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  1. Symmetry-Breaking Dynamics in Development.Noah Moss Brender - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (4):585-596.
    Recognition of the plasticity of development — from gene expression to neuroplasticity — is increasingly undermining the traditional distinction between structure and function, or anatomy and behavior. At the same time, dynamic systems theory — a set of tools and concepts drawn from the physical sciences — has emerged as a way of describing what Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls the “dynamic anatomy” of the living organism. This article surveys and synthesizes dynamic systems models of development from biology, neuroscience, and psychology in (...)
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  • Gallagher on Non-Reductive Naturalism: Complementarity, Integration or Multiscale Science?Patrick McGivern - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):159-170.
    Gallagher [2019] defends a form of naturalised phenomenology based on a non-classical view of science. A central component of this argument involves an analogy between phenomenology and quantum-mechanics: Gallagher suggests that both require us to give up key components of a classical view of the natural world. Here, I try to clarify this analogy and consider two associated problems. The first problem concerns the concept of subjectivity and its different roles in physics and phenomenology, and the second concerns the concept (...)
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  • Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-Reductionist Cognitive Science.Shaun Gallagher - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):125-137.
    Resistance to the idea that phenomenology can be relevant to cognitive scientific explanation has faced two objections advanced, respectively, from both sides of the issue: from the scientific perspective it has been suggested that phenomenology, understood as an account of first-person experience, is ultimately reducible to cognitive neuroscientific explanation; and from a phenomenological perspective it has been argued that phenomenology cannot be naturalized. In this context it makes sense to consider that the notion of scientific reduction is linked to a (...)
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