- No Being Sure of Myself.Derek Lam - manuscriptdetails
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The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
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Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - manuscriptdetails
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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The Epistemology of Testimony: Locke and His Critics.Kenneth L. Pearce - forthcoming - In Stephen Howard & Jack Stetter (eds.), The Edinburgh Critical History of Early Modern and Enlightenment Philosophy. Edinburgh University Press.details
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Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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The Lockean Thesis.Paul Silva - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa & Jonathan Dancy (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd Edition.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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A "purist" feminist epistemology?Emily Tilton - 2023 - Dissertation, University of British Columbiadetails
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Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Paul Silva Jr & Matthew Brandon Lee - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.details
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Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachment.Adam Zweber - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2745-2757.details
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A Defense of Impurist Permissivism.Jenny Yi-Chen Wu - 2023 - Episteme:1-21.details
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Rigged lotteries: a diachronic problem for reducing belief to credence.Jonathan Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1355-1373.details
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Two Kinds of Stakes.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):307-324.details
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Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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Belief does not entail a reasoning disposition.Simon Wimmer - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14975-14991.details
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Publicity and Common Commitment to Believe.J. R. G. Williams - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1059-1080.details
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Belief, information and reasoning.Bruno Whittle - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):431-446.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Margins and Errors.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):63-76.details
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
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After Pascal’s Wager: on religious belief, regulated and rationally held.Jack Warman & David Efird - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90 (1):61-78.details
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In the Space of Reasonable Doubt.Marion Vorms & Ulrike Hahn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3609-3633.details
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New Semantics for Bayesian Inference: The Interpretive Problem and Its Solutions.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (4):696-718.details
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The Puzzle of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (2):e13245.details
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The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability, by Hannes Leitgeb.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):1006-1017.details
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Belief and cognitive limitations.Weng Hong Tang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):249-260.details
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An Instrumentalist Explanation of Pragmatic Encroachment.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Should I pretend I'm perfect?Julia Staffel - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):301-324.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
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Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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The epistemic normativity of conjecture.Mona Simion - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3447-3471.details
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How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
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Why You'll Regret Not Reading This Paper.Mark Schroeder - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85:135-156.details
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The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.details
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Sins of Thought.Mark Schroeder - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (3):273-293.details
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Strong knowledge, weak belief?Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8741-8753.details
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Rational stability under pragmatic encroachment.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):297-312.details
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Partial Reliance.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):436-451.details
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Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8069-8090.details
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Knowledge and decision: Introduction to the Synthese topical collection.Moritz Schulz, Patricia Rich, Jakob Koscholke & Roman Heil - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-13.details
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Believing on eggshells: epistemic injustice through pragmatic encroachment.Javiera Perez Gomez & Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):593-613.details
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A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism.Mark Satta - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):625-640.details
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