- 'More Likely Than Not' - Knowledge First and the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2017 - In Carter Adam, Gordon Emma & Jarvis Benjamin (eds.), Knowledge First,. Oxford University Press. pp. 278-292.details
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Debunking Arguments: Mathematics, Logic, and Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - In Michael Ruse & Robert J. Richards (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.Bin Zhao - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (1):56-71.details
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Knowledge from Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (2):833-845.details
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Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):391-401.details
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A Dilemma for Globalized Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):249-261.details
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A Probabilistic Approach to Epistemic Safety from the Perspective of Ascribers.Yingjin Xu - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):31-46.details
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A statistical analysis of luck.Isaac Wilhelm - 2018 - Synthese (2):1-19.details
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Possible World Semantics and True-True Counterfactuals.Lee Walters - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):322-346.details
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Predictive coding and religious belief.Hans Van Eyghen - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3).details
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Are Design Beliefs Safe?Hans Van Eyghen - 2019 - Studia Humana 8 (1):75-83.details
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Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge.Brett Topey - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4415-4436.details
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Saving Sensitivity.Brett Topey - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):177-196.details
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Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces.Folke Tersman & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
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Grounding, Understanding, and Explanation.Wes Siscoe - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4):791-815.details
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Safety, the Preface Paradox and Possible Worlds Semantics.Michael J. Shaffer - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (4):347-361.details
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Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):121-134.details
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Foley’s Threshold View of Belief and the Safety Condition on Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (4):589-594.details
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Lost at Sea: A New Route to Metaphysical Skepticism.Aaron Segal - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):256-275.details
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Recent work on the proof paradox.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12667.details
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Kitcher, Mathematics, and Apriority.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):687-702.details
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Contentless basic minds and perceptual knowledge.Giovanni Rolla - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).details
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Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths.Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.details
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Um problema para a epistemologia anti-sorte de Pritchard.Lucas Roisenberg Rodrigues - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):683-704.details
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A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism.Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):189-207.details
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Moral understanding and knowledge.Amber Riaz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):113-128.details
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The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.details
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Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (3):436-461.details
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Lotteries, Possible Worlds, and Probability.Maura Priest - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2097-2118.details
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Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.details
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Beware of Safety.Christian Piller - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (4):01-29.details
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“That is just what they want you to believe”: A modest defence of Marxist paranoia.Nicolas Olsson Yaouzis - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):827-839.details
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Engineered Knowledge, Fragility and Virtue Epistemology.Dan O’Brien - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):757-774.details
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A new solution to the safety dilemma.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-17.details
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Lotteries, Quasi-Lotteries, and Scepticism.Eugene Mills - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):335-352.details
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Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology as Religious Epistemology: A Response to Bobier.Joe Milburn - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):427-434.details
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Against Mixed Epistemology.Joe Milburn - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (2):183-195.details
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Sensitivity, safety, and impossible worlds.Guido Melchior - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):713-729.details
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Replies to the Critics of Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (1):95-131.details
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Précis on Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (1):1-13.details
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Interpretation and knowledge maximization.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):391-405.details
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Safety and Knowledge in God.T. J. Mawson - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):81--100.details
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Remembering is not a kind of knowing.Changsheng Lai - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):333.details
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Debunking, Epistemic Achievement, and Undermining Defeat.Michael Klenk - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):43-60.details
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Understanding, grasping and luck.Kareem Khalifa - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):1-17.details
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What's Wrong with Prepunishment?Alex Kaiserman - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (3):622-645.details
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Objectivity and reliability.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):841-855.details
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Disjunctive luminosity.Drew Johnson - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):118-126.details
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Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity.Grace Helton & Christopher Register - 2023 - Synthese 202 (5):1-24.details
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Real Fakes: The Epistemology of Online Misinformation.Keith Raymond Harris - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (3):1-24.details
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