During the past 50 years since the first successful organ transplant, waiting lists of potential organ recipients have expanded exponentially as supply and demand have been on a collision course. The recovery of organs from patients with circulatory determination of death is one of several effective alternative approaches recommended to reduce the supply-and-demand gap. However, renewed debate ensues regarding the ethical management of the overarching risks, pressures, challenges and conflicts of interest inherent in organ retrieval after circulatory determination of death. (...) In this article, the author claims that through the engagement of a Heideggerean existential phenomenological and hermeneutic framework what are perceived as ethical problems dissolve, including collapse of commitment to the dead donor rule. The author argues for a revisioned socially constructed conceptual and philosophical responsibility of humankind to recognize the limits of bodily finitude, to responsibly use the capacity of the transplantable organs, and to grant enhanced or renewed existence to one with diminished or life-limited capacity; thereby making the locus of ethical concern the donor–recipient as unitary ‘‘life.’ What ethically matters in the life-cycle (life-world) of donor–recipient is the viability of the organs transplanted; thereby granting reverence to all life. (shrink)

Many people in desperate need of an organ will die on waiting lists for transplantation or face increased morbidity because of their wait. This circumstance is particularly troubling since many viable organs for transplantation go unused when individuals fail to participate in their local organ donation system. In this paper, I consider whether participating in organ transplantation should be considered a form of a rescue of others from the great harms caused by a shortage in transplantable organs. Specifically, I consider (...) whether cadaver organ transplantation is a case of an easy rescue. If so, participation in cadaver organ transplantation will be a duty rather than a supererogatory act.1 This question is important in illuminating individual duties to participate in organ transplantation. Moreover, as I will argue, it has repercussions for community-wide policies for enrolling individuals in transplantation schemes. -/- In the first section of this paper, I tie cadaver organ transplantation to the duty to rescue others from great harm when it is easy to do so. Given the number of persons who will die or be greatly harmed without transplanted organs, the transfer of organs upon death is seemingly similar to other, classical cases of easy rescue. In the second section, I consider objections to this proposal on the ground that cadaver organ transplantation is structurally dissimilar to classical rescue cases, especially given uncertainty over when and to whom organs will be transplanted, if they are transplanted at all. In the third section, I consider the objection that cadaver organ transplantation is a demanding, rather than easy, rescue. While I grant that cadaver organ transplantation will be demanding for some persons, I argue that there remain many cases where it will be an easy rescue. In the final section, I consider the policy implications of my argument. In particular, I argue that understanding cadaver organ transplantation as a duty should shift the debate over opt-out, opt-in, and mandatory choice procedures for participating in organ transplantation upon death. While different systems will be appropriate for different communities, understanding transplantation as a duty in some cases helps to justify an opt-out system. (shrink)

Background and Purpose: Providing non-therapeutic intensive care for some patients in hopeless condition after cerebrovascular stroke in order to protect their organs for possible post-mortem organ donation after brain death is an effective but ethically tricky strategy to increase organ grafting. Finding out the feelings and opinion of the involved healthcare professionals and assessing the training needs before implementing such a strategy is critical to avoid backlash even in a presumed consent system. Participants and methods: A single-centre opinion survey of (...) healthcare professionals was conducted in 2013 in the potentially involved wards of a French University Hospital: the Neurosurgical, Surgical and Medical Intensive Care Units, the Stroke Unit and the Emergency Department. A questionnaire with multiple-choice questions and one open-ended question was made available in the different wards between February and May 2013. Ethical considerations: The project was approved by the board of the Lorraine University Diploma in Medical Ethics. Results: Of a total of 340 healthcare professionals, 51% filled the form. Only 21.8% received a specific education on brain death, and only 18% on potential donor’s family approach and support. Most healthcare professionals (93%) think that non-therapeutic intensive care is the continuity of patient’s care. But more than 75% of respondents think that the advance patient’s consent and the consent of the family must be obtained despite the presumed consent rule regarding post-mortem organ donation in France. Conclusion: The acceptance by healthcare professionals of non-therapeutic intensive care for brain death organ donation seems fairly good, despite a suboptimal education regarding brain death, non-therapeutic intensive care and families’ support. But they ask to require previously expressed patient’s consent and family’s approval. So, it seems that non-therapeutic intensive care should only remain an ethically sound mean of empowerment of organ donors and their families to make post-mortem donation happen as a full respect of individual autonomy. (shrink)