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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2012 - Introduction 4 (32).details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2012 - Introduction 4 (32).details
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Who’s Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Roman Frigg & Stephan Hartmann - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (3):393-412.details
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Sensuous content.J. Christopher Maloney - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 15 (November):131-54.details
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Explanationist Plasticity and the Problem of the Criterion.Ted Poston - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (3):395-419.details
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Perceptual belief and nonexperiential looks.Jack Lyons - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256.details
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Internal Recurrence.Don Ross - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):155-162.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--234.details
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Property Theories.George Bealer & Uwe Mönnich - 1983 - In Dov M. Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 133-251.details
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Folk Psychology and the Bayesian Brain.Joe Dewhurst - 2017 - In Metzinger Thomas & Wiese Wanja (eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing. MIND Group.details
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Functional architectures for cognition: are simple inferences possible?Steven W. Zucker - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):153-154.details
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The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.details
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Quine and the Contemporary Debate on Misreading.Giancarlo Zanet - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (32):395 - 412.details
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II—Moral Dependence and Natural Properties.Nick Zangwill - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):221-243.details
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Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth.José L. Zalabardo - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):147-171.details
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Empiricist Pragmatism.José L. Zalabardo - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):441-461.details
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Belief, desire and the prediction of behaviour.José L. Zalabardo - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):295-310.details
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Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
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Is folk psychology a Lakatosian research program?Bill Wringe - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):343-358.details
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Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
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Two categories of content.Andrew Woodfield - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (4):319-54.details
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Talking to Cats, Rats and Bats.K. V. Wilkes - 1997 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42:177-.details
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Representation redux.Hugh Wilder - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (July-October):185-195.details
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Provocation on belief: Part 6.Hugh Wilder - 1987 - Social Epistemology 1 (2):195-201.details
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Object-Based Epistemology at a Creationist Museum.Paul J. Wendel - 2011 - Science & Education 20 (1):37-50.details
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Cognition is not computation, for the reasons that computers don't solve the mind-body problems.Walter B. Weimer - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):152-153.details
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What do propositions measure in folk psychology?Peter Weatherall - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):365-80.details
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Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
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Intentional system theory and experimental psychology.Michael H. Van Kleeck - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):533.details
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Evaluating New Wave Reductionism: The Case of Vision.D. van Eck - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):167-196.details
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Intentionally: A problem of multiple reference frames, specificational information, and extraordinary boundary conditions on natural law.M. T. Turvey - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):153-155.details
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On radical conceptual revolutions in social science.Raimo Tuomela - 1991 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (2):303-320.details
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Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under theoretical stress.J. D. Trout - 1991 - Synthese 87 (June):379-400.details
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Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.details
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Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
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Frames, knowledge, and inference.Paul R. Thagard - 1984 - Synthese 61 (2):233 - 259.details
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The consequences of taking consequentialism seriously.Philip E. Tetlock - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):31-32.details
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Clinical artificial intelligence.Virginia Teller & Hartvig Dahl - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):549-550.details
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Actions, inactions and the temporal dimension.Karl Halvor Teigen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):30-31.details
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What really matters.Charles Taylor - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):532.details
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Is PARRY paranoid?David W. Swanson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):548-549.details
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Probaility and information.Patrick Suppes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):81-82.details
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On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now.Pär Sundström - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-12.details
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On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now.Pär Sundström - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2539-2550.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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What is it like to be Oscar?Leopold Stubenberg - 1992 - Synthese 90 (1):1-26.details
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Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience.Dustin Stokes - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92.details
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Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.details
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