Complexity is pleased to announce the installment of Prof Hiroki Sayama as its new Chief Editor. In this Editorial, Prof Sayama describes his feelings about his recent appointment, discusses some of the journal’s journey and relevance to current issues, and shares his vision and aspirations for its future.

Scientific theories often need to envision that a given output variable Y is jointly determined by all input variables of a certain kind ΣX that we can identify onlyas a kind without knowing all its specific instances or even how many of these there are, When the number of variables in ΣX is possibly infinite, the function by which they determine Y proves to be enormously enigmatic, epistemically, mathematically, and scientifically.

The properties of antisymmetry and linearity are easily seen to be sufficient for a recursively enumerable binary relation to be recursively isomorphic to a recursive relation. Removing either condition allows for the existence of a structure where no recursive isomorph exists, and natural examples of such structures are surveyed.

A well-known theorem by Martin asserts that the degrees of maximal sets are precisely the high recursively enumerable degrees, and the same is true with ‘maximal’ replaced by ‘dense simple’, ‘r-maximal’, ‘strongly hypersimple’ or ‘finitely strongly hypersimple’. Many other constructions can also be carried out in any given high r. e. degree, for instance r-maximal or hyperhypersimple sets without maximal supersets . In this paper questions of this type are considered systematically. Ultimately it is shown that every conjunction of simplicity- (...) and non-extensibility properties can be accomplished, unless it is ruled out by well-known, elementary results. Moreover, each construction can be carried out in any given high r. e. degree, as might be expected. For instance, every high r. e. degree contains a dense simple, strongly hypersimple set A which is contained neither in a hyperhypersimple nor in an r-maximal set. The paper also contains some auxiliary results, for instance: every r. e. set B can be transformed into an r. e. set A such that A has no dense simple superset, the transformation preserves simplicity- or non-extensibility properties as far as this is consistent with , and A [TRIPLE BOND]TB if B is high, and A ≥TB otherwise. Several proofs involve refinements of known constructions; relationships to earlier results are discussed in detail. (shrink)

This paper introduces the notion of cW10-creative set, which strengthens that of semicreative set in a similar way as complete creativity strengthens creativity. Two results are proven, both of which imply that not all semicreative sets are cW10-creative. First, it is shown that semicreative Dedekind cuts cannot be cW10-creative; the existence of semicreative Dedekind cuts was shown by Soare. Secondly, it is shown that if A ⊕ B, the join of A and B, is cW10-creative, then either A or B (...) is cW10-creative, and the same is not true with ‘cW10-creative’ replaced by ‘semicreative’. Moreover, sets A, B which provide a counterexample for can be constructed within any given nonrecursive r.e. T-degrees a, b. MSC: 03D30. (shrink)

Turing computation over a non-linguistic domain presupposes a notation for the domain. Accordingly, computability theory studies notations for various non-linguistic domains. It illuminates how different ways of representing a domain support different finite mechanical procedures over that domain. Formal definitions and theorems yield a principled classification of notations based upon their computational properties. To understand computability theory, we must recognize that representation is a key target of mathematical inquiry. We must also recognize that computability theory is an intensional enterprise: it (...) studies entities as represented in certain ways, rather than entities detached from any means of representing them. (shrink)

A natural problem from elementary arithmetic which is so strongly undecidable that it is not even Trial and Error decidable (in other words, not decidable in the limit) is presented. As a corollary, a natural, elementary arithmetical property which makes a difference between intuitionistic and classical theories is isolated.

The aim of this paper is to comprehensively question the validity of the standard way of interpreting Chaitin's famous incompleteness theorem, which says that for every formalized theory of arithmetic there is a finite constant c such that the theory in question cannot prove any particular number to have Kolmogorov complexity larger than c. The received interpretation of theorem claims that the limiting constant is determined by the complexity of the theory itself, which is assumed to be good measure of (...) the strength of the theory. I exhibit certain strong counterexamples and establish conclusively that the received view is false. Moreover, I show that the limiting constants provided by the theorem do not in any way reflect the power of formalized theories, but that the values of these constants are actually determined by the chosen coding of Turing machines, and are thus quite accidental. (shrink)

Chaitin’s incompleteness result related to random reals and the halting probability has been advertised as the ultimate and the strongest possible version of the incompleteness and undecidability theorems. It is argued that such claims are exaggerations.

