- Richard Joyce's new objections to the divine command theory.Scott Hill - 2010 - Journal of Religious Ethics 38 (1):189-196.details
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Reasons for Action.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):407-427.details
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Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons.Amelia Hicks - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):765-789.details
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Reasons for actions and desires.Ulrike Heuer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):43–63.details
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Making Sense of Animal Disenhancement.Adam Henschke - 2012 - NanoEthics 6 (1):55-64.details
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Which Desires Are Relevant to Well‐Being?Chris Heathwood - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):664-688.details
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Simulation and cognitive penetrability.Jane Heal - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.details
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The guise of the good and the problem of partiality.Allan Hazlett - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):851-872.details
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Silencing, Psychological Conflict, and the Distinction Between Virtue and Self-Control.Matthew C. Haug - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):93-114.details
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Moral supervenience.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):592-615.details
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Moral Disagreement and Arational Convergence.Patrick Hassan - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (2):145-161.details
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Disentangling Normativity and Ethics.Binesh Hass & Dominic Wilkinson - 2023 - American Journal of Bioethics 23 (12):29-31.details
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Obligation and Regret When There is No Fact of the Matter About What Would Have Happened if You Had not Done What You Did.Caspar Hare - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):190 - 206.details
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Morality, Inescapable Rational Authority, and a God's Wishes.Gerald K. Harrison - 2015 - Journal of Religious Ethics 43 (3):454-474.details
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Cognitivism, non-cognitivism, and skepticism about folk psychology.James Harold - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):165 - 185.details
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Conceptual analysis as armchair psychology: in defense of methodological naturalism.Daniel F. Hartner - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):921-937.details
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A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):21--35.details
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Do We Love For Reasons?Yongming Han - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):106-126.details
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Intention and the authority of avowals.Andy Hamilton - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):23 – 37.details
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„Besser, nicht geboren zu sein“ Ist es rational, die eigene Existenz zu bedauern?Oliver Hallich - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 5 (2):179-212.details
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Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.details
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Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.details
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Can hierarchical predictive coding explain binocular rivalry?Julia Haas - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):424-444.details
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Legal Facts and Reasons for Action: Between Deflationary and Robust Conceptions of Law’s Reason-Giving Capacity.Noam Gur - 2019 - In Frederick Schauer, Christoph Bezemek & Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac (eds.), The Normative Force of the Factual: Legal Philosophy Between is and Ought. Springer Verlag. pp. 151-170.details
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Action explanations are not inherently normative.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):60-78.details
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Normative reasons as good bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.details
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Moral concepts and motivation.Mark Greenberg - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):137-164.details
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Functionalism about possible worlds.Dominic Gregory - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):95 – 115.details
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Changing Direction on Direction of Fit.Alex Gregory - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):603-614.details
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A very good reason to reject the buck-passing account.Alex Gregory - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):287-303.details
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Voting and motivation.K. Graham - 1996 - Analysis 56 (3):184-190.details
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Towards a Cognitive Scientific Vindication of Moral Realism: The Semantic Argument.Abraham D. Graber - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1059-1069.details
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The psychology of meta-ethics: Exploring objectivism.Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley - 2008 - Cognition 106 (3):1339-1366.details
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The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy. [REVIEW]Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):161-188.details
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Interlocking content and attitude: a reply to the anti-normativist.Javier González de Prado & Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (10):1051-1072.details
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The good's magnetism and ethical realism.Irwin Goldstein - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):1-14.details
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Loss of Affect in Intellectual Activity.Peter Goldie - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):122-126.details
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Is Moral Motivation Rationally Required?Alan H. Goldman - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):1-16.details
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Moral rationalism vs. moral sentimentalism: Is morality more like math or beauty?Michael B. Gill - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):16–30.details
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Indeterminacy and variability in meta-ethics.Michael B. Gill - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):215-234.details
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You gotta do what you gotta do.John Gibbons - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):157-177.details
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Things That Make Things Reasonable.John Gibbons - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):335-361.details
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Wittgenstein, Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-21.details
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Two Concepts of Rationality.Joshua Gert - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):367-398.details
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Revenge is sweet.Joshua Gert - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):971-986.details
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Requiring and justifying: Two dimensions of normative strength. [REVIEW]Joshua Gert - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (1):5 - 36.details
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Parity, Preference and Puzzlement.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Theoria 81 (3):249-271.details
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Lenman on externalism and amoralism: An interplanetary exploration.Joshua Gert & Alfred Mele - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):275-283.details
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Internalism and Hyperexternalism About Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):15-34.details
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Introduction: Is cognitive penetrability the mark of the moral?Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):3 – 12.details
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