Biodiversity loss is an immense ecological crisis of our time. But while “biodiversity” has become a buzzword in media and policy, conservationists have found it difficult to build a common understanding on the nature and severity of biodiversity loss and the means to tackle it. Perhaps surprisingly, many biologists and philosophers have proposed that biodiversity might be best defended with reference to its aesthetic value. This article explores whether aesthetic values could provide strong support for biodiversity conservation. By exploring the (...) question from the viewpoints of species diversity, ecosystem diversity, and genetic diversity, we argue that there is a mismatch between apparent and real biodiversity and that aesthetics can, at best, give only limited support for biodiversity conservation. (shrink)

This paper defends a ‘noetic’ conception of aesthetic experience whereby such experience is best conceived as a kind of explorative thought process. Although not directly aimed at acquiring knowledge, this process often leads to an enhanced understanding or improved epistemic grasp of the object of appreciation itself and the world. On this conception, aesthetic value acts as an invitation to engage in a series of contemplative and reflective processes during which we rely not only on the perceptual, imaginative, and affective (...) abilities which have occupied such a central role in aesthetic theory, but also on our capacities for sense-making, problem-solving and theory-building. Cases of intelligible beauty or aesthetic value should thus lie at the heart of accounts of aesthetic experience. (shrink)

A key dispute in environmental aesthetics concerns the role of scientific knowledge in our aesthetic appreciation of the natural environment. In this article, I will explore this debate by focusing on the aesthetic experience of forests. I intend to question reductive forms of the scientific approach and support the role of imagination and stories in nature appreciation.

Scientific cognitivists argue formalist aesthetics of nature are (i) inadequate for appreciating the full range of nature’s aesthetic values and (ii) too subjective to be useful for defending nature conservation. I argue that (i) is false because moderate formalists can appreciate nature for its performances, not merely objects and vistas. I argue (ii) is false because moderate formalists can argue that appreciation of beauty (including natural beauty) is a constitutive good of human flourishing, whose realization relies on access to a (...) rich and diverse array of aesthetically rewarding experiences throughout a lifetime. On these grounds, moderate formalists (among others) can justify conserving distinctive natural entities and environs for our own and future generations’ good. (shrink)

The attribution of perceptually based aesthetic properties to a garden should be indexed to whether that attribution is (1) to the ever-changing dynamic garden or (2) to some phenomenal capture of the garden in one’s experience, frozen like a photograph. Perceptually based aesthetic properties are used to identify objects, to compare them to others, to evaluate them, and to describe them as we seek to interpret or find meaning in them. This set of activities requires aesthetic properties that do not (...) change, or at least not much, if any degree of normativity is to be maintained. But those aesthetic properties that are derived from our immediate sensations of a garden only describe a garden at a certain time, under certain conditions, in certain states—all of which change constantly. Both descriptions are useful, and perhaps necessary, for appreciating gardens. (shrink)

For in all natural things there is something marvelous.1 None of nature’s landscapes are ugly so long as they are wild.2 Positive aesthetics is the idea that all of nature is beautiful.3 The more qualified version supported here claims that nature—to the extent it is not influenced by humans—is specially and predominantly beautiful. Some of the most prominent figures in environmental aesthetics and ethics have defended PA. Holmes Rolston III was an early proponent: The Matterhorn leaves us in awe, but (...) so does the fall foliage on any New England hillside, or the rhododendron on Roan Mountain. Those who linger with nature find this integrity where it is not at first suspected, in... (shrink)

Recently, several authors have defended a new version of formalism in the aesthetics of nature and attempted to refute earlier arguments against the doctrine. In this essay, we assess this new formalism by reconsidering the force of antiformalist arguments against both traditional formalism and new formalism. While we find that these arguments remain effective against traditional formalism, new formalism falls largely beyond their scope. We therefore provide a novel line of argument for the insignificance of the formal appreciation of nature. (...) This argument suggests that new formalism is inadequate as a theory of the aesthetics of nature. (shrink)

In this article, I want to understand the nature of aesthetic experiences of landscapes. I offer an understanding of aesthetic appreciation of landscapes based on a notion of a landscape where landscapes are perspectival observer-dependent entities, where the 'creator' of the landscape necessarily happens to be the same person as the spectator, and where her scientific (and other) knowledge and beliefs matter for the appreciation to be complete. I explore the idea that appreciating a landscape in this sense has quite (...) a lot in common with taking and appreciating a photograph. On our way, we will see how imagination plays a crucial role in the story. (shrink)

Instances of natural beauty are widely regarded as counterexamples to practice-based theories of aesthetic value. They are not. To see that they are not, we require the correct account of natural beauty and the correct account of social practices.