Chomsky’s highly influential Syntactic Structures ( SS ) has been much praised its originality, explicitness, and relevance for subsequent cognitive science. Such claims are greatly overstated. SS contains no proof that English is beyond the power of finite state description (it is not clear that Chomsky ever gave a sound mathematical argument for that claim). The approach advocated by SS springs directly out of the work of the mathematical logician Emil Post on formalizing proof, but few linguists are aware of (...) this, because Post’s papers are not cited. Chomsky’s extensions to Post’s systems are not clearly defined, and the arguments for their necessity are weak. Linguists have also overlooked Post’s proofs of the first two theorems about effects of rule format restrictions on generative capacity, published more than ten years before SS was published. (shrink)

We begin by distinguishing computationalism from a number of other theses that are sometimes conflated with it. We also distinguish between several important kinds of computation: computation in a generic sense, digital computation, and analog computation. Then, we defend a weak version of computationalism—neural processes are computations in the generic sense. After that, we reject on empirical grounds the common assimilation of neural computation to either analog or digital computation, concluding that neural computation is sui generis. Analog computation requires continuous (...) signals; digital computation requires strings of digits. But current neuroscientific evidence indicates that typical neural signals, such as spike trains, are graded like continuous signals but are constituted by discrete functional elements (spikes); thus, typical neural signals are neither continuous signals nor strings of digits. It follows that neural computation is sui generis. Finally, we highlight three important consequences of a proper understanding of neural computation for the theory of cognition. First, understanding neural computation requires a specially designed mathematical theory (or theories) rather than the mathematical theories of analog or digital computation. Second, several popular views about neural computation turn out to be incorrect. Third, computational theories of cognition that rely on non-neural notions of computation ought to be replaced or reinterpreted in terms of neural computation. (shrink)

This paper concerns Alan Turing’s ideas about machines, mathematical methods of proof, and intelligence. By the late 1930s, Kurt Gödel and other logicians, including Turing himself, had shown that no finite set of rules could be used to generate all true mathematical statements. Yet according to Turing, there was no upper bound to the number of mathematical truths provable by intelligent human beings, for they could invent new rules and methods of proof. So, the output of a human mathematician, for (...) Turing, was not a computable sequence (i.e., one that could be generated by a Turing machine). Since computers only contained a finite number of instructions (or programs), one might argue, they could not reproduce human intelligence. Turing called this the “mathematical
objection” to his view that machines can think. Logico-mathematical reasons, stemming from his own work, helped to convince Turing that it should be possible to reproduce human intelligence, and eventually compete with it, by developing the appropriate kind of digital computer. He felt it
should be possible to program a computer so that it could learn or discover new rules, overcoming the limitations imposed by the incompleteness and undecidability results in the same way that human
mathematicians presumably do. (shrink)

Answering a question raised by Shavrukov and Visser :569–582, 2014), we show that the lattice of \-sentences ) over any computable enumerable consistent extension T of \ is uniformly dense. We also show that for every \ and \ refer to the known hierarchies of arithmetical formulas introduced by Burr for intuitionistic arithmetic) the lattices of \-sentences over any c.e. consistent extension T of the intuitionistic version of Robinson Arithmetic \ are uniformly dense. As an immediate consequence of the proof, (...) all these lattices are also locally universal. (shrink)

The emperor's new mind (hereafter Emperor) is an attempt to put forward a scientific alternative to the viewpoint of according to which mental activity is merely the acting out of some algorithmic procedure. John Searle and other thinkers have likewise argued that mere calculation does not, of itself, evoke conscious mental attributes, such as understanding or intentionality, but they are still prepared to accept the action the brain, like that of any other physical object, could in principle be simulated by (...) a computer. In Emperor I go further than this and suggest that the outward manifestations ofconscious mental activity cannot even be properly simulated by calculation. To support this view, I use various arguments to show that the results of mathematical insight, in particular, do not seem to be obtained algorithmically. The main thrust ofthis work, however, is to present an overview ofthe present state of physical understanding and to show that an important gap exists at the point where, quantum and classical physics meet, as well as to speculate on how the conscious brain might be taking advantage ofwhatever new physics is needed to fill this gap to achieve its nonalgorithmic effects. (shrink)

Criteria of approximate scientific success are defined within a formal paradigm of empirical inquiry. One consequence of aiming for less than perfect truth is examined.

