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On rules of inference and the meanings of logical constants
Analysis 68 (4):282287 (2008)
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This paper attempts to motivate the view that instead of rejecting modus ponens as invalid in certain situations, one could preserve its validity by associating such situations with nonnormal interpretations of logical connectives. 

Throughout this paper, we are trying to show how and why our Mathematical framework seems inappropriate to solve problems in Theory of Computation. More exactly, the concept of turning back in time in paradoxes causes inconsistency in modeling of the concept of Time in some semantic situations. As we see in the first chapter, by introducing a version of “Unexpected Hanging Paradox”,first we attempt to open a new explanation for some paradoxes. In the second step, by applying this paradox, it (...) 

A good argument is one whose conclusions follow from its premises; its conclusions are consequences of its premises. But in what sense do conclusions follow from premises? What is it for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises? Those questions, in many respects, are at the heart of logic (as a philosophical discipline). Consider the following argument: 1. If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll. We charge high fees for university. Therefore, only the rich (...) 

The entire development of modern logic is characterized by various forms of confrontation of what has come to be called proof theory with what has earned the label of model theory. For a long time the widely accepted view was that while model theory captures directly what logical formalisms are about, proof theory is merely our technical means of getting some incomplete grip on this; but in recent decades the situation has altered. Not only did proof theory expand into new (...) 

This paper is a conceptual study in the philosophy of logic. The question considered is 'How may formulae of the propositional calculus be brought into a representational relation to the world?'. Four approaches are distinguished: (1) the denotational approach, (2) the abbreviational approach, (3) the truthconditional approach, and (4) the modelling approach. (2) and (3) are very familiar, so I do not discuss them. (1), which is now largely obsolete, led to some interesting twists and turns in early analytic philosophy (...) 

Quantifier variance faces a number of difficulties. In this paper we first formulate the view as holding that the meanings of the quantifiers may vary, and that languages using different quantifiers may be charitably translated into each other. We then object to the view on the basis of four claims: (i) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning extensionally by changing the domain of quantification; (ii) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning intensionally without collapsing into logical pluralism; (iii) quantifier variance is not an (...) 

It is sometimes held that rules of inference determine the meaning of the logical constants: the meaning of, say, conjunction is fully determined by either its introduction or its elimination rules, or both; similarly for the other connectives. In a recent paper, Panu Raatikainen argues that this view—call it logical inferentialism—is undermined by some “very little known” considerations by Carnap (1943) to the effect that “in a definite sense, it is not true that the standard rules of inference” themselves suffice (...) 

Carnap in the 1930s discovered that there were nonnormal interpretations of classical logic  ones for which negation and conjunction are not truthfunctional so that a statement and its negation could have the same truth value, and a disjunction of two false sentences could be true. Church argued that this did not call for a revision of classical logic. More recent writers seem to disagree. We provide a definition of "nonnormal interpretation" and argue that Church was right, and in fact, (...) 

It is sometimes held that rules of inference determine the meaning of the logical constants: the meaning of, say, conjunction is fully determined by either its introduction or its elimination rules, or both; similarly for the other connectives. In a recent paper, Panu Raatikainen (2008) argues that this view  call it logical inferentialism  is undermined by some "very little known" considerations by Carnap (1943) to the effect that "in a definite sense, it is not true that the standard (...) 

Carnap’s result about classical prooftheories not ruling out nonnormal valuations of propositional logic formulae has seen renewed philosophical interest in recent years. In this note I contribute some considerations which may be helpful in its philosophical assessment. I suggest a vantage point from which to see the way in which classical prooftheories do, at least to a considerable extent, encode the meanings of the connectives (not by determining a range of admissible valuations, but in their own way), and I demonstrate (...) 