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  1. (1 other version)Reading One's Own Mind: Self-Awareness and Developmental Psychology.Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):297-339.
    The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, this idea carne under serious attack, first from philosophy and more recently from developmental psychology. The attack from developmental psychology arises from the growing body (...)
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  • Conceptualizing intellectual attention.Mark Fortney - 2019 - Theory & Psychology 1:1-14.
    Remembering that there’s a difference between intellectual and perceptual attention can help us avoid miscommunication due to meaning different things by the same terms, which has been a particular problem during the last hundred years or so of the study of attention. I demonstrate this through analyzing in depth one such miscommunication that occurred in a philosophical criticism of the influential psychological text, Inattentional Blindness. But after making the distinction between perceptual attention and intellectual attention, and after making an effort (...)
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  • Mental Concepts: Theoretical, Observational or Dispositional Approach?Marek Pokropski - 2017 - Hybris. Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny 38:58-73.
    In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with (...)
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  • The Transcendental Argument of the Novel.Gilbert Plumer - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):148-167.
    Can fictional narration yield knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional? This is the hard question of literary cognitivism. It is unexceptional that knowledge can be gained from fictional literature in ways that are not dependent on its fictionality (e.g., the science in science fiction). Sometimes fictional narratives are taken to exhibit the structure of suppositional argument, sometimes analogical argument. Of course, neither structure is unique to narratives. The thesis of literary cognitivism would be supported if (...)
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  • A Pure Representationalist Account of Belief and Desire.Steve Pearce - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
    According to the traditional view, beliefs and desires are mental representations that play particular functional roles. A belief that P is state which represents P and plays the belief-role, while a desire that P is a state which represents that P and plays the desire-role. In this dissertation I argue that the traditional view has trouble accounting for (a) role that belief and desire play in the causal and rational explanation of behaviour and (b) our knowledge of our own conscious, (...)
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  • Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition.Shaun Gallagher & Micah Allen - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2627-2648.
    We distinguish between three philosophical views on the neuroscience of predictive models: predictive coding, predictive processing and predictive engagement. We examine the concept of active inference under each model and then ask how this concept informs discussions of social cognition. In this context we consider Frith and Friston’s proposal for a neural hermeneutics, and we explore the alternative model of enactivist hermeneutics.
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  • (2 other versions)Getting interaction theory (IT) together: Integrating developmental, phenomenological, enactive, and dynamical approaches to social interaction.Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - Interaction Studies 13 (3):436-468.
    We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the `social mind' is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached `social cognition' (conceived as a process of theorizing about and/or simulating another mind) is a secondary achievement that is dependent on more immediate processes of embodied social interaction. (...)
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  • How pretence can really be metarepresentational.Cristina Meini & Alberto Voltolini - 2010 - Mind and Society 9 (1):31-58.
    Our lives are commonly involved with fictionality, an activity that adults share with children. After providing a brief reconstruction of the most important cognitive theories on pretence, we will argue that pretence has to do with metarepresentations, albeit in a rather weakened sense. In our view, pretending entails being aware that a certain representation does not fit in the very same representational model as another representation. This is a minimal metarepresentationalism, for normally metarepresentationalism on pretense claims that pretending is or (...)
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  • Thought experiments and mental simulations.John Zeimbekis - 2011 - In Katerina Ierodiakonou & Sophie Roux (eds.), Thought Experiments in Methodological and Historical Contexts. Brill.
    Thought experiments have a mysterious way of informing us about the world, apparently without examining it, yet with a great degree of certainty. It is tempting to try to explain this capacity by making use of the idea that in thought experiments, the mind somehow simulates the processes about which it reaches conclusions. Here, I test this idea. I argue that when they predict the outcomes of hypothetical physical situations, thought experiments cannot simulate physical processes. They use mental models, which (...)
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  • Constructing an understanding of mind: The development of children's social understanding within social interaction.Jeremy I. M. Carpendale & Charlie Lewis - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):79-96.
    Theories of children's developing understanding of mind tend to emphasize either individualistic processes of theory formation, maturation, or introspection, or the process of enculturation. However, such theories must be able to account for the accumulating evidence of the role of social interaction in the development of social understanding. We propose an alternative account, according to which the development of children's social understanding occurs within triadic interaction involving the child's experience of the world as well as communicative interaction with others about (...)
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  • Quine and the Contemporary Debate on Misreading.Giancarlo Zanet - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (32):395 - 412.
    The paper examines some of the questions emerging from the debate on mindreading regarding Quine’s legacy and contribution to a new agenda on the issue. Since mindreading is an exercise in folk-psychology, a) which role folk psychology has to play according to Quine? b) was Quine’s account of mindreading closer to theory-theory, simulation theory or hybrid theory? c) was Quine a rationality theorist? d) are hybrid-theory and rationality theory incompatible as many would suggest? On the score of the answers to (...)
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  • The 'theory theory' of mind and the aims of Sellars' original myth of Jones.James R. O’Shea - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):175-204.
    Recent proponents of the ‘theory theory’ of mind often trace its roots back to Wilfrid Sellars’ famous ‘myth of Jones’ in his 1956 article, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’. Sellars developed an account of the intersubjective basis of our knowledge of the inner mental states of both self and others, an account which included the claim that such knowledge is in some sense theoretical knowledge. This paper examines the nature of this claim in Sellars’ original account and its relationship (...)
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  • Inferring the intentional states of autonomous virtual agents.Peter C. Pantelis, Chris L. Baker, Steven A. Cholewiak, Kevin Sanik, Ari Weinstein, Chia-Chien Wu, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & Jacob Feldman - 2014 - Cognition 130 (3):360-379.
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  • Social systems.Heidi L. Maibom - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):557 – 578.
    It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building (...)
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  • An empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will.Julia Haas - 2018 - Synthese (12):1-21.
    This paper presents an empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will. Specifically, it presents a theory of action, grounded in contemporary cognitive neuroscientific accounts of decision making, that explains the phenomenon of weakness of will without resulting in a puzzle.
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  • 「ジョーンズの神話」において思考に対する 一人称権威はいかにして成立するのか.Youhei Kanou - 2022 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 49 (2):75-86.
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  • A Life Form is a Lived Body: Toward an Ecological Extension of Intercorporeality and Interaffectivity.Beniamino Cianferoni - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (36).
    Phenomenological approaches to empathy and intersubjectivity have overcome some critical and open issues of traditional representationalist accounts, placing the embodied character of the social encounter at the centre of the debate. At this stage, I suggest that it would be possible and important to take a further step away from Cartesian vestiges by abandoning the affective and ontological dualism between human beings and other living beings. I argue that phenomenological and enactivist accounts based on characteristics such as pre-reflectivity and sensory (...)
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