Alternative models of idealized scientific inquiry are investigated and compared. Particular attention is devoted to paradigms in which a scientist is required to determine the truth of a given sentence in the structure giving rise to his data.

We examine the prospects for finding “best possible” or “ideal” computing machines for various learning tasks. For this purpose, several precise senses of “ideal machine” are considered within the context of formal learning theory. Generally negative results are provided concerning the existence of ideal learning‐machines in the senses considered.

We investigate strong versions of enumeration reducibility, the most important one being s-reducibility. We prove that every countable distributive lattice is embeddable into the local structure $L(\mathfrak D_s)$ of the s-degrees. However, $L(\mathfrak D_s)$ is not distributive. We show that on $\Delta^{0}_{2}$ sets s-reducibility coincides with its finite branch version; the same holds of e-reducibility. We prove some density results for $L(\mathfrak D_s)$ . In particular $L(\mathfrak D_s)$ is upwards dense. Among the results about reducibilities that are stronger than s-reducibility, (...) we show that the structure of the $\Delta^{0}_{2}$ bs-degrees is dense. Many of these results on s-reducibility yield interesting corollaries for Q-reducibility as well. (shrink)

We show that the c.e. Q1,N\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${Q_{1,N}}$$\end{document}-degrees are not an upper semilattice. We prove that if M is an r-maximal set, A is an arbitrary set and M≡Q1,NA\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M \equiv{}_ {Q_{1,N}}A}$$\end{document}, then M≤mA\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M\leq{}_{m} A}$$\end{document}. Also, if M1 and M2 are r-maximal sets, A and B are major subsets of M1 and M2, respectively, and M1\A≡Q1,NM2\B\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} (...) \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}{\setminus} A\equiv{}_{Q_{1,N}}M_{2}{\setminus} B}$$\end{document}, then M1\A≡mM2\B\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}{\setminus}A\equiv{}_{m}M_{2}{\setminus} B}$$\end{document}. If M1 and M2 are r-maximal sets and M10,M11\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}^{0},\,M_{1}^{1}}$$\end{document} and M20,M21\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{2}^{0},\,M_{2}^{1}}$$\end{document} are nontrivial splittings of M1 and M2, respectively, then M10≡Q1,NM20\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}^{0} \equiv{}_{Q_{1,N}}M_{2}^{0}}$$\end{document} if and only if M10≡1M20\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}^{0} \equiv{}_{1}M_{2}^{0}}$$\end{document}. From this result follows that if A and B are Friedberg splitting of an r-maximal set, then the Q1,N\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${Q_{1,N}}$$\end{document}-degree of A contains only one c.e. 1-degree. (shrink)

We show that the Q-degree of a hyperhypersimple set includes an infinite collection of Q1-degrees linearly ordered under \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\leq_{Q_1}}$$\end{document} with order type of the integers and consisting entirely of hyperhypersimple sets. Also, we prove that the c.e. Q1-degrees are not an upper semilattice. The main result of this paper is that the Q1-degree of a hemimaximal set contains only one c.e. 1-degree. Analogous results are valid for \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} (...) \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Pi_1^0}$$\end{document}s1-degrees. (shrink)

In a rather general setting, we prove a number of basic theorems concerning computational complexity of derivability in adaptive logics. For that setting, the so-called standard format of adaptive logics is suitably adopted, and the corresponding completeness results are established in a very uniform way.

The busy beaver problem of Rado [6] is reexamined for the case of Turing machines given by quadruples rather than quintuples. Moreover several printing symbols are allowed. Some values of the corresponding beaver function are given and it is shown that this function for a fixed number of states and varying number of symbols is nonrecursive for three or more states and recursive for two states. As a byproduct we get that the minimal number of states in a universal Turing (...) machine (quadruples) is three. (shrink)

The difficulty of making social choices seems to take on two forms: one that is related to both preferences and the method used in aggregating them and one which is related to the preferences only. In the former type the difficulty has to do with the discrepancies of outcomes resulting from various preference aggregation methods and the computation of winners in elections. Some approaches and results which take their motivation from the computability theory are discussed. The latter ‘institution-free’ type of (...) difficulty pertains to solution theory of the voting games. We discuss the relationships between various solution concepts, e.g. uncovered set, Banks set, Copeland winners. Finally rough sets are utilized in an effort to measure the difficulty of making social choices. (shrink)