This article begins with a brief survey of Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical approaches to theodicy. I maintain that his theodical response of moral faith during the Critical period appears to be a dispassionate version of what Leibniz called Fatum Christianum. Moral rationality establishes the existence and goodness of God and translates into an endless and unwavering commitment to following the moral law. I then argue that Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason offers a revision of Kant’s 1791 conception of (...) “authentic theodicy.” Kant comes to recognize that the ends of morality and virtue, as well as the action needed to respond to the noumenal evil at the heart of humanity, outstrip the “religion of good life conduct.” This leads Kant to argue in favor of a new form of moral life embedded in a religious community and based on the love of God and of one’s fellow humans. Such a life is rooted in the incorporation of a holy principle in our noumenal selves that he terms “divine blessedness.”. (shrink)

According to Kant, men cannot do evil for the sake of evil. A satanic act of resistance against the moral law is impossible, and therefore the idea of ultimate evil is called a “mere idea”. However, it isn’t impossible to realize the idea of satanic evil, as is widely thought: the idea of ultimate evil can be fully realized by the everyday evil of men, as if they were ultimately evil. Kant exposes this structure within his Doctrine of Right (1797) (...) as an extension of his philosophy of radical evil, presented in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). This interpretation will be developed in a close reading of the crucial passage – where it is the revolutionizing people of France who are held responsible for having realized the idea of satanic evil. (shrink)