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Husserl’s Theory of Meaning and Reference

In L. Haaparanta (ed.), Mind, Meaning and Mathematics: Essays on the Philosophy of Husserl and Frege. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 163-183 (1994)

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  1. Meinong and Husserl on Assumptions.R. D. Rollinger - 1996 - Axiomathes 7 (1-2):89-102.
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  • Storia E Teorie Dell'intenzionalità.Simone Gozzano - 1997
    The book presents the various theories of intentionality from Brentano and Husserl to present day (1997) theories on mental content, narrow and broad.
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  • A Review of Dreyfus on Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's Intentionality.Napoleon M. Mabaquiao - 2009 - Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy (Philippine e-journal) 38 (1):84-104.
    This essay primarily disputes Dreyfus’s account of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s theory of intentionality. Specifically, it raises objections to the three central claims of such an account; namely: (1) that Searle’s theory of intentional action can be used as a stand-in for Husserl’s; (2) that Heidegger rejects the primordiality of the intentionality of consciousness; and (3) that Heidegger distinguishes between conscious and unconscious types of intentional actions and he privileges the latter over the former. I show the first to be (...)
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  • The Dawn of Husserl’s Pure Logical Grammar: Husserl’s Study of Inauthentic Judgments From “On The Logic Of Signs” as the Germ of the “Fourth Logical Investigation”.Thomas Byrne - 2017 - Studia Phaenomenologica 17:285-308.
    This paper accomplishes two goals. First, I elucidate Edmund Husserl’s theory of inauthentic judgments from his 1890 “On the Logic of Signs.” It will be shown how inauthentic judgments are distinct from other signitive experiences, in such a manner that when Husserl seeks to account for them, he is forced to revise the general structure of his philosophy of meaning and in doing so, is also able to realize novel insights concerning the nature of signification. Second, these conclusions are revealed (...)
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  • A “Principally Unacceptable” Theory: Husserl’s Rejection and Revision of His Philosophy of Meaning Intentions From the Logical Investigations.Thomas Byrne - 2020 - Studia Phaenomenologica 20:357-378.
    This paper accomplishes two goals. First, the essay elucidates Husserl’s descriptions of meaning consciousness from the 1901 Logical Investigations. I examine Husserl’s observations about the three ways we can experience meaning and I discuss his conclusions about the structure of meaning intentions. Second, the paper explores how Husserl reworked that 1901 theory in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Investigation. I explore how Husserl transformed his descriptions of the three intentions involved in meaningful experience. By doing so, Husserl not only (...)
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  • Dreyfus on Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's Intentionality: A Review.Napoleon Mabaquiao Jr - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1).
    This paper primarily disputes Dreyfus’s account of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s theory of intentionality. Specifically, it raises objections to the three central claims of such an account; namely: that Searle’s theory of intentional action can be used as a stand-in for Husserl’s; that Heidegger rejects the primordiality of the intentionality of consciousness; and that Heidegger distinguishes between conscious and unconscious types of intentional actions and he privileges the latter over the former. I show the first to be unwarranted owing to (...)
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  • Husserl's Theory of Intentionality.Napoleon M. Mabaquiao - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (1):24-49.
    This essay is a critical examination of how Edmund Husserl, in his appropriation of Franz Brentano’s concept of intentionality into his phenomenology, deals with the very issues that shaped Brentano’s theory of intentionality. These issues concern the proper criterion for distinguishing mental from physical phenomena and the right explanation for the independence of the intentionality of mental phenomena from the existence or non-existence of their objects. Husserl disagrees with Brentano’s views that intentionality is the distinguishing feature of all mental phenomena (...)
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  • Husserl’s Relapse? Concerning a Fregean Challenge to Phenomenology.Wayne M. Martin - 1999 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):343-369.
    An influential interpretation of phenomenology construes Husserl's project as an attempt to generalize the Fregean notion of sense- an attempt to extend Frege's analysis of the structure of meaningful expressions to a more general account of the structure of meaning in experience . Michael Dummett has articulated a broadly Fregean critique of this Husserlian program, arguing that the project is misguided and retrograde-a relapse into the psychologism and idealism that Frege sought to avoid. A defense of Husserl is offered, based (...)
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