Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Probabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: the paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning.Shira Elqayam & David Over - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):27-40.
    In recent years, the psychology of reasoning has been undergoing a paradigm shift, with general Bayesian, probabilistic approaches replacing the older, much more restricted binary logic paradigm. At the same time, dual processing theories have been gaining influence. We argue that these developments should be integrated and moreover that such integration is already underway. The new reasoning paradigm should be grounded in dual processing for its algorithmic level of analysis just as it uses Bayesian theory for its computational level of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • New paradigm psychology of reasoning.David E. Over - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):431-438.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  • The suppression of modus ponens as a case of pragmatic preconditional reasoning.Jean-Francois Bonnefon & Denis J. Hilton - 2002 - Thinking and Reasoning 8 (1):21 – 40.
    The suppression of the Modus Ponens inference is described as a loss of confidence in the conclusion C of an argument ''If A1 then C; If A2 then C; A1'' where A2 is a requirement for C to happen. It is hypothesised that this loss of confidence is due to the derivation of the conversational implicature ''there is a chance that A2 might not be satisfied'', and that different syntactic introductions of the requirement A2 (e.g., ''If C then A2'') will (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Conceptual clarity and empirical testability: Commentary on Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2023).Nicole Cruz - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 29 (3):396-408.
    Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2022) criticise the use of the term “new paradigm” in the psychology of reasoning and raise important issues about how to advance research in the field. In this commentary I argue that for the latter it would be helpful to clarify further the concepts that reasoning theories rely on, and to strengthen the links between the theories and the empirical observations that would and would not be compatible with them.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark