- Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):1-16.details
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Dutch Books, Coherence, and Logical Consistency.Anna Mahtani - 2014 - Noûs 49 (3):522-537.details
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Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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Rationality is Not Coherence.Nora Heinzelmann - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):312-332.details
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Unspecific Evidence and Normative Theories of Decision.Rhys Borchert - forthcoming - Episteme:1-23.details
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Acting on belief functions.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2023 - Theory and Decision 95 (4):575-621.details
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(1 other version)The Normative Standard for Future Discounting.Craig Callender - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):227-253.details
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Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief.Nevin Climenhaga - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):153-176.details
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Pick the Sugar.Seamus Bradley - manuscriptdetails
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Learning by Ignoring the Most Wrong.Seamus Bradley - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):9-31.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
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Normative Decision Theory.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):755-772.details
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Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology.Benjamin Lennertz - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):184-208.details
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Imprecise evidence without imprecise credences.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2735-2758.details
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Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):539-554.details
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(1 other version)Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Imprecise Probabilities.Anna Mahtani - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 107-130.details
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Is Epistemology Autonomous?Daniel Greco - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Accuracy and Credal Imprecision.Dominik Berger & Nilanjan Das - 2019 - Noûs 54 (3):666-703.details
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On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Noûs (1):23-38.details
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An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization.R. A. Briggs & Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):162-181.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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Imprecise Probabilities and Unstable Betting Behaviour.Anna Mahtani - 2014 - Noûs 52 (1):69-87.details
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Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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A Reply to the Synchronist.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):859-871.details
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Mental Processes and Synchronicity.Brian Hedden - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):873-888.details
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Chancy accuracy and imprecise credence.Jennifer Carr - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):67-81.details
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Probabilistic consistency norms and quantificational credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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A defense of objectivism about evidential support.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):716-743.details
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Future-Bias and Practical Reason.Tom Dougherty - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
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Revisiting Risk and Rationality: a reply to Pettigrew and Briggs.Lara Buchak - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):841-862.details
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Objectivity and Bias.Gordon Belot - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):655-695.details
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Vague Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3931-3954.details
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On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Imprecise Credences and Acceptance.Benjamin Lennertz - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Thick credence and pragmatic encroachment.Jeremy Shipley - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):339-361.details
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(1 other version)The Normative Standard for Future Discounting.Craig Callender - manuscriptdetails
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A Counterexample to Three Imprecise Decision Theories.Seamus Bradley - 2018 - Theoria 85 (1):18-30.details
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Incommensurability as vagueness: a burden-shifting argument.Luke Elson - 2017 - Theoria 83 (4):341-363.details
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The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
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Don’t stop believing.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):744-766.details
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Mushy Akrasia: Why Mushy Credences Are Rationally Permissible.Rachel Fraser - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):79-106.details
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