- Closure and Epistemic Modals.Justin Bledin & Tamar Lando - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):3-22.details
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Coherentism via Graphs.Selim Berker - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):322-352.details
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Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.details
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What’s the matter with epistemic circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.details
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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
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Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.details
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How can necessary facts call for explanation.Dan Baras - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11607-11624.details
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Epistemic Justification: Probability, Normalcy, and the Functional Theory.Marvin Backes - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):65-81.details
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Evidence and Inductive Inference.Nevin Climenhaga - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge. pp. 435-449.details
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Misleading higher-order evidence, conflicting ideals, and defeasible logic.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:141--74.details
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The Problem of Easy Justification: An Investigation of Evidence, Justification, and Reliability.Samuel Alexander Taylor - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 132-159.details
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Higher-Order Evidence and the Normativity of Logic.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Ethics.Andreas Lech Mogensen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 77.details
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Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Rules.Joshua Schechter - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Isolating Correct Reasoning.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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How Moral Uncertaintism Can Be Both True and Interesting.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7.details
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Fallibility and Normativity.DiPaolo Joshua - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts - Amherstdetails
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Luck, Rationality, and Explanation.Joshua Schechter - manuscriptdetails
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Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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Normative Indeterminacy in the Epistemic Domain.Nicholas Leonard & Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup.details
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On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - 2014 - Dissertation, New Brunswick Rutgersdetails
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On Divorcing the Rational and the Justified in Epistemology.Kurt Sylvan - manuscriptdetails
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