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  1. Deliberation and Decision.Phillip Pettit - 2010 - In Constantine Sandis & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell.
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  • Three Mistakes About Doing Good (And Bad).Philip Pettit - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (1):1-25.
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  • Adaptive Preference.H. E. Baber - 2007 - Social Theory and Practice 33 (1):105-126.
    I argue, first, that the deprived individuals whose predicaments Nussbaum cites as examples of "adaptive preference" do not in fact prefer the conditions of their lives to what we should regard as more desirable alternatives, indeed that we believe they are badly off precisely because they are not living the lives they would prefer to live if they had other options and were aware of them. Secondly, I argue that even where individuals in deprived circumstances acquire tastes for conditions that (...)
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  • Reasoning with Preferences?John Broome - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:183-208.
    Rationality requires certain things of you. It requires you not to have contradictory beliefs or intentions, not to intend something you believe to be impossible, to believe what obviously follows from something you believe, and so on. Its requirements can be expressed using schemata such as.
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  • Degrees of Preference and Degrees of Preference Satisfaction.Mauro Rossi - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (3):316-323.
    The standard view holds that the degree to which an individual's preferences are satisfied is simply the degree to which the individual prefers the prospect that is realized to the other prospects in her preference domain. In this article, I reject the standard view by showing that it violates one fundamental intuition about degrees of preference satisfaction.
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