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Wittgenstein's remarks on gödel's theorem

In Max Kölbel & Bernhard Weiss (eds.), Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance. Routledge (2004)

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Gödel's and Other Paradoxes.Hartley Slater - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (4):353-361.details Francesco Berto has recently written “The Gödel Paradox and Wittgenstein's Reasons,” about a paradox first formulated by Graham Priest in 1971. The major reason for disagreeing with Berto's conclusions concerns his elucidation of Wittgenstein's understanding of Gödel's theorems. Seemingly, Wittgenstein was some kind of proto-paraconsistentist. Priest himself has also, though in a different way, tried to tar Wittgenstein with the same brush. But the resolution of other paradoxes is intimately linked with the resolution of the Gödel Paradox, and with understanding (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Wittgenstein and Gödel: An Attempt to Make ‘Wittgenstein’s Objection’ Reasonable†.Timm Lampert - 2018 - Philosophia Mathematica 26 (3):324-345.details According to some scholars, such as Rodych and Steiner, Wittgenstein objects to Gödel’s undecidability proof of his formula $$G$$, arguing that given a proof of $$G$$, one could relinquish the meta-mathematical interpretation of $$G$$ instead of relinquishing the assumption that Principia Mathematica is correct. Most scholars agree that such an objection, be it Wittgenstein’s or not, rests on an inadequate understanding of Gödel’s proof. In this paper, I argue that there is a possible reading of such an objection that is, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Wittgenstein on Incompleteness Makes Paraconsistent Sense.Francesco Berto - 2008 - In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications. Springer. pp. 257--276.details I provide an interpretation of Wittgenstein's much criticized remarks on Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem in the light of paraconsistent arithmetics: in taking Gödel's proof as a paradoxical derivation, Wittgenstein was right, given his deliberate rejection of the standard distinction between theory and metatheory. The reasoning behind the proof of the truth of the Gödel sentence is then performed within the formal system itself, which turns out to be inconsistent. I show that the models of paraconsistent arithmetics (obtained via the Meyer-Mortensen (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
The gödel paradox and Wittgenstein's reasons.Francesco Berto - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):208-219.details An interpretation of Wittgenstein’s much criticized remarks on Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem is provided in the light of paraconsistent arithmetic: in taking Gödel’s proof as a paradoxical derivation, Wittgenstein was drawing the consequences of his deliberate rejection of the standard distinction between theory and metatheory. The reasoning behind the proof of the truth of the Gödel sentence is then performed within the formal system itself, which turns out to be inconsistent. It is shown that the features of paraconsistent arithmetics match (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 8 citations
Truth in the Investigations.Nicoletta Bartunek - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4091-4111.details According to a widespread interpretation, in the Investigations Wittgenstein adopted a deflationary or redundancy theory of truth. On this view, Wittgenstein’s pronouncements about truth should be understood in the light of his invocation of the equivalences ‘p’ is true = p and ‘p’ is false = not p. This paper shows that this interpretation does not do justice to Wittgenstein’s thoughts. I will be claiming that, in fact, in his second book Wittgenstein is returning to the pre-Tractarian notion of bipolarity, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations

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