One of the vibrant topics of debate among African and non-African scholars in the 20th and 21st centuries centered on the existence of African philosophy. This debate has been described as unnecessary. What is necessary is, if African philosophy exists, we should show it, do it and write it rather than talking about it, or engaging in endless talks about it. A popular position on the debate is that what is expected to be shown, done and written is philosophy tailored (...) along the stereotyped and paradigmatic sense peculiar to Western philosophy. Interestingly, a non-African scholar, Barry Hallen argues that using the method of ordinary language philosophy, African philosophy is philosophy per se, and should be recognised as such. The focus of this paper is to analyse what Hallen refers to as ordinary language philosophy and explain how it authenticates African philosophy as unique ‘species’ of philosophy, thus, putting an end to the controversy on the ontology of African philosophy. (shrink)

Philosophers ponder on how to do philosophy and how to do it well. This pondering has divided metaphilosophers’ concern about philosophical methodology into two groups that I shall label “pro-history” and “pro-intuitions”. The claim (and belief) of philosophers in the former group can be realized with this sentence by Robert Pasnau (2011): “The discipline of philosophy benefits from a serious, sustained engagement with its history.” The latter group believes that for philosophy not to slide into the realm of irrelevance, rather (...) than studying history of philosophy, it must rely on intuitions to make sense of our present ontologies. In this paper, I examine the disagreement between both parties and argue that both proponents of pro-history and pro-intuitions are wrongheaded. I argue for what I call proto-history. Proto-history here refers to the method of doing philosophy in which the intuitions of philosophers are informed by the history of philosophy (though not directly influencing, but indirectly informing). I shall refer to this informing-ness as “autonomous impression.” By autonomous impression, I mean the process of forming beliefs based on intuitions and by taking into account one’s knowledge about other people’s (i.e., past philosophers’) beliefs and opinions. (shrink)

Discusses the conditions of possibility for intercultural and comparative philosophy, and for crosscultural communication at large. This innovative book explores the preconditions necessary for intercultural and comparative philosophy. Philosophical practices that involve at least two different traditions with no common heritage and whose languages have very different grammatical structure, such as Indo-Germanic languages and classical Chinese, are a particular focus. Lin Ma and Jaap van Brakel look at the necessary and not-so-necessary conditions of possibility of interpretation, comparison, and other forms (...) of interaction and how we can speak of similarities and differences in this context. The authors posit that it is necessary to dissolve the question of universalism versus relativism by replacing the ideal language paradigm with a paradigm of family resemblances and that it is not necessary to share a common language to engage in comparison. Numerous case studies are presented, including many comparisons of Western and Chinese concepts. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present a commentary on the current state of contemporary African philosophy and to offer some criticisms and recommendations. The question concerning African philosophy has been debated for some years now and one has witnessed a number of interesting works on this topic.

This paper focuses on evaluating Odera Oruka’s role as an expert witness in customary law for the Luo community during the Nairobi, Kenya-based trial in 1987 to decide on the place of the burial of S.M. Otieno. During that trial, an understanding of Luo burial and widow guardianship (ter) practices was essential. Odera Oruka described the practices carefully and defended them against misunderstanding and stereotype. He revisited related topics in several delivered papers, published articles, and even interviews and columns in (...) the Kenyan newspapers. The paper will raise the questions: How does Odera Oruka’s role as expert on Luo customs fit in with his sage philosophy project? In his testimony at the trial and subsequent public addresses and published work, does he accomplish two important goals, the first being defending African traditions against prejudice and anti-African bias, and secondly, does he champion reform of traditions when reform is needed? And, can Odera Oruka’s participation in the famous trial avoid seeming ethnic chauvinism and marginalization of women? My conclusion is that he achieves the first goal, but some problems remain in the achievement of the other goals. While he often asserted the need to evaluate traditions and to jettison those that have become unhelpful, in this context he evaluated traditions so strongly that the need for evaluation and possible change was muted. (shrink)

I argue that the analytic method has been circularly used to analyze the concept of “philosophy,” and that the result of this analysis has also been used to criticize African ethnophilosophy as nonphilosophical. I critically examine the criticism that ethnophilosophy implies cognitive relativism and the criticism that it implies authoritarianism. I defend ethnophilosophy against these criticisms, arguing that they are rooted in logical positivism, the view that philosophy essentially involves the use of the methods of science and logical analysis. I (...) argue that such analysis and criticisms, given their pedigree, do not provide an adequate or accurate picture of the nature of philosophy. (shrink)

This article takes its inspiration from Jacques Derrida to consider how deconstructionism can be done inadvertently. This possibility is underscored when one considers how a very significant phrase in Ifá texts— “A díá fún...” has been construed away from its transliteration as “Ifá divination was performed for...” by each of Oluwole and Karenga. Oluwole justifies her “deconstruction” on the grounds that such transliteration does not capture the philosophic cogs gravid within Ifá verses. Karenga, through his Kawaida methodology, “improvises” to suit (...) the ethical inferences he seeks to deduce out of the corpus. On this showing, this research infers that each of these scholars have engaged in a reflective activity that passes, on Derrida’s reading, as deconstruction, unbeknownst to them. Would they admit that their intellectual drudgeries amount to postmodern philosophy? This is the primary research question that this disquisition interrogates. (shrink)

