- Moral realism, normative reasons, and rational intelligibility.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):47-69.details
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Debunking morality: Evolutionary naturalism and moral error theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):567-581.details
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Emotion, utility maximization, and ecological rationality.Yakir Levin & Itzhak Aharon - 2014 - Mind and Society 13 (2):227-245.details
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Disciplined syntacticism and moral expressivism.James Lenman - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):32–57.details
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Zombies Incorporated.Olof Leffler - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):640-659.details
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Desire, Disagreement, and Corporate Mental States.Olof Leffler - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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A Reason to Know.Olof Leffler - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (3):557-575.details
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Two roles for reasons: Cause for divorce?Wooram Lee - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1993-2008.details
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In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):529-542.details
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Intentional Normativism Meets Normative Supervenience and the Because Constraint.Daniel Laurier - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):315-331.details
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Parfit, Derek. On What Matters. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 488. $45.00 .Singer, Peter, ed. Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 288. $45.00. [REVIEW]Nicholas Laskowski - 2018 - Ethics 128 (2):496-505.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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Categorical phenomenalism about sexual orientation.T. R. Whitlow & N. G. Laskowski - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):581-596.details
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Reflection and morality.Charles Larmore - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):1-28.details
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Psychopathy as moral blindness: a qualifying exploration of the blindness-analogy in psychopathy theory and research.Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (3):214-233.details
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Should Utilitarianism Be Scalar?Gerald Lang - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (1):80-95.details
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Moral Fixed Points, Rationality and the ‘Why Be Moral?’ Question.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):647-664.details
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Being realistic about motivation.Charlie Kurth - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2751-2765.details
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Psychopathy and internalism.Victor Kumar - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):318-345.details
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Moral judgment as a natural kind.Victor Kumar - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.details
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Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1135-1152.details
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Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):469-486.details
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Justifying Desires.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (3):335-349.details
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Brentano’s Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Will and Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 142 (4):529-548.details
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Aristotelian motivational externalism.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):419-442.details
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Moral Sensitivity and Desire Attachment: In What Sense are they Constituents of One’s Rational Profile? [REVIEW]Aristophanes Koutoungos - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (2):125-145.details
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Moral coherence, moral worth and explanations of moral motivation.Aristophanes Koutoungos - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (3):59-79.details
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Agency and Self‐Sufficiency in Fichte's Ethics.Michelle Kosch - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):348-380.details
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The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.Jason Konek & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):69-107.details
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.details
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How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.details
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The ordinary concept of valuing.Joshua Knobe & Erica Roedder - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals. pp. 131-147.details
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Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Knobe, Wesley Buckwalter, Shaun Nichols, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian & Tamler Sommers - 2012 - Annual Review of Psychology 63 (1):81-99.details
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Why Be a Subjectivist about Wellbeing?Peter Königs - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):165-179.details
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Moral Rationalism and Moral Motivation.Justin Klocksiem - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):123-136.details
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Against reductive ethical naturalism.Justin Klocksiem - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):1991-2010.details
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The phenomenology of propositional attitudes.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):445-462.details
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Why ultra-externalism goes too far.R. Kirk - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):73-79.details
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Presumptuous aim attribution, conformity, and the ethics of artificial social cognition.Owen C. King - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 22 (1):25-37.details
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Acquaintance, singular thought and propositional constituency.Jeffrey C. King - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):543-560.details
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Rethinking Right: Moral Epistemology in Management Research.Tae Wan Kim & Thomas Donaldson - 2018 - Journal of Business Ethics 148 (1):5-20.details
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Reason and Moral Motivation in Mòzǐ.Myeong-Seok Kim - 2021 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 20 (2):179-205.details
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You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.details
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"Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent.Benjamin Kiesewitter - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.details
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Quasi Indexicals.Justin Khoo - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):26-53.details
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Expressivism, Subjectivism and Moral Disagreement.Sebastian Köhler - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):71-78.details
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Expressivism and Mind-Dependence.Sebastian Köhler - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (6):750-764.details
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Frog and Toad lose control.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63-73.details
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Do psychopaths really threaten moral rationalism?Jeanette Kennett - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):69 – 82.details
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