In this introduction to the special section on the attributional approach to emotion and motivation, the character of Weiner’s attributional theory as an appraisal theory is discussed. I argue that the theory, although focusing on appraisal dimensions related to causal attribution, is actually a fairly general appraisal theory of emotion. Distinctive features of the attributional approach are its pioneering role in emotion research, its emphasis on the functional role of emotions, particularly for the motivation of action, and the existence of (...) a large supportive data base. Given the solid evidence compiled by attributional researchers for emotion-specific effects of emotion on motivation, I propose that future research should focus on the details of the mental mechanisms through which emotions affect motivation, and formulate five questions that could guide this inquiry. (shrink)

We first present a reconstruction of James’s theory of emotion (JATE) and then argue for four theses: (a) Despite constructivist elements, James’s views are overall in line with basic emotions theory. (b) JATE does not exclude an influence of emotion on intentional action even in its original formulation; nevertheless, this influence is quite limited. It seems possible, however, to repair this problem of the theory. (c) Cannon’s theory of emotion is a centralized version of JATE that inherits from the latter (...) theory a potentially fatal flaw, the insufficient physiological differentiation of emotions. (d) The core claim of JATE, that emotions are bodily feelings, is very likely false. (shrink)

I argue, contra traditional interpretations of James's emotion theory like Antonio Damasio and alternative interpretations like Phoebe Ellsworth and Lisa Barrett, that James is best classified as a functionalist regarding emotion categories. In arguing for this point, I will make four textual claims: (1) James was an important precursor to Basic Emotion Theory (BET) and his theory is best identified as a flavor of BET; (2) James's theory individuates emotion categories by their evolutionary, functional roles; (3) The only necessary condition (...) on something being an emotion is that it is a bodily feeling; and, (4) Contrary to Barrett and Ellsworth, James was loath to offer a definitive list of basic emotions not because he loathed taxonomy but rather because he thought psychology was not yet a natural science with well-defined theoretical categories. I close by arguing that a proper understanding of James's emotion theory defangs some critiques of BET and of Neo-Jamesian theory. (shrink)