In this article, I offer concrete suggestions about which topics, texts, positions, arguments and authors from the African philosophical tradition one could usefully put into conversation with ones from the Western, especially the Anglo-American. In particular, I focus on materials that would make for revealing and productive contrasts between the two traditions. My aim is not to argue that one should teach by creating critical dialogue between African and Western philosophers, but rather is to provide strategic advice, supposing that is (...) a sensible goal to adopt. (shrink)

The humanitarian problems of Africa are manifest and widespread.Periodic occurrences of ethnic cleansing as seen in Rwanda, the ongoing conflict in Darfur-Sudan, the breakdown of democracy under thedictatorship of President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, the outbreak of postelection violence in Kenya, the widespread growth of HIV/AIDS andoverwhelming endemic poverty are by no means isolated examples of thetragedies which continue to plague the continent. These and similar issues have become the subject of intense philosophical debate and reflection. This contribution to the (...) debate will argue that if a sustainable solution to all of these problems is to be found the key area requiring philosophical debate is the degree to which the subjective development of the self is submerged in an African sense of collective identity. (shrink)

This article makes a case for wide reflective equilibrium in doing African epistemology. It argues that on the issue of formulating a viable theory of knowledge, such an approach is more promising than the extant dominant approaches, namely the method of ethno-epistemology and the method of particularistic studies. More specifically, wide reflective equilibrium articulates a proper balance between philosophy and culture and endows a theory of knowledge with multiple sources of normativity.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 60, Issue 2, Page 154-172, June 2022.

To date, the theology and practices of modern pagan religions have not been critically studied using the methods of analytic theology. I discuss some of the challenges presented by these religions for the analytic theologian, and present a possible methodology to address these challenges, based on interview. I then use this methodology to examine the Wiccan practice of “Drawing Down the Moon”, comparing it in particular to the Christian doctrine of incarnation, and considering its philosophical implications.

Professor Peter Bodunrin's paper ‘The Question of African Philosophy’ 161–179) has, as it were, become the first question for most African scholars, teachers or students, starting a course in African philosophy. In most of the discussions, the controversy over what constitutes an African philosophy tends to dominate, sometimes so much that it forms almost the entire content of the course.

P. O. Bodunrin, in his 1981 essay, asks: ‘Is there an African Philosophy, and if there is, what is it?’ This question has occupied centre stage among younger African intellectuals for about a decade now. The most articulate among these intellectuals, who are themselves philosophers, are Bodunrin , Kwasi Wiredu , H. Odera Oruka , Marcien Towa and Eboussi Boulaga , and Paulin Hountondji . These philosophers among others are in dialogue with one another and currently are seen to be (...) the principal architects of a new orientation in African thought. (shrink)

Undoubtedly, the discipline of nursing has been influenced extensively by both Western and Eastern/Asian philosophies. What remains unknown or, perhaps, poorly articulated is the potential influence of African philosophy on the onto‐epistemology of nursing. As a starting point, this article sought to examine the core claims of African philosophy and how they may offer new meanings to the metaparadigm domains of interest in the discipline of nursing. At the core of African philosophy is the notion of personhood (which is distinguished (...) from what it means to be a human being), community, solidarity, and relationality. A major claim of African philosophy is the notion that ‘a person is a person through persons’ which may mean that nursing will be relevant from the African philosophical perspective if it is able to attain this. Health and illness from the African philosophical perspective are defined relationally which shifts attention from the biomedical framework to holism and relational care. The sick ‘person’ is also distinguished from the sick ‘human being’ which has the potential of leading to exclusion from the African philosophical viewpoint. Put together, the African philosophical stance potentially extends the meaning of the metaparadigm domains of interest to the discipline of nursing which warrants further exploration. (shrink)

An instance of the use of a version of the analytic method known as the “ordinary-language approach” in African philosophy is characterised by a systematic examination (for the purpose of clarity) of philosophically significant concepts in an African language as used in ordinary discourse contexts among a local linguistic community. Central to this approach is the idea that the meaning of concepts depends on the ways ordinary people use them, and that this may form the basis of a philosophy. This (...) article examines Barry Hallen and Olubi Sodipo’s critical engagements with the epistemological concepts of ìmọ (knowledge) and ìgbàgbọ (belief) as an instance of this analytic methodological orientation in African philosophy. The article finds the resultant analysis of these Yoruba concepts theoretically faulty because it defeats both the rational structure of complex concept formation in Yoruba language and the logical presupposition embedded in every language. The article concludes that in order to correct this, African philosophy needs to evolve its own unique method of analysis, or otherwise reject altogether the analytic method and erect in its place its own peculiar method suitable for what it does, and consistent with the general nature of philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the on-going debate about self-redescription in the history of African philosophy using the method and theory of redescription. This method and theory of redescription has become the deep concern of not only Western philosophers but of many African philosophers which is markedly present in their agitated pursuits of wisdom. This self-redescription is always resiliently presented in the works of Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Appiah, Gyekye Kwame, Olusegun Oladipo, Wole Soyinka, Sophie Oluwole, Jim (...) Unah, Martin Heidegger and Maduabuchi Duko;r who is the most recent emergence of the problem of theory and method in African philosophy. So, the general purpose of this paperis to enact the intellectual concern of these self-redescription in the history of African philosophy while the specific purpose is to determine the adequacy of humanism and hermeneutics as concepts covering the self-image of African philosophy. This paper will further show the incoherence and incongruence of humanism and hermeneutics with the concrete self-image of African philosophy by redescribing them in the mould of emerging concepts such as the humanness of Orisa intellectual culture, in particular; and orunmineutics as a general philosophical theory. (shrink)

