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Bayesian Epistemology.Jürgen Landes - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-7.details
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How to expect a surprising exam.Brian Kim & Anubav Vasudevan - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3101-3133.details
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Structural Inference from Conditional Knowledge Bases.Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Christian Eichhorn - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):751-769.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?Franz Huber - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):81-110.details
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Why follow the royal rule?Franz Huber - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
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New foundations for counterfactuals.Franz Huber - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.details
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For True Conditionalizers Weisberg’s Paradox is a False Alarm.Franz Huber - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):111-119.details
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Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.details
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JuDAS: a theory of rational belief revision.Gordian Haas - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5027-5050.details
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Four Ways in Which Theories of Belief Revision Could Benefit from Theories of Epistemic Justification.Gordian Haas - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):295-316.details
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Scientific Theories as Bayesian Nets: Structure and Evidence Sensitivity.Patrick Grim, Frank Seidl, Calum McNamara, Hinton E. Rago, Isabell N. Astor, Caroline Diaso & Peter Ryner - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):42-69.details
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Epistemic logic meets epistemic game theory: a comparison between multi-agent Kripke models and type spaces.Paolo Galeazzi & Emiliano Lorini - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2097-2127.details
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Knowability as potential knowledge.André Fuhrmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1627-1648.details
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Justification and gradability.Davide Fassio & Artūrs Logins - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2051-2077.details
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Impossible worlds and partial belief.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3433-3458.details
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Philosophical Methods Under Scrutiny: Introduction to the Special Issue "Philosophical Methods".Anna-Maria A. Eder, Insa Lawler & Raphael van Riel - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):915-923.details
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No Match Point for the Permissibility Account.Anna-Maria Asunta Eder - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):657-673.details
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The Strength of Desires: A Logical Approach.Didier Dubois, Emiliano Lorini & Henri Prade - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):199-231.details
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Categorical versus graded beliefs.Franz Dietrich - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 18.details
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Inductive Logic.Vincenzo Crupi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):641-650.details
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Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.Matteo Colombo, Lee Elkin & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):185-220.details
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Bayesian Cognitive Science, Monopoly, and Neglected Frameworks.Matteo Colombo & Stephan Hartmann - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):451–484.details
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Getting Accurate about Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):158-191.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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Big Systems Versus Stocky Tangles: It Can Matter to the Details.Nancy Cartwright - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (1):3-19.details
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Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision.Georg Brun & Hans Rott - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4041-4063.details
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Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.details
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Infinitism and probabilistic justification.Benjamin Bewersdorf - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):691-699.details
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Truth in Evidence and Truth in Arguments without Logical Omniscience.Gregor Betz - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1117-1137.details
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What Makes Something Surprising?Dan Baras & Oded Na’Aman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):195-215.details
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Varieties of Justification—How (Not) to Solve the Problem of Induction.Marius Backmann - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):235-255.details
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Explicating the Concept of Epistemic Rationality.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - Synthese (1-2):1-26.details
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Reasoning Studies. From Single Norms to Individual Differences.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Freiburgdetails
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Better Foundations for Subjective Probability.Sven Neth - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Pluralists about Pluralism? Versions of Explanatory Pluralism in Psychiatry.Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In M. C. Galavotti, D. Dieks, W. J. Gonzalez, S. Hartmann, Th Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science (The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Series). Springer. pp. 105-119.details
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Ranking Theory.Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Niels Skovgaard-Olsen & Wolfgang Spohn - 2021 - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), The Handbook of Rationality. pp. 337-345.details
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Ceteris Paribus Laws.Alexander Reutlinger, Gerhard Schurz, Andreas Hüttemann & Siegfried Jaag - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Bayes Nets and Rationality.Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - In The Handbook of Rationality. Boston, Massachusetts, USA:details
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Making Ranking Theory Useful for Psychology of Reasoning.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Konstanzdetails
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Putting Inferentialism and the Suppositional Theory of Conditionals to the Test.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Freiburgdetails
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Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.details
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Safe Contraction Revisited.Hans Rott & Sven Ove Hansson - 2014 - In Sven Ove Hansson (ed.), David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems (Outstanding Contributions to Logic, Vol. 3). Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 35–70.details
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Conditionals, Individual Variation, and the Scorekeeping Task.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, David Kellen, Ulrike Hahn & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2017 - Proceedings of Cognitive Science 39:xxx.details
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Conditionals, Causal Claims and Objectivity.Michał Sikorski - 2020 - Dissertation, Università di Torinodetails
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Don't Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis.Roland Bluhm - 2013 - In Migue Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 7-15.details
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Two Problems with the Socio-Relational Critique of Distributive Egalitarianism.Christian Seidel - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. Duisburg-Essen: DuEPublico. pp. 525-535.details
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The Veritistic Merit of Doxastic Conservatism in Belief Revision.Gregor Betz - unknowndetails
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