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  1. The Dark Side of the Exceptional: On Moral Exemplars, Character Education, and Negative Emotions.Maria Silvia Vaccarezza & Ariele Niccoli - 2019 - Journal of Moral Education 48 (3):332-345.
    ABSTRACTThis article focuses on negative exemplarity-related emotions and on their educational implications. In this article, we first argue for the nonexpendability of negative emotions broadly conceived by defending their instrumental and intrinsic role in a good and flourishing life. We make the claim more specific by focusing on the narrower domain of NEREs and argue for their moral and educational significance by evaluating whether they fit the arguments provided in the previous section. We go on to propose three educational strategies (...)
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  • Happy Self-Surrender and Unhappy Self-Assertion: A Comparison Between Admiration and Emulative Envy.Sara Protasi - 2019 - In Alfred Archer & Andre Grahlé (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Admiration. New York: Rowman & Little International. pp. 45-60.
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  • Admiration, Moral Knowledge and Transformative Experiences.Maria Silvia Vaccarezza - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (35).
    In this paper, I examine the role played by the emotion of admiration in formulating moral judgments. First, I discuss whether and when admiration is a reliable source of moral knowledge, or, on the contrary, it misleads the subject, leaving her prey to forms of uncritical devotion to unworthy objects of admiration. To do so, I try to elucidate which underlying theory of emotions best allows one to characterize admiration as a reliable source of moral knowledge. Second, I introduce the (...)
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  • Envy and Us.Alessandro Salice & Alba Montes Sánchez - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):227-242.
    Within emotion theory, envy is generally portrayed as an antisocial emotion because the relation between the envier and the rival is thought to be purely antagonistic. This paper resists this view by arguing that envy presupposes a sense of us. First, we claim that hostile envy is triggered by the envier's sense of impotence combined with her perception that an equality principle has been violated. Second, we introduce the notion of â hetero-induced self-conscious emotionsâ by focusing on the paradigmatic cases (...)
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