Switch to: References

Citations of:

If not non-cognitivism, then what?

In Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan (2009)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Hume’s Better Argument for Motivational Skepticism.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe & Richard McCarty - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):76-89.
    On a standard interpretation, Hume argued that reason is not practical, because its operations are limited to “demonstration” and “probability.” But recent critics claim that by limiting reason’s operations to only these two, his argument begs the question. Despite this, a better argument for motivational skepticism can be found in Hume’s text, one that emphasizes reason’s inability to generate motive force against contrary desires or passions. Nothing can oppose an impulse but a contrary impulse, Hume believed, and reason cannot generate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Inertness of Reason and Hume's Legacy (On-Line Publication 2015, Issue Backdated to 2012).Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):117-133.
    Hume argues against the seventeenth-century rationalists that reason is impotent to motivate action and to originate morality. Hume's arguments have standardly been considered the foundation for the Humean theory of motivation in contemporary philosophy. The Humean theory alleges that beliefs require independent desires to motivate action. Recently, however, new commentaries allege that Hume's argument concerning the inertness of reason has no bearing on whether beliefs can motivate. These commentaries maintain that for Hume, beliefs about future pleasurable and painful objects on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation