- The Philosophy of Online Manipulation.Michael Klenk & Fleur Jongepier (eds.) - 2022 - Routledge.details
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A Moral Defense of Prostitution.Rob Lovering - 2021 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Problemas Filosóficos: Uma Introdução à Filosofia / Philosophical Problems: An Introduction to Philosophy.Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid & Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / UFPel Publisher.details
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Human rights and the rights of states: a relational account.Ariel Zylberman - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):291-317.details
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Prospective Possibilism.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):117-150.details
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Exclusion in Morality.Lei Zhong - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2):275-290.details
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Meaning, moral realism, and the importance of morality.Michael Zhao - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):653-666.details
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Of Normal Human Sympathies and Clear Consciences: Comments on Hyman Gross’s Crime and Punishment: A Concise Moral Critique.Leo Zaibert - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (1):91-108.details
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Rationalitätsforderungen als konstitutive Normen.Jonas Zahn - 2020 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 3 (1):69-89.details
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Rationality and the Unit of Action.Christopher Woodard - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):261-277.details
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Why realists must reject normative quietism.Daniel Wodak - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2795-2817.details
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The Priority View Bites the Dust?Andrew Williams - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (3):315-331.details
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The Evolution of Retribution: Intuitions Undermined.Isaac Wiegman - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2):490-510.details
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Ethics and Evolutionary Theory.Erik Joseph Wielenberg - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):502-515.details
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What is the Normativity of Meaning?Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):219-238.details
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Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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Why conceptual competence won’t help the non-naturalist epistemologist.Preston J. Werner - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):616-637.details
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Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for Perceptual Awareness?Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3):290-319.details
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Introducing the new meat. Problems and prospects.Stellan Welin - 2013 - Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 1 (1):24-37.details
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Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.details
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The misapplication dilemma.Daniel Webber - 2023 - Noûs.details
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Putting Wronging First.Daniel Webber - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Is It Always Good to Be Reasonable?Konstantin Weber - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):616-624.details
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Evilism, moral rationalism, and reasons internalism.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):3-24.details
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Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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Explaining the Instrumental Principle.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):487-506.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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Epistemology versus Non-Causal Realism.Jared Warren - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
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Dialogic Consensus in Medicine—A Justification Claim.Paul Walker & Terence Lovat - 2019 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 44 (1):71-84.details
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Succeeding competently: towards an anti-luck condition for achievement.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):394-418.details
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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Subjective Reasons.Eric Vogelstein - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.details
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Moral normativity.Eric Vogelstein - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1083-1095.details
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Morality, reasons, and sentiments.Eric Vogelstein - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.details
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Parfit’s and Scanlon’s Non-Metaphysical Moral Realism as Alethic Pluralism.Herman Veluwenkamp - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):751-761.details
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Shapelessness in Context.Pekka Väyrynen - 2012 - Noûs 48 (3):573-593.details
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Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.details
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Identifications, Volitions and the Case of Successful Psychopaths.Somogy Varga - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):87-106.details
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The value of practical usefulness.Rob van Someren Greve - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):167-177.details
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Kant and Moral Demandingness.Marcel van Ackeren & Martin Sticker - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):75-89.details
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Can Reasons be Self-Undermining?Rob Van Someren Greve - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (2):411-414.details
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No practical reasons for belief: the epistemic significance of practical considerations.Hamid Vahid - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-18.details
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Is Rawls's theory of justice exclusively forward-looking?Moisés Vaca - 2013 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 45 (1):299-330.details
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Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon: a defense of indefinability.Miles Tucker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2261-2276.details
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Rule consequentialism at top rates.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv065.details
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How Norms (Might) Guide Belief.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409.details
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A realist and internalist response to one of Mackie’s arguments from queerness.Torbjörn Tännsjö - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):347-357.details
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Does scrupulous securitism stand-up to scrutiny? Two problems for moral securitism and how we might fix them.Travis Timmerman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1509-1528.details
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