- Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
|
|
Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field & Bruno Jacinto - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-53.details
|
|
Who’s afraid of common knowledge?Giorgio Sbardolini - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):859-877.details
|
|
Not So Phenomenal!John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):1-43.details
|
|
Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.details
|
|
Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?David Thorstad - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):396-413.details
|
|
Epistemic Paradise Lost: Saving What We Can with Stable Support.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
|
|
Formulating Independence.David Christensen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 13-34.details
|
|
Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility.Ru Ye - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5435-5455.details
|
|
Explaining Higher-order Defeat.Marco Tiozzo - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):453-469.details
|
|
A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):685-699.details
|
|
Pro tem rationality.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):383-403.details
|
|
Normative uncertainty and probabilistic moral knowledge.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6739-6765.details
|
|
Intraspecies impermissivism.Scott Stapleford - 2018 - Episteme 16 (3):340-356.details
|
|
Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):281-294.details
|
|
An Improved Argument for Superconditionalization.Julia Staffel & Glauber De Bona - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-27.details
|
|
Moral Knowledge By Deduction.Declan Smithies - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):537-563.details
|
|
Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):393-421.details
|
|
Does rationality demand higher-order certainty?Mattias Skipper - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11561-11585.details
|
|
Bayesianism for Non-ideal Agents.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):93-115.details
|
|
Real and ideal rationality.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):879-910.details
|
|
Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
|
|
Justified group belief is evidentially responsible group belief.Paul Silva - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):262-281.details
|
|
How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
|
|
Elusive Externalism.Bernhard Salow - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):397-427.details
|
|
Fine-Tuning Should Make Us More Confident that Other Universes Exist.Bradford Saad - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1):29-44.details
|
|
Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.details
|
|
Logical ignorance and logical learning.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9991-10020.details
|
|
Permissivism and the Truth Connection.Michele Palmira - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):641-656.details
|
|
Evidence, coherence and epistemic akrasia.Ram Neta - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):313-328.details
|
|
How Imagination Informs.Joshua Myers - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
|
|
Normative Defeaters and the Alleged Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects.Giacomo Melis - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2065-2083.details
|
|
Bounded emotionality and our doxastic norms.Winnie Ma - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Cognitive diversity and the contingency of evidence.Jack C. Lyons - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-20.details
|
|
Resolutions Against Uniqueness.Kenji Lota & Ulf Hlobil - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1013–1033.details
|
|
Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):573-596.details
|
|
Ideal rationality and the relation between propositional and doxastic justification.Bada Kim - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-16.details
|
|
Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
|
|
You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
|
|
The Problem with Trusting Unfamiliar Faculties: Accessibilism Defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):447-471.details
|
|
Dispossessing Defeat.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):323-340.details
|
|
Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment.James Fritz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):573-587.details
|
|
Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-9.details
|
|
Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.details
|
|
Fragmentation and logical omniscience.Adam Elga & Agustín Rayo - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):716-741.details
|
|
The demon that makes us go mental: mentalism defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.details
|
|