In autumn 2009, BBC television ran a natural history series, ‘Last Chance to See’, with Stephen Fry and wildlife writer and photographer, Mark Carwardine, searching out endangered species. In one episode they retraced the steps Carwardine had taken in the 1980s with Douglas Adams, when they visited Madagascar in search of the aye-aye, a nocturnal lemur. Fry and Carwardine visited an aye-aye in captivity, and upon first setting eyes on the creature they found it rather ugly. After spending an hour (...) or so in its company, Fry said he was completely ‘under its spell’. A subsequent encounter with an aye-aye in the wild supported Fry's judgment of ugliness and fascination for the creature: ‘The aye-aye is beguiling, certainly bizarre, for some even a little revolting. And I say, long may it continue being so.’. (shrink)

In this paper I present an overview of the doctrine known as Positive Aesthetics regarding aesthetic judgements about nature. According to this view, all pristine nature is always beautiful and, generally, although not necessarily, human intervention tends to introduce ugliness in nature. One of the strong practical motivations behind this claim is an attempt to ground our reasons to preserve natural environments in aesthetic reasons. Positive Aesthetics has been defended within contrary approaches to nature appreciation such as the cognitivists and (...) the anti-cognitivist. Recently, the possibility of real ugliness in nature has been defended; at the same time, it is argued that the presence of ugly items in nature does not lead necessarily to the idea that they are not aesthetically valuable. Hence, natural ugliness can be a reason to preserve nature. In this sense, the denial of the Positive Aesthetics claim is shown to be compatible with the appeal to aesthetic negative qualities as a source of reasons for preserving natural environments. (shrink)

Much recent discussion in the aesthetics of nature has focused on Scientific cognitivism, the view that in order to engage in a deep and appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, one must possess certain kinds of scientific knowledge. The most pressing difficulty faced by this view is an apparent tension between the very notion of aesthetic appreciation and the nature of scientific knowledge. In this essay, I describe this difficulty, trace some of its roots and argue that attempts to dismiss it (...) fail. I then develop a response to the problem, drawing on the notion of the theory-ladenness of observation. I conclude by considering the relationship between this response and one common approach to the problem, the appeal to expressive qualities in nature. (shrink)

As aesthetic appreciators of the environment, we often encounter cases where our environmental commitments and our aesthetic responses do not seem to match. Some highly altered or contaminated environments may occasion powerful and insightful aesthetic experiences. In this article, I discuss some arguments that have been offered in favor of the view that this mismatch is not possible when we appreciate a particular environment with full awareness of its damaged or altered condition. I show that these arguments are not conclusive (...) and that there is room for valuable experiences of damaged or highly altered environments. Our knowledge of the damaged condition of an environment, while perceptually significant, does not necessarily make the resulting aesthetic experience to be negative. Finally, I show that these cases do not necessarily diminish the role that aesthetics can play in shaping our environmental sensibility and commitments. (shrink)

The aesthetics of nature is a growing sub-field of contemporary aesthetics. In this article, I outline the view called ‘Scientific cognitivism’, which has been central in recent discussions of nature aesthetics. In assessing two important arguments for this view, I outline some recent thinking about key issues for the aesthetics of nature, including the relationship between nature and art and the relevance of ethical considerations to the aesthetic appreciation of nature.

The cognitivist environmental-aesthetic theory of Positive Aesthetics—that holds that nature untouched by humans, known through the lens of science, is always aesthetically good—is not relevant to gardens. Nonetheless, I argue that every garden (with one possible exception) is aesthetically positive, that true summative aesthetic judgements about (bona fide) gardens are always on balance positive, and that every garden possesses more aesthetically positive features than negative ones. I offer three arguments for this thesis: (1) once a garden has more negative than (...) positive aesthetic properties, it loses both its design and its purpose; (2) once a garden has more negative than positive aesthetic properties, standard or typical gardening practices are no longer useful for maintaining the garden; and (3) a particular garden that has more negative than positive aesthetic properties is no longer the garden that it was; to bring it back, so to speak, is to redesign and reinstall a new garden. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide a cross-cultural comparison between the life and work of the English land- and seascape painter, J.M.W. Turner, and the conception of aesthetic experience and artisanship f...

In Natural Beauty, Ronald Moore presents a novel account of our aesthetic encounters with the natural world. In this essay, I consider the relation between Moore's 'syncretic aesthetic' and rival views of the aesthetics of nature, particularly the view sometimes called 'scientific cognitivism'. After discussing Moore's characterization of rival views in general, and scientific cognitivism in particular, I rehearse his reasons for rejecting the latter view. I critique these arguments, but also suggest that scientific cognitivism and the syncretic aesthetic need (...) not, after all, be viewed as incompatible notions. (shrink)

The aesthetic appreciation of animals in China is different from that in the West. In this paper, I identify these differences by tracing the various definitions of the word ‘animal’ in Chinese, an...

Emily Brady asks us to reconsider what kinds of environmental artworks constitute ‘aesthetic affronts to nature’, and concludes that many of these works may in fact show aesthetic regard for nature...

This essay is a critical notice of Malcolm Budd's _The Aesthetics of Nature (Oxford, 2002) and Emily Brady's _Aesthetics of the Natural Environment (Edinburgh, 2003). I argue that, although each of the volumes makes an important contribution to our understanding of the aesthetic experience of nature, the accounts of aesthetic appreciation of nature that are developed by Budd and Brady are each somewhat defective in that neither grants an adequate role to knowledge in such appreciation, and specifically to scientific knowledge.

Allen Carlson and Sheila Lintott (eds): Nature, Aesthetics, and Environmentalism: From Beauty to Duty Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s10806-010-9258-2 Authors Nathaniel Barrett, Institute for the Biocultural Study of Religion 1711 Massachusetts Ave NW #308 Washington DC 20036 USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.