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  1. Rule‐Following and Rule‐Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein.Daniel Watts - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy (4):1159-1185.
    My aim in this paper is twofold: to establish that Kierkegaard's so‐called theory of the leap strongly anticipates a line of argument that is central to Wittgenstein's so‐called rule‐following considerations; and to begin to show how Kierkegaard's work has fruitful contributions of its own to make to on‐going discussions about rules and rule‐following. The paper focuses throughout on the question of how, if at all, human rule‐following can be distinguished from behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. I identify a (...)
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  • Kierkegaard, Repetition and Ethical Constancy.Daniel Watts - 2017 - Philosophical Investigations 40 (4):414-439.
    How can a person forge a stable ethical identity over time? On one view, ethical constancy means reapplying the same moral rules. On a rival view, it means continually adapting to one's ethical context in a way that allows one to be recognized as the same practical agent. Focusing on his thinking about repetition, I show how Kierkegaard offers a critical perspective on both these views. From this perspective, neither view can do justice to our vulnerability to certain kinds of (...)
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  • El comportamiento de la verdad y la justificación, y su relación con la práctica asertiva.Federico Matías Pailos - 2014 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 70:119-131.
    Crispin Wright afirma que tanto la norma que insta a afirmar lo verdadero como la que exhorta a afirmar lo justificado son distintivas de la práctica asertórica. A pesar de que ellas no son diferentes en la práctica, son distintas. Pero Richard Rorty argumenta que las razones ofrecidas obligarían a Wright a aceptar demasiadas reglas como propias de dicha práctica. Wright admitiría que las normas pueden ser ilimitadas, pero no que son ilimitadas las normas correctas. Para defender esta posición, basta (...)
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  • Wittgenstein and the end of philosophy: neither theory nor therapy.Daniel D. Hutto - 2003 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    What is the true worth of Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy? Answers to this question are strongly divided. However, most assessments rest on certain popular misreadings of his purpose. This book challenges both "theoretical" and "therapeutic" interpretations. In their place, it seeks to establish that, from beginning to end, Wittgenstein regarded clarification as the true end of philosophy. It argues that, properly understood, his approach exemplifies rather than betrays critical philosophy and provides a viable alternative to other contemporary offerings.
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