in his meta-argument. I also offer a rival account of the effect of multiverse models on the debate about evil.
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  • Why is God's Revelation so Vague? A Multiverse Theory of Revelation and Divine Hiddenness.Atle O. Søvik - 2022 - Zygon 57 (3):576-594.
    This article has two main parts. The first part argues in favor of a multiverse theodicy. God has created our particular universe because it contains unique goods. While God could have made our universe better, that would in fact have turned our universe into another universe, which God has also created. Our universe remains as it is to actualize its specific goals. The second part uses this basis to defend why God's revelation is so vague. It could have been clearer, (...)
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  • One Philosopher's Bug can be Another's Feature: Reply to Almeida's 'Multiverse and Divine Creation'.Klaas J. Kraay - 2018 - Religions 9 (1).
    Michael Almeida once told me that he thought we were just a couple of hours of conversation away from reaching deep agreement about some important topics in the philosophy of religion pertaining to God, multiverses, and modality. This paper represents my attempt to move this conversation forward and to seek this common ground. Specifically, I respond to Almeida’s paper entitled “The Multiverse and Divine Creation”. In the first four sections, I record my disagreement with him concerning some smaller matters. In (...)
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  • Bad Samaritans, Aftertastes, and the Problem of Evil.Eugene Schlossberger - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):197-204.
    The paper argues first that, by not rescuing innocents in certain ways , God violates a weak Bad Samaritan principle that few would deny. This ‘Bad Samaritan argument’ appears to block the traditional free will defense to the problem of evil, since respecting the principle does not violate or show lack of respect for free will. Second, the paper articulates a version of the traditional argument from evil, the ‘Aftertaste argument’, that appears to close some of the traditional loopholes in (...)
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