- Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism.Brett Topey - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-27.details
|
|
Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
|
|
An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.details
|
|
The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.details
|
|
Elusive Externalism.Bernhard Salow - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):397-427.details
|
|
On the proper formulation of conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):1935-1965.details
|
|
An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1013-1041.details
|
|
What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3427-3463.details
|
|
Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization.Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3217-3236.details
|
|
Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
|
|
Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.details
|
|
Updating Without Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - Noûs.details
|
|
Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
|
|
Accurate believers are deductively cogent.Matthew Hewson - 2022 - Noûs 56 (4):763-786.details
|
|
Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.details
|
|
Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):49-80.details
|
|
Decision and Foreknowledge.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Noûs.details
|
|
Mushy Akrasia: Why Mushy Credences Are Rationally Permissible.Rachel Fraser - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):79-106.details
|
|
The Tripartite Role of Belief.Kenny Easwaran - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):189-206.details
|
|
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
|
|
Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
|
|
Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):435-460.details
|
|
The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axaa003.details
|
|
Externalism and exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.details
|
|
Credal Imprecision and the Value of Evidence.Nilanjan Das - forthcoming - Noûs.details
|
|
Accuracy and ur-prior conditionalization.Nilanjan Das - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):62-96.details
|
|
Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.details
|
|
The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Ratio 36 (1):22-31.details
|
|
Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality.Marc-Kevin Daoust - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
|
|
A modesty proposal.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3581-3601.details
|
|
Accurate Updating for the Risk Sensitive.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3):751-776.details
|
|
Self-Locating Belief and Updating on Learning.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):579-584.details
|
|
Don’t Look Now.Bernhard Salow & Arif Ahmed - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):327-350.details
|
|
Why Subjectivism?Chloé de Canson - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Best Laid Plans: Idealization and the Rationality–Accuracy Bridge.Brett Topey - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
|
|
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms?Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
|
|
Bayesian Variations: Essays on the Structure, Object, and Dynamics of Credence.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
|
|
Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), MIT Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press.details
|
|
Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.details
|
|