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Autonomy and Ulysses Arrangements

In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. pp. 252-280 (2012)

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  1. Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics.Jonathan Pugh - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics. Though the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as uncontroversial in this sphere, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether the reasons underpinning the choice (...)
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  • Public Mental Health and Prevention.Jennifer Radden - 2018 - Public Health Ethics 11 (2):126-138.
    Although employed throughout health-related rhetoric and research today, prevention it is an ambiguous and complicated category when applied to mental and behavioral health. It is analyzed here, along with four ethical issues arising when public health preventative methods and goals involve mental health: age of intervention; resource priorities between prevention and treatment; substantive issues in preventive pedagogies and trade-offs framed by differences of approach. Illustrations include some of the most widespread and ambitious recent preventive models: those aiming to avert subsequent (...)
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  • Autonomy and Depression.Lubomira Radoilska - 2013 - In K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davis, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. pp. 1155-1170.
    In this paper, I address two related challenges the phenomenon of depression raises for conceptions according to which autonomy is an agency concept and an independent source of justification. The first challenge is directed at the claim that autonomous agency involves intending under the guise of the good: the robust though not always direct link between evaluation and motivation implied here seems to be severed in some instances of depression; yet, this does not seem to affect the possibility of autonomous (...)
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  • Emotion and Value in the Evaluation of Medical Decision-Making Capacity: A Narrative Review of Arguments.Helena Hermann, Manuel Trachsel, Bernice S. Elger & Nikola Biller-Andorno - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will.Lubomira Radoilska - 2012 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 43:25-50.
    Este artículo ofrece una explicación de la noción de akrasia como una falla primaria de la acción intencional, por oposición con una reciente propuesta sobre la debilidad de la voluntad desarrollada por Richard Holton, que también apunta a un tipo de falla en la acción intencional, pero la presenta tanto separada de la akrasia como más fundamental que ella. Con base en la obra de Aristóteles, se arguye aquí que la falla en la agencia articulada por el concepto de akrasia (...)
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  • Autonomy and Orthonomy.Tom O’Shea - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy (4):1-19.
    The ideal of personal autonomy faces a challenge from advocates of orthonomy, who think good government should displace self-government. These critics claim that autonomy is an arbitrary kind of psychological harmony and that we should instead concentrate on ensuring our motivations and deliberations are responsive to reasons. This paper recasts these objections as part of an intramural debate between approaches to autonomy that accept or reject the requirement for robust rational capacities. It argues that autonomy depends upon such responsiveness to (...)
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