- Self-control in action and belief.Martina Orlandi & Sarah Stroud - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):225-242.details
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Resistant beliefs, responsive believers.Carolina Flores - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
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Judging and the scope of mental agency.Fabian Dorsch - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-71.details
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Judgment's aimless heart.Matthew Vermaire - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Debunking Doxastic Transparency.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A3)5-24.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2007 - Introduction 2 (23):153-160.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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Alienated Belief.David Hunter - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):221-240.details
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Reasons for Belief and Normativity.Glüer-Pagin Kathrin & Wikforss Åsa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 575-599.details
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Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self‐Defeating.Stan Husi - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):424-449.details
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Conceptual evidentialism.Inga Nayding - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.details
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A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Epistemic agency: Some doubts.Kieran Setiya - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):179-198.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219-246.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis.Philip J. Nickel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.details
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A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism.Davide Fassio - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (3):343-364.details
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Why W. K. Clifford was a Closet Pragmatist.Veli Mitova - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):471-489.details
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Why believe the truth? Shah and Velleman on the aim of belief.José L. Zalabardo - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):1 - 21.details
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What can we Learn from Buridan's Ass?Ruth Weintraub - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):281-301.details
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Imagination.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Is depressive rumination rational?Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff - 2016 - In Timothy Joseph Lane & Tzu-Wei Hung (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. London, U.K.: Elsevier Academic Press. pp. 121-145.details
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Normative Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Cham, Switzerland and Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 145-168.details
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Epistemic Schmagency?A. K. Flowerree - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 289-310.details
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Fictional Persuasion and the Nature of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 174-193.details
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Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Lisa Bortolotti - 2017 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 153-73.details
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Good Questions.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 123-145.details
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Jörg Meibauer (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 689. [REVIEW]Vladimir Krstić - 2022 - Linguistische Berichte 270:225–236.details
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Truth, value and epistemic expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.details
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Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.details
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Le droit de ne pas croire.Pascal Engel - 2012 - ThéoRèmes 2 (1).details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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The Quest for Certainty.Luca Zanetti - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):71-95.details
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Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Luca Zanetti - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):33-54.details
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Deflationism about Truth-Directedness.Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (4):2022-0069.details
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Beyond Authority: Hinge Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity.Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2261-2283.details
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Inferentialism, degrees of commitment, and ampliative reasoning.Jesús Zamora Bonilla, Xavier de Donato Rodríguez & Javier González de Prado Salas - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 4):909-927.details
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Taking aim at the truth.Masahiro Yamada - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.details
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A new argument for evidentialism?Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):399-404.details
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A Defense of Impurist Permissivism.Jenny Yi-Chen Wu - 2023 - Episteme:1-21.details
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Mere formalities: fictional normativity and normative authority.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):1-23.details
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Extended belief and extended knowledge.Åsa Wikforss - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):460-481.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
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Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
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Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):384-399.details
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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