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  1. Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2022 - In Chris Howard & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.
    The chapter introduces and characterizes the notion of fittingness. It charts the history of the relation and its relevance to contemporary debates in normative and metanormative philosophy and proceeds to survey issues to do with fittingness covered in the volume’s chapters, including the nature and epistemology of fittingness, the relations between fittingness and reasons, the normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness in theorizing about responsibility. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of issues to (...)
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  • What Perceptualists Can Say About Reasons for Emotion.Michael Milona - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    Perceptualism is a prominent theory analyzing emotions as perceptual experiences of value. A longstanding challenge to perceptualism says that emotions cannot be perceptual because they are subject to normative assessments in terms of reasons and rationality while perceptual experiences are not. I defend perceptualism from this charge. My argument begins by distinguishing two forms of normative assessment: fundamental and non-fundamental. Perceptualism is compatible with the latter (i.e., non-fundamental reasons and rationality); even sensory experiences are so assessable. I next argue that (...)
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  • What Perceptualists Can Say About Reasons for Emotion.Michael Milona - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (6):502-518.
    Perceptualism is a prominent theory analyzing emotions as perceptual experiences of value. A long-standing challenge to perceptualism says that emotions cannot be perceptual because they are subject to normative assessments in terms of reasons and rationality, while perceptual experiences are not. I defend perceptualism from this charge. My argument begins by distinguishing two forms of normative assessment: fundamental and non-fundamental. Perceptualism is compatible with the latter (i.e., non-fundamental reasons and rationality); even sensory experiences are so assessable. I next argue that (...)
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