This paper argues that one part of the picture of thinking about decolonising the philosophy curriculum should include problematising the notion of Western philosophy. I argue that there are many problems with the idea of Western philosophy, and with the idea that decolonising the curriculum should involve rejecting so-called Western philosophy. Doing this could include granting the West a false narrative about its origins, influences and interactions, perpetuating exclusions within contemporary and recent North American and European philosophy, perpetuating exclusions and (...) failed acknowledgements within the history of so-called Western philosophy, while at the same time rejecting a tradition which has included in itself so many topics and methodologies that what is left after excluding it would leave other traditions with limited resources, at the same time as wrongly granting the West proprietary rights over any ideas it has happened to investigate, rather than seeing these as belonging to all of humanity. I therefore conclude that a central part of curriculum change should be problematising Western philosophy, including our learning more about, and teaching, more complex views of its history and interactions with other traditions. (shrink)

In the field of African philosophy, there exists the belief among the modernists or professional philosophers that gerontocracy is coterminous with authoritarian traditions in traditional Africa which, supposedly, are responsible for the lack of sustained curiosity to look at issues from different perspectives. Drawing from the Ifá literary corpus as a store-house for Yorùbá philosophy, I argue in this paper that gerontocracy in Africa does not construe the idea that the elderly in Africa are rigid in thoughts or have immutable (...) authority which discourages independence of thought. I conclude that the position of the modernists on the supposed manifestation of authoritarianism in Africa derives its continuing force from a conception of philosophy which gives special overtones to the ideas of individuals as opposed to a collectivistic system of thought and the assumption that the multitude cannot produce philosophy. (shrink)

Even in the field of comparative or cross-cultural philosophy, distinctive contributions by African philosophers are often side-lined – that is, relegated to niche publications. Why is it so hard for African philosophers to draw their Western colleagues into a real dialogue? An attempt is made to describe the field of tension; it is shown that some of the reflexes that manifest themselves in it reveal not just the attachment to specific perspectives or frames of reference, but also implicit ideas about (...) the nature of the “philosophical game”. On the Western side, motives constitutive of practical or traditional life are either ignored or tacitly equated with attempts to realize goals that can be best understood from a reflexive point of view. In this way, the concrete conditions of any human activity, including intellectual activity, are lost from view. This critical lesson has been spelt out by a number of philosophers, but is seldom taken to heart. As a result, it becomes difficult to penetrate beyond conceptual differences. It will also be maintained that while many African philosophers question intellectualist attitudes, they do not always do so in a way that invites discussion on the central, or basic, issues. (shrink)

This chapter examines the three projects that constitute contemporary African epistemology and suggests various ways in which they can be put on a firmer footing, and by so doing advance the epistemic goal of the discipline. These three projects include ethno-epistemology, analytic African epistemology and what one might call ameliorative African epistemology. Ethno-epistemology is the study of the phenomenon of knowledge from the perspective of particular African communities as revealed in their cultural heritage, proverbs, folklores, traditions, and practices. Analytic African (...) epistemology involves the philosophical study of concepts such as ‘knowledge,’ ‘justification,’ ‘belief’ and ‘truth’ from the African perspective using the methods of analysis, criticism, arguments, ordinary language philosophy, and so on. And finally, ameliorative African epistemology addresses the predicament of African knowledge systems and voices in the global knowledge and credibility economy within the broader context of the problem of epistemic injustice suffered by historically marginalized groups. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the importance of wonder in human flourishing and is orientated towards the dynamics between the two, but with an emphasis on how the former is important for illuminating the latter. It begins with a preliminary sketch of both wonder and human flourishing and subsequently moves on to highlight three aspects of human flourishing: 1) ‘Individuality’, 2) ‘Relations’ and 3) ‘The political’, and why these play to wonderment.

I would like to begin my thesis with a general overview of a book on African sage philosophy (1990) written by the prominent African philosopher Henry Odera Oruka (1944-1995), My reading of this book on philosophic sagacity needs to be equipped by two underlying backgrounds of philosophic sagacity. The first background is a perspective of the intercultural philosophy. The second one explains of philosophic sagacity in the